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3 October 1979

USSR REPORT

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No. 2, Apr-May-Jun 1979

Translation of the Russian-language journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, published quarterly in Moscow.

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IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF SOVIET SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 3-10

[Text] "The Marxists have always believed that the development of national production lies at the basis of social progress. But this does not in any sense mean that the resolution of other important social and political problems can be relegated to a position of secondary importance. All aspects of communist construction are closely interrelated. It is a well-known fact that the attainment of sociopolitical objectives depends on economic achievements. In turn, economic development depends largely on the degree of success with which sociopolitical problems are solved."¹

These meaningful words by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, reflect one of the major tendencies in the mature socialist society--the comprehensive and harmonious nature of its development. The quick and efficient resolution of all problems facing this society during each stage of communist construction gives rise to new and powerful stimuli for the socioeconomic and cultural progress of the nation, whereas a lag in even one facet of social development considerably reduces the speed and effectiveness with which other problems are solved.

At the present time, sociodemographic factors are acquiring increasing significance in the development of Soviet society: population reproduction, its distribution over the vast expanses of our nation, the control of migration processes and the training of the younger generation for labor, sociopolitical activity and the performance of civic duties specified in the Constitution of the USSR.

The family plays an important role in the formation of all these factors. In his speech at the All-Union Teachers Congress on 4 July 1968, L. I. Brezhnev made the following comment: "In 'Das Kapital,' Marx defined the communist society by stating that its highest goal would be the development of the human personality. This would be harmonious development, in which physical perfection would be combined with a high educational level; broad cultural interests would be combined with industry; noble moral qualities

would be combined with a sense of civic duty. The basis for this kind of personality development is laid in childhood, in the family and the schools."²

The family not only lies at the basis of human existence, but also of human personality development, and this means that, the more solid and morally mature marital and family relations become, the more fully the potential of the subjective factor of the developed socialist society will be revealed.

The Soviet family, which has come into being as a result of socialist reforms in the sociopolitical order, economy and culture, now personifies the highest values of communist humanism: love, mutual respect and mutual assistance between men and women and between the older and younger generations, and a heightened sense of responsibility for the health and upbringing of children. "The family is under the protection of the state," the Constitution of the USSR declares. "Marriage is based on the voluntary consent of men and women; the spouses are completely equal in family relations (art 53).

Even though marital and family relations have developed under the influence of the economic, social and cultural progress of Soviet society, they are also being influenced by several factors unconnected with the essence of socialism as a socioeconomic order. The family was most severely damaged by the after-effects of the war, the great losses in the male population, the destruction of a considerable portion of total available housing, and economic difficulties. These difficulties are already behind us, but the negative behavioral stereotypes they engendered are still apparent in the thoughts and actions of some people. A certain degree of inertia in the individual consciousness and its tendency to lag behind current reality are displayed to the maximum in family and personal life because this sphere is least subject to social regulation and control. The ensuing situation, which is not conducive to enhanced family stability, has been aggravated by insufficient concern for the need to reinforce the psychogenetic and moral bases of relations between the sexes on the part of public health and education agencies, and by the fact that labor collectives and public organizations often limit their indoctrinational work to the production framework without really entering into the everyday habits, leisure pursuits and family life of individuals.

The scientific and technical revolution has introduced substantial changes into interpersonal communication, social regulation, social control and the very structure of the personality, its aims, inclinations and expectations. Scientific studies of the nature and tendencies of these changes and their effect on marriage, the family and the upbringing of children, however, are hardly comprehensive as yet, and this has indisputably influenced the effectiveness of social efforts to ensure the stability of the family and augment its role in the development of the younger generation.

All of this has led to the accumulation of unsolved problems, difficulties and conflicts in the sphere of marital and family relations and has reinforced some negative tendencies in this sphere.

In recent years, there has been a considerable rise in the number of persons of marriageable age who have not taken part in registered--that is, socially sanctioned--marriages, and, consequently, a rise in the number of single-parent families. These are usually families consisting only of a mother and child; this, in itself, is enough to substantially deteriorate the conditions for the primary socialization of children, which requires the influence of both parents.

Public concern is also being aroused by the steady decline in quantitative and qualitative indicators of the birth rate in several regions, as well as the decline in the effectiveness of family upbringing, which is being reflected in a slower decrease than expected in the crime rate and cases of "deviant behavior" among minors.

One of the main reasons for these conflicts is the increase in the absolute and relative number of divorces, particularly in large cities and urbanized parts of the nation. Marriages frequently disintegrate during the first year, which attests, on the one hand, to the moral immaturity of a certain segment of the younger generation and the fact that these people are unprepared to fulfill the high civic obligations connected with marriage, fatherhood and motherhood, and, on the other, to the fact that young people who have just started their own families are not receiving enough assistance and support from labor collectives and public organizations. Moreover, there is a view which excuses this indifference to the needs of the family by virtue of the fact that marriage and birth and upbringing of children are, according to the proponents of this view, a purely personal affair that only concerns the individuals directly involved.

It is true that personal relations are not identical to the relations, for example, in a labor collective. Marxism-Leninism, however, has always stressed the profound social meaning and public significance of marriage and the family. "Love," V. I. Lenin said, "involves two people and gives rise to a third and new being. This makes it a matter of public interest and engenders duties with respect to the group."³ In view of the fact that duty presupposes reciprocal responsibility, the group, public organizations and society as a whole are also far from indifferent to the way in which the family takes shape and develops and the effectiveness with which it performs its social functions, particularly the most important of these--population reproduction, bearing in mind its qualitative aspect as well as the quantitative one--not only the physical birth, but also the social and spiritual evolution of the new generation.

Concern for the upbringing of children, for their preparation for socially useful activity and for their maturation into worthy members of the socialist society represents one of the major constitutional obligations of Soviet citizens. For this reason, party organizations and prominent representatives of the Soviet public have conducted several successful social experiments in recent years for the purpose of testing scientific recommendations aimed at the better preparation of young people for marriage and the strengthening of

the family. These initiatives have included the organization of consultations on marital and family affairs in Leningrad and Vil'nyus; the establishment of a system of parent education, first in Gor'kiy and then in several other cities; the development and testing of programs for the preparation of young people for marriage in progressive schools and vocational and technical institutes; the organization of parties "for those over 30" at many clubs and cultural centers; the institution of other measures to help single people meet one another and communicate; the publication of a special journal in the Lithuanian SSR, SEM'YA, in which "matchmaking service" notices are regularly printed in addition to news articles; and so forth.

In Moscow, at the initiative and under the supervision of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, a comprehensive program of measures has been drawn up and is being carried out "for the all-round simplification of women's labor in production and in the home. Much has been done to guarantee more favorable conditions for the upbringing of children and the protection of motherhood."⁴ The experience accumulated as a result of all this will now make it possible to proceed to more thoroughly planned work for the purpose of assisting the family during all stages of its establishment and development on the nationwide scale. The self-funding family service agencies, set up initially in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Vil'nyus and Tallin and then in other cities, are expected to offer the following services:

Consultations on aspects of family relations (ethical, psychological, medical, genetic, educational, legal and so forth) for individuals who are preparing for marriage or are already married;

Matchmaking services for single people who wish to start a family;

Various types of work with the public, particularly youth, to acquaint people with the fundamentals of family life and its ethical, psychological, educational, medical, genetic, sexual and other problems.

In the interest of fundamental improvement in the preparation of young people for marriage, schools and vocational and technical institutes plan to offer special classes in the ethnical and psychological aspects of relations between the sexes, sexual hygiene and family law and to include these subjects in the curricula of social science, literature, biology and other courses.

Work has been instituted on a much broader scale to propagandize the standards of relations between the sexes and the socialist system of values with respect to personal life, marriage and the family through cultural universities, Znaniye Society lecture series, television, radio, periodicals and popular science publications.

The resolution of this entire group of problems will necessitate the training of more personnel in these fields in psychology departments and pedagogical and medical VUZ's; a major in this particular field should be envisaged when sociological education is introduced. Sociologists will be expected to

participate in the search for optimal variations of the organization and functioning of family service agencies, in the substantiation of forms and methods of agency activity and the specific plans for this activity, in the creation of a scientific theoretical basis for widespread propaganda work in regard to the psychological aspects of sexual relations, the family and family training and, finally, in the compilation and implementation of VUZ curricula for the training of highly qualified specialists in this field.

The widespread preparations in republic and oblast party organizations for the All-Union Applied Science Conference on "The Development of an Active Position on Life: Experience and Current Problems in Moral Indoctrination" showed how much significance the Soviet society attaches to the reinforcement of the family and the elevation of birth rate and family training indicators. When these matters were discussed, several speakers stressed the need to accelerate the development and implementation of a scientifically substantiated system of moral and aesthetic training for the younger generation in the school, the family and social organizations for children and adolescents; to raise the standards of family upbringing by disseminating and improving parent educational materials; to systematically enrich and cultivate progressive family traditions and new customs and rituals connected with engagements, weddings, the birth of a child and the celebration of anniversaries; to work more intensively on the prevention of amoral and criminal behavior in relations between the sexes and family life and to inform young people more frankly about the consequences of a frivolous attitude toward sex, alcoholism and drug addiction.

Problems in the strengthening of the family, the moral education of youth and the preparation of youth for labor are organically interrelated. One of the links in this interconnected chain is the guarantee of the necessary qualitative level of generations beginning their own life and the prevention of mental retardation, imbecility, psychic disorders and other ailments that are still difficult to treat. Modern science has still not established all of the causes giving rise to these ailments, but there are three facts that might be taken into account for the purpose of considerably reducing their spread. The first involves the disclosure of cases of hereditary risks for the purpose of informing the persons with these defects of the possible consequences of their decision to bear children; this kind of preventive service, which is already being offered in many countries, is one of the ways of guarding against conflicts connected with motherhood and fatherhood and one of the conditions of conscious family planning.

Secondly, modern physiology and medicine are able, with a timely diagnosis, to neutralize to some degree the effect of factors giving rise to the danger of the anomalous development of the embryo; consequently, these scientific achievements must be incorporated in medical practice as quickly as possible. Finally, the third fact is the statistically valid established relationship between alcoholism or drug addiction in the parent and deviations from the biopsychic norm in the new-born. The existence of this relationship suggests that the moral responsibility of parents does not begin with birth, but with

conception. In turn, this conclusion should be taken into account when the degree of parental legal responsibility for protecting the physical and mental health of children is determined.

The rehabilitation of children with deviations from the mental norm and their integration into society are of exceptionally great significance for the moral indoctrination of youth and the maximally effective utilization of each individual.

Experiments in teaching these children in schools of the conventional type have produced primarily negative results and, for this reason, more expedient solutions to the problem must be found within the framework of a comprehensive interdepartmental program for improving the quality of the population.

Social mechanisms for the stimulation of the birth rate should probably be adjusted in such a way that society will not receive a maximum of children from a minimum of families, but two or three children from each physically and morally healthy family. Various forms of material incentive for the birth rate have been employed in different countries: grants paid to parents upon the birth of a child, systematic raises in the salaries of fathers or mothers and, finally, supplements to old-age pensions. In the last case, the qualitative as well as the quantitative indicators of the individual's fulfillment of parental obligations can be taken into account: the way in which the family brought up children and the degree to which it instilled children with civic virtues. Without an in-depth and comprehensive study of this topic, it would be difficult to determine the particular combination of these forms that might stimulate the birth rate most effectively; what is more, it is essential that this study also include a thorough analysis of what the other socialist states have done and are doing in this area.

In addition to cultural, ideological and legal factors, the level of consumer services and the existence of opportunities to combine professional and family obligations have a substantial effect on the strength and social capability of the family. These problems are particularly urgent for working mothers, who, according to the data of numerous sociological studies, are still investing much more time and energy than their husbands in housework.

Our sociologists still do not have any direct empirical proof of the negative effects of this kind of division of housework on the strength of marriage, the birth rate, the upbringing of children and the professional careers of women. On the basis of statistical data, however, some researchers have hypothesized that, given the current state of consumer services, the level of women's professional employment in different regions is generally directly related to the divorce rate and is inversely proportional to the relative number of births per family. As for the effects of the woman's double workload on family upbringing, these should be determined primarily from the standpoint of a fact established by science long ago--the tremendous importance of contact between the child--particularly in infancy--and

the mother for the development of his mind, intellect and verbal skills and the equally tremendous importance of childhood in the development of the human personality.

The Great October Socialist Revolution marked the beginning of an exceedingly profound qualitative reversal in the status of women and, consequently, in marital and family relations. The permanent worldwide historic significance of the experience of the USSR, which actually liberated women from all types of oppression and dependence, and the unprecedented increase in their career and social activity and rise in their educational and cultural levels are no longer being denied even by socialism's opponents.

These grand social advances are reinforced in the Constitution of the USSR, which not only declares the complete equality of men and women, but also envisages a system of guarantees of this equality: the provision of women with equal opportunities in the acquisition of an education and professional training, in labor, salaries and promotions, and in sociopolitical and cultural activity, as well as special labor safety and health protection measures for women; legal protection and financial and moral support for mothers and children, including paid leaves and other benefits for pregnant women and mothers; government assistance for single mothers.

Questions connected with the equality of women have always occupied a prominent place in the economic and legal sciences and in history, ethnography, philosophy and sociology. When this matter is being studied, however, little attention is focused on analyses of the difficulties and conflicts involved in the processes of the inclusion of women in national production, their sociopolitical and cultural growth, the search for optimal ways of combining their professional and family roles, and the compilation of forecasts and practical recommendations pertaining to specific ways of combining the achievements of the technological revolution with the advantages of socialism in this area. These problems are not being investigated adequately in social psychology either, even though the scientific and technical revolution and the new socioeconomic, legal and moral status of women under the conditions of socialism have a considerable effect on the woman's mind and all facets of her behavior. As yet, discussions of the nature of these changes are going on primarily on the level of everyday conversation rather than on the level of scientific awareness. In view of the fact that articles on this topic arouse particularly lively interest in the reading public and are eagerly published in mass periodicals, the possibility of disseminating accurate information coexists with the possibility of spreading ideas that only confuse the issue.

Sociopsychological studies of the personality of the contemporary Soviet woman, her ideals, her ambitions and the motives for her behavior would enrich both literary and artistic creativity and the theory (and, consequently, the practice) of indoctrination, but their chief merit would consist in their reinforcement of the scientific basis of such important areas of family services as the work being done to prepare young people for marriage, help spouses overcome conflicts within the family, and forecast the

compatibility of people who wish to start a family and, consequently, the stability of the resulting family.

In the socialist society, marital and family relations are regulated with the aid of moral standards, the law, public opinion and social control.

The economic stimulation of marriage, the birth rate and family training are also of great significance in the socialist society, particularly during the initial stage, when the family is just beginning to take shape and embark on a new life. But we still have only an extremely limited amount of scientific information in regard to the effectiveness of various aspects of demographic policy, the functioning of existing moral and legal norms, the reaction of public opinion to the changes taking place in the status of women and relations between the sexes, the interaction of various types of social control and individual behavior, and the possibility of augmenting the role of public institutions and labor collectives in the regulation of demographic processes. All of these problems must be investigated by sociologists and by scientists directly engaged in the study of the economic mechanisms of society, the law, morality, communication and indoctrination. The main point is that not one of these problems can be totally and completely solved by any particular science. In other words, the maximum theoretical and practical impact of scientific studies of marriage, the family, sexual and reproductive behavior, forms and methods of more active demographic policy-making, and stronger public assistance for families can only be achieved through the closest possible interaction by the sciences, including sciences concerned with the physiological and genetic aspects of population reproduction. In connection with this, the USSR Council of Ministers has recognized the need to organize a scientific council on family affairs as part of the USSR Academy of Sciences, with participation by representatives of the ministries of education, higher education, health and justice, state committees for vocational and technical education and labor, the AUCCTU and several other institutions and organizations whose activity is in some way related to marital and family relations and the birth rate.

The scientific council will be responsible for the following:

Coordinating scientific studies of family problems conducted in the nation;

Drawing up a unified program of scientific research for the 5-year period and the long range;

Conducting a comprehensive analysis of research findings;

Studying the causes of family conflicts and divorce and the means of their eradication;

Preparing papers and proposals pertaining to ways of strengthening the family for government agencies.

The constant attention given to problems in family development and the higher status of women by the CPSU Central Committee, which has stressed the need for an effective demographic policy, the creation of family service agencies and a scientific council on family affairs, the intensification and improvement of work to propagandize the standards and values of the developed socialist society in the sphere of relations between the sexes and between the older and younger generations, will require that Soviet sociologists, particularly the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Sociological Association, conduct research on a much broader scale in this increasingly important area of social life, systematically improve the quality of scientific work and reinforce its connection with practice.

Studies of the family, the birth rate and indoctrination are now being conducted by several large scientific centers and a number of small subdivisions, many of which are publicly operated. The theoretical and practical impact of this research could be enhanced considerably if these studies were to be conducted according to unified programs; this, in turn, would necessitate further improvement in the coordination of scientific activity and resolution of the long-ignored problem of the professional training and advanced training of sociologists.

This problem is becoming increasingly urgent in connection with the fact that sociological methods for the collection and analysis of empirical materials are now being used more and more widely in the other social sciences and in the activities of party, soviet, trade-union and Komsomol organizations.

The combined efforts of the public, party and state organs and scientists have laid the basis for the tremendous and exceptionally important job of setting up a nationwide network of family service agencies to offer qualified assistance to Soviet citizens in overcoming the difficulties and conflicts they encounter while they are exercising their right to personal happiness, fatherhood and motherhood.

The socialist order provides the most favorable opportunities for each Soviet person to enjoy this right to the fullest.

The need to promote the maximum realization of these opportunities and take the most active part in elaborating the scientific bases of the demographic policy of the developed socialist society is one of the most important, crucial and humanist problems ever encountered by Soviet sociological science.

FOOTNOTES

1. Brezhnev, L. I., "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Current Issues in CPSU Ideological Work], Moscow, 1978, vol I, p 139.

2. Ibid., p 210.
3. "Vospominaniya o V. I. Lenine" [Memories of V. I. Lenin], vol V, Moscow, 1970, p 45.
4. Grishin, V. V., "Selfless labor Is the Basis of Our Successes," PRAVDA, 15 February 1979.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOSCOW

MUSCOVITES' STRUGGLE TO TRANSFORM THE CAPITAL INTO A MODEL COMMUNIST CITY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian, No 2 Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 11-20

[Article by Igor' Nikolayevich Ponomarev, secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government display constant concern for Moscow, the development of its industry, transportation, trade and municipal economy, the welfare and culture of the Muscovites and the improvement of their working, living, educational and leisure conditions. Vivid proof of this concern can be seen in the objective, set by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, of transforming Moscow into a model communist city and in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, adopted in 1971, "On the General Plan for the Development of the City of Moscow."

The attainment of this objective is an organic part of Communist Party policy on the development of Soviet society, which is aimed at the constant elevation of the material and cultural standard of living of the population through the dynamic and proportional development of national production, the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, the augmentation of labor productivity and maximum improvement in the quality of work in all areas of the national economy.

The Muscovites are responding to the concern of the party and government with intensive labor, ensuring the fulfillment and overfulfillment of production plans and socialist commitments in all branches of the national economy in the capital, and are constantly augmenting their contribution to the cause of socialist construction. Just before the new year began, workers in the capital informed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, that more than 400,000 workers at enterprises and organizations in the city had fulfilled the assignments for 3 or more years of the five-year plan and that several thousand leading workers in production had fulfilled

their own personal five-year plans by 7 October 1978--the first anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution of the USSR.

During the time that has elapsed since the 24th CPSU Congress, communists and all workers have done much to implement the party's objective of turning Moscow into a model communist city. A plan of concrete measures in all of the basic areas of Moscow's socioeconomic development during the 1976-1990 period was examined in detail and adopted at a plenum of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom (March 1975). On the basis of a scientific approach, this program sets forth the guidelines for the comprehensive development of the capital, its industry and transportation, construction and municipal economy, service sphere, science and education, the improvement of communist indoctrination for the workers, the regulation of population size, the more effective use of labor resources and city territory and the resolution of several other socioeconomic problems.

The Moscow party organization is striving to encourage large segments of the working public to take part in the campaign to transform Moscow into a model communist city. Practical matters connected with the attainment of this objective are regularly discussed at plenums and bureau meetings of the gorkom and CPSU raykoms, meetings of the party, soviet and administrative aktiv and primary party, trade-union and Komsomol organizations. A standing commission has been set up as part of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom to deal with the socioeconomic problems of the city's development. It is headed by Comrade V. V. Grishin, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom. Other members of the commission include party and soviet workers, prominent scientists, leading production workers and administrators of organizations and enterprises in the city.

At a meeting of the active membership, held to discuss the organizational and mass political work of party, soviet, trade-union and Komsomol organizations in the capital to assist in the implementation of the objective, set forth at the 24th CPSU Congress, of turning Moscow into a model communist city, speakers stressed that the model communist city is a highly organized city in which the great ideals of communism are most fully and consistently implemented.

This kind of city should have the following distinctive features: all-round development of productive forces on the basis of scientific and technical progress, improvement in the organization and structure of the national economy, the creation of comfortable conditions for public life, a high level of organization in labor, personal life and leisure pursuits, a high level of awareness, discipline and orderliness on the part of all inhabitants of the city, their fidelity to the public interest, the fullest possible satisfaction of the varied material and cultural demands of citizens and the flourishing and complete disclosure of the capabilities and best moral qualities of individuals.

The capital's total image must be distinguished by high cultural standards, reflecting the best achievements of contemporary city planning and architecture. This will entail the expert planning and lay-out of highways, public squares and blocks, modern architecture in the spirit of our era, a constantly rising level of convenience and sanitary and hygienic conditions and the exemplary organization of the entire municipal economy, trade, public catering, consumer services, medical services and recreational facilities for the workers.

Moscow cannot become a model communist city without exemplary enterprises, establishments, academic institutions, consumer services, architecture, residential buildings, blocks, streets and neighborhoods. It is important that each labor collective and each organization in the city vigorously pursue this goal. In connection with this, basic requirements have been worked out and adopted for the exemplary enterprise in industry, transportation and communications, scientific and cultural establishments, consumer services, public education and public health and the exemplary neighborhood and residential building. These requirements envisage the achievement of several social indicators. For example, for enterprises in industry, transportation and communications, they include, in addition to the unconditional fulfillment of plan assignments, a rise in the technical level of production and a reduction in labor and material expenditures, such indicators as stronger labor discipline, advanced training for the workers, a rise in their political and general educational levels, the involvement of workers in production management and several others.

The experience of enterprises and organizations which have earned the title of exemplary establishments, V. V. Grishin said in his speech at the meeting of the aktiv, indicates that a comprehensive approach to the resolution of these problems, based on plans for the socioeconomic development of collectives, will bring success. The principal, deciding condition for success, however, will be the involvement of each member of the labor collective in the struggle to achieve exemplary indicators, which will be ensured by well-planned organizational and political work.

Many of the socioeconomic problems now facing labor collectives in the capital should be solved on the level of individual enterprises and on the citywide level. Above all, this applies to the problem of labor resources. In recent years, some of the branches of the national economy in Moscow, particularly the service sphere, have experienced a manpower shortage due to unfavorable demographic processes and some shortcomings in planning work. The latter essentially consist in the failure of some ministries and departments to take the number of workers into account when they are planning the development of enterprises and organizations. Each year new administrative and project planning establishments are opened in Moscow, and their personnel staffs are naturally made up of individuals who formerly worked at industrial, motor transport and construction enterprises and other organizations in the city.

The chief way of providing the complex multisectorial economy of the capital with sufficient manpower will entail a rise in labor productivity levels as a result of intensive remodeling and technical re-equipping and the widespread incorporation of automation, mechanization and progressive technology. Reserve opportunities are still relatively substantial in this field, as the technical equipment of several industrial and construction enterprises consists mainly of obsolete pieces. The percentage of workers in industry and construction who are engaged in the performance of manual operations is still high.

There are also some reserves which will not require capital expenditures. These include the reduction of losses of working time in connection with idle time, unauthorized absences and short leaves authorized by the administration. The losses arising from these causes are equivalent to the labor of 10,000 additional workers in industry and more than 2,000 in construction each year.

The shortage of manpower and the shortcomings in the planning and utilization of labor resources are also having a negative effect on personnel turnover, which, in turn, is complicating the resolution of this problem.

Public personnel divisions are now operating at almost all of the large enterprises in Moscow. They examine all notices of resignation, determine the reasons for job dissatisfaction and take steps to eliminate them, if possible. Experience has shown that public personnel offices are able to prevent an average of around 14 percent of all resignations (and even a much higher percentage at some enterprises) by means of the efficient use of internal (within the enterprise framework) personnel transfers. But these offices are now operating without the necessary scientific basis, which cannot be established without thorough and comprehensive sociological analysis.

The improvement of labor norms represents an important manpower reserve. The prevailing type of labor standard in industry and construction is the experimental statistical norm, which is virtually never changed. The average fulfillment of norms by piece-rate workers is around 150 percent, which does not motivate them to make more productive use of working time. Some experience has been accumulated in the nation in the revision of norms with worker participation. Unfortunately, this experience has not been disseminated intensively enough as yet. Obviously, this calls for special studies to demonstrate the way in which norming work might be improved and the psychological barriers created by intensive norms might be overcome.

Given the present balance of labor resources, it is important to encourage retired individuals and housewives to take jobs in the national economy. When 100,500 pensioners were polled by the administration for the utilization of labor resources, in conjunction with the Moscow Main Housing Administration and the city social security department, 9,600 expressed a desire to work. The involvement of housewives and mothers in the sphere of

national production will necessitate, on the one hand, systematic improvement in consumer services and the work of pre-school establishments and, on the other, the creation of a more flexible system for the utilization of the labor of pensioners and women, including part-time jobs and, if possible, entire shops, enterprises and establishments operating on a part-time basis, work in the home, etc. Obviously, all of these ideas will require the proper sociological, economic and legal substantiation.

Young people naturally represent the main source of additional manpower for the national economy in Moscow. In recent years, more attention has been given to the vocational guidance of students and the organized job placement of graduates of secondary general educational schools. At present, skilled workers are being trained at 137 vocational and technical day institutes and 20 technical schools of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Vocational and Technical Education, 21 departmental institutes, 32 academic combines, 829 academic centers and classes and 232 academic shops and technical laboratories. By 1980 the system of vocational and technical education will essentially have completed the transition to the training of skilled workers in vocational and technical institutes and technical schools offering a secondary education. In all, during the current 5-year period, 900,000 skilled workers will be trained in Moscow.

We know that the effective utilization of manpower depends largely on the degree to which the work performed by an individual corresponds to his interests and his psychophysiological and sociopsychological characteristics. As some studies have shown, the labor productivity level of workers whose abilities correspond to the requirements of their profession is 20-30 percent higher on the average than that of workers who are still trying to find their place in the professional structure of the production sphere. In the first of these groups, the level of job satisfaction is higher and there is less desire to change professions. In view of this fact, as well as of the scales of personnel training in Moscow, more extensive research in the area of vocational guidance and job placement services would now be of great significance.

In view of the fact that the problem of vocational guidance progresses far beyond economic bounds as the technological revolution develops and is acquiring increasing moral and indoctrinational significance, the objective now should not be merely the labor indoctrination of adolescents, but their involvement, in one form or another, in work that is within their powers but is systematically productive.

Under present conditions, the development of Moscow's production and economic potential will depend on an entire set of objective and subjective factors. Consequently, organization and control are now acquiring increasing significance in this development.

In his speech at the November (1978) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out the need to raise the work of planning and economic

agencies to the level of the high demands made by the party's aim of resolving crucial economic problems, which "attaches primary significance to questions of an administrative and organizational nature."¹

Guided by the decisions of the November CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the city party organization is focusing its attention on the need to improve the planning of the capital's economic and social development. The plan for 1979 is based on a more reliable normative foundation, several important problems were solved with the aid of computers, and balance estimates were further developed, particularly those pertaining to capital construction and labor resources. The plan is more comprehensive and now encompasses all of the processes involved in national economic development. At the same time, the need to accelerate the transfer of the entire municipal economy to the track of intensive development will require that scientists systematically enhance the practical effectiveness of their studies by focusing their attention on major and cardinal problems, one of which is the problem of augmenting the role of social and moral factors in the realization of the tremendous possibilities of developed socialism.

A great deal of work is being performed in the city to improve the existing system of indicators used in planning and evaluating the work of labor collectives and summing up the results of competition between collectives. The evaluation of several enterprises is based on the indicator of "conditional net output." Experience has shown that the use of this indicator motivates labor collectives to reduce material expenditures and lower the cost of items. In construction, the current practice is to evaluate work on the basis of an indicator which does not reflect the volume of construction and installation operations carried out, which is expressed in terms of rubles, but the value of facilities that have been built and turned over to the client. Naturally, the introduction of new indicators will have certain social, as well as economic, consequences and will influence the labor enthusiasm of workers and their attitude toward the job. This is why this work should be carried out comprehensively, with participation by sociologists as well as economists.

It is a well-known fact that production growth in the socialist society is accomplished for the good of all the workers, and that enhanced public welfare is one of the powerful stimuli of continued progress in production.

Proceeding from this major principle of CPSU policy, the party organization of the capital is devoting increasing attention to the improvement of living conditions, particularly housing, for the Muscovites. Available housing in Moscow now amounts to around 135 million square meters of living area. More than 90 percent of the housing is located in buildings equipped with all types of communal conveniences. Of the 22.5 million square meters of new living area envisaged for the capital in the 10th Five-Year Plan, 13.5 million were completed by construction organizations during the first 3 years of the 5-year period.

Housing construction has undergone considerable quantitative changes in recent years: The new buildings have more stories and more service lines, and their utility characteristics have improved. Each year, more residential buildings of the newest types are built, with a better lay-out of apartments, differing in their architectural styles. New residential neighborhoods have come into being: Orekhovo-Borisovo, Yasenevo, Bibirevo, Otradnoye, Lianozovo and others. From 1981, all prefabricated residential construction in the city will be carried out according to plans of this type.

The better technical maintenance of available housing will depend largely on planned preventive repair, and the successful organization of this kind of repair will contribute much to the now traditional citywide inspections of the technical condition of residential buildings and local public utilities. These inspections direct the attention of the general public to such vitally important citywide issues as the preservation of residential buildings, they represent a powerful stimulus in the mobilization of the internal labor and material resources of enterprises and they are becoming an increasingly effective factor in programs for transforming the capital into a model communist city.

Each inspection represents an important stage in the preparation of residences for the winter, but the winter itself also tests the buildings--and quite harshly. Last winter, with its severe frost, necessitated improvement in the preparation of residences and fuel and power utilities for operation under winter conditions, particularly the Mosenergo heating network. Temperature and hydraulic conditions were disrupted in heating networks, and there were accidents which caused the temporary shut-down of heating systems in some regions.

A comprehensive analysis of the causes of these shortcomings indicated the need for more reliable provision of the city with heat and electricity.

One of the objectives of the inspection is to create model neighborhoods to serve as an example of healthy everyday life and cultural recreation for Soviet citizens. The model neighborhood calls for the exemplary maintenance of residential and public buildings and all of their elements, a high level of comprehensive convenience and beautification, the existence of interesting small-scale architectural forms in courtyards and the presence of well-equipped sports areas and children's playgrounds. But all of this only represents the beginning of the great job of creating the optimal conditions for the workers' life. The Moscow party organization believes that the continuation of this work will necessitate more and more sociological research and experimentation.

The growth of the city population, the considerable enlargement of developed areas in the city and the move of some inhabitants to peripheral regions have substantially increased the workload of the transport network. At present, it exceeds 31 billion passenger-kilometers a year.

During the first 3 years of the five-year plan, there was further development in the capital's freight and passenger transport system. The Moscow Main Motor Transport Administration successfully fulfilled its plan assignments pertaining to freight shipment and public service. During this period, 102.7 kilometers of trolleybus lines in the city were constructed or remodeled, 45 bus, trolleybus and streetcar routes were instituted, and 74 existing routes were lengthened. Exceptionally careful attention was given and is being given to the construction of new subway lines.

The improvement of transport operations is connected with the resolution of several problems, including some of a social nature. At a meeting of the Moscow Gorkom Commission for Socioeconomic Problems in the Development of Moscow, speakers noted that the augmentation of labor productivity in transportation would require an increase in the carrying capacity of means of transport, the simplification of work in this sphere, the lengthening of intervals between repairs, the acceleration of traffic speeds, etc. In addition, the number of violations of labor discipline is still high in transportation, and personnel turnover is particularly intensive among drivers. This often leads to a situation in which the planned number of transport means cannot be used in rush hours, there are longer intervals between vehicles, and the regularity of traffic is disrupted. For this reason, the elaboration of scientifically substantiated recommendations on the reduction of personnel turnover among drivers could be a considerable aid in overcoming one of the chief difficulties in the improvement of Moscow transport services.

Today Moscow is one of the cleanest and most attractive cities in the world. The general plan for the development of Moscow envisages several measures to improve the air in Moscow, to relocate or revamp several enterprises which present sanitation hazards, to put an end to soil and water pollution, to plant more greenery and to beautify the city in general. These measures are being successfully implemented on the whole.

During the last 5 years, 450 purification units and 60 water recycling systems began operating at city enterprises. Now all household sewage in the capital is completely purified, which has considerably improved the state of the Moscow River. The work of purifying city ponds and of filling the Moscow, Yauza, Skhodni and Setuni rivers and their flood plains is still going on.

There has been no shortage of drinking water in Moscow for a long time. The per capita supply amounts to around 700 liters of water a day, which is much higher than in the large cities of the developed capitalist nations. Nonetheless, in anticipation of Moscow's future development, the Vazuzskaya Hydraulic Engineering System imeni 60-Letiye Velikogo Oktyabrya has just been started up. Alternative plans for the construction of the Rzhevsk water engineering system are being drawn up. The Kuntsevskaya and Cherkizovskaya systems are being built and the Southeastern System of Industrial Water Supply is being enlarged to reduce industry's need for drinking water.

In order to improve the air in the capital, more than 1,200 gas purifiers and dust filters have been constructed during the last 5 years to trap or neutralize most of the harmful emissions produced by city enterprises. In particular, the quantity of trapped and neutralized substances emitted by permanent sources of pollution was 98,300 tons lower in 1978 than in 1976. Cleaner air is also being promoted by the continued development of the capital's centralized heat supply system, which now supplies the city with 99 percent of its heat, including 71.5 percent from heat and electric power stations. The conversion of industrial enterprises and public utilities to gas fuel is being continued. This will reduce the dust content of the air and lower its pollution with oxides to the minimum level.

One of the main causes of air pollution is motor transport. The concentration of carbon monoxide has increased noticeably on some highways during the last 5 years; this is connected with the considerable growth of the motor pool and the number of privately owned vehicles. In order to reduce the negative effect of these processes, intensive work is being performed at automotive enterprises to improve the quality of engine repairs and operation, strict controls are being imposed on the content of harmful substances in automobile exhaust, and more propane-powered vehicles and electromobiles are being used. The State Motor Vehicle Inspection Agency is also working on the stricter enforcement of norms and standards of ecological discipline.

The Muscovites' concern with greenery is renowned. The world of vegetation is an exceedingly important factor in cleaning the air, conserving water resources and creating favorable conditions for the work and leisure pursuits of the population. Greenery now covers 34,700 hectares, or 40 percent of the city's territory. There are around 45 square meters of greenery of all types for each inhabitant of the capital.

The environmental protection section of the comprehensive plan for the socioeconomic development of the city in 1979 envisages large-scale undertakings which will considerably improve the water and air in the capital and increase its number of planted areas. The Moscow public should contribute a great deal to the resolution of problems in natural conservation: conservation society activists, patrols of schoolchildren and college students and public technical commissions at plants, factories, design institutes and project planning organizations.

One of the chief concerns of party and soviet agencies is the protection of human health. Moscow has a broad network of establishments for preventive medicine and treatment of illness. Medical assistance is available to each individual. At present, the Main Administration of the Moscow Gorispolkom has 188 hospitals with almost 94,000 beds, 634 out-patient polyclinics (including 122 for children), 66 medical check-points and 31 medical divisions at industrial enterprises. Around 70 percent of the hospitals are large multispecialized establishments with 600 or more beds.

More than 90 percent of Moscow's workers are provided with the most progressive form of organized medical assistance--shop medical services. As a result of the measures that have been taken, indicators of worker health improve with each year. The rate of industrial accidents declines by 10 percent each year. During the last 5 years, the rate of occupational disease has also decreased by approximately 20 percent.

Each year, more is done to maintain and improve the health of women and children. Women's counseling centers and pediatric polyclinics have been opened in all regions. Municipal counseling centers and specialized labs have been opened, including the All-Union Scientific Research Center for the Protection of the Health of Mothers and Infants.

The 22d Olympics will be held in Moscow in the summer of 1980. The capital is enthusiastically preparing for this major sports event. In a message addressed to the members of the International Olympic Committee, L. I. Brezhnev stressed that "the Soviet people are preparing for the 1980 Moscow Olympics and will do everything to ensure the high standards of these games and see to it that they provide new impetus for the noble ideals of friendship and peace."²

The preparations being made in the city for the Olympics will be tremendous in scale and diverse in nature. The chief element of these preparations will consist in the remodeling and construction of Olympic sports facilities. All of the major aspects of the preparations for the 1980 Olympics are closely connected with the development of the city and with the program set forth in the Moscow General Plan for improving the working, living and recreational conditions of the working public. The sports facilities that are now being built will be used for many years after the Olympics, and the preparations for the games are simply accelerating this construction. For example, a sports center with the largest indoor stadium in Europe, seating 45,000, is being built in the Prospekt Mira region. A swimming pool with bleachers for 10,000 spectators and a diving pool will be built next door. There are few sports facilities in this part of the capital, and the new sports center will play an important role in the future development of mass sports work here.

The construction and remodeling of Olympic facilities and the beautification of the city will be a difficult and responsible task. The organization of services for Olympic athletes and guests will be an equally difficult task. In accordance with a decision of the Moscow Gorispolkom, 556 booths, 338 automatic vending machines, 13 pavillions, around 400 vending stands and a great deal of other equipment will be set up in the Olympic complexes, the approaches to them and the hotels where guests, officials and tourists will be staying. Much of this work has already been completed, but a great deal still remains to be done in the near future.

While they are working on enhancing the quality and efficiency of their labor and beautifying and decorating their city, the Muscovites are

simultaneously devoting a great deal of attention to the sphere of human relations. "The model communist city is a city inhabited by people with a high cultural level and a high level of awareness, a city of exemplary public order. This is a city in which an atmosphere of goodwill, mutual respect and mutual concern reigns."³ With these words, L. I. Brezhnev defined one of the chief areas of the activities of party, soviet and public organizations in the capital.

The Moscow CPSU Gorkom and the party raykoms have worked out a comprehensive system of measures for a further rise in the level of ideological, political, labor and moral indoctrination. The city party organization is constantly improving the system of political and economic education, mass propaganda and all means of mass political work. Around 92 percent of all working Muscovites are now studying Marxist-Leninist theory and the documents of the CPSU. The cultural needs of the capital's inhabitants are being satisfied more fully and there has been expansion of the network of libraries, clubs, movie theaters and sports facilities, which has considerably improved the leisure and recreation of the working public. Nonetheless, city and rayon soviets of workers' deputies and trade-union and Komsomol organizations in the capital still have much to do to enhance the social effectiveness of one of the most widespread forms of leisure activity--so-called informal communication.

The attainment of this objective presupposes, above all, a broader network of small, varied and comfortable cafes, tea rooms and special interest clubs--places where people can meet, converse, read newspapers, play chess, etc. Many recommendations have already been made in this respect and the passivity displayed by some workers must be overcome. This is particularly important in view of the fact that socially regulated informal communication can be of exceptionally great value in combating various negative phenomena: drunkenness, vandalism, violations of labor discipline and the private-ownership mentality.

Until recently, virtually all of the work involved in the rehabilitation of citizens who had behaved badly at work or during their leisure time was performed only by the police and production collectives. Now their efforts in this direction are being reinforced by public efforts on the neighborhood level, aided by the creation of local law enforcement stations. These represent a successful vehicle for interaction by all of the forces participating in the maintenance of public order and the legal indoctrination of the population: party and public organizations, enterprises and establishments, the administrations of housing operation offices, building committees, district police inspectors, volunteer public patrols, comrades' courts, juvenile police committees, the schools, and cultural enlightenment and sports establishments located in the neighborhood.

The main facet of the activity of these stations is crime prevention. One of the first tasks they performed was to learn about the particular individuals in each neighborhood who were prone to antisocial behavior and the

abuse of alcohol and who avoided socially useful labor. Individual work is being done with these people, as experience has shown that this kind of work is the most effective. As these stations accumulate experience, they will become an increasingly effective factor of crime prevention in neighborhoods and genuine centers of indoctrinational and preventive work on the local level.

At the same time, proceeding from Lenin's assessment of antisocial behavior as a phenomenon alien to our class, and guided by L. I. Brezhnev's statement that "crime and all forms of antisocial behavior are a social evil and must be fought against every day, with strength and determination,"⁴ we are also taking the necessary steps to enhance the effectiveness of legal and administrative means of putting an end to the antisocial phenomena of theft, drunkenness, vandalism and parasitism. Socialism and humanism are inseparable, but it is precisely in the interest of humanism that we must resolutely put an end to anything that endangers the honor, dignity and, in particular, the safety of workers in the socialist society.

The capital's party organization believes that strengthening the indoctrinating influence of labor collectives, instilling the workers with a scientific, Marxist-Leninist outlook and increasing the sociopolitical activity of the masses constitute one of the important factors contributing to the success of the struggle to turn Moscow into a model communist city. As L. I. Brezhnev stressed in his speech at a meeting with the voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy Electoral District on 2 March 1972, "each Soviet person must sense his involvement in public affairs and must be certain that his opinion and his vote will be taken into account in the making of major and minor decisions.

"This is why it is necessary to continue the struggle, and to make it even more vigorous, resolute and uncompromising, against violations of the law, the suppression of criticism, red tape, formalism and bureaucratism."⁵

The CPSU gorkom and raykoms are performing a great deal of multifaceted work to involve Moscow laborers in the management of municipal affairs and production and to develop democratic principles in the capital's public life. The active membership of local soviets alone now numbers more than half a million Muscovites. The work of local self-government agencies is improving; these unite hundreds of thousands of people in the struggle to elevate the standards of everyday life and instill the public with the spirit of collectivism, comradeship, mutual assistance and intolerance for violations of the norms of socialist communal living.

In response to the decisions of the November (1978) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Moscow's workers have launched even broader socialist competition for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan for 1979 and are investigating and mobilizing production reserves for the completion of their personal five-year assignments by the date marking the 110th anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's birth.

"Summing up the results of the capital's development over the last 4 years," First Secretary V. V. Grishin of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom said, "we can say that, thanks to the constant assistance of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers and the personal assistance of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, considerable progress has been made during this period in all branches of the national economy and an important step has been taken toward the transformation of Moscow into a model communist city."⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 28 November 1978.
2. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rech' i stat'i" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 70.
3. Brezhnev, L. I., "Vse dlya blaga naroda, vo imya sovetskogo cheloveka" [All for the Good of the People, on Behalf of the Soviet Individual], Moscow, 1974, p 30.
4. Ibid., p 15.
5. Brezhnev, L. I., "Vo imya schast'ya sovetskikh lyudey" [For the Happiness of the Soviet People], Moscow, 1979, p 4.
6. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 15 February 1979.

EXPERIENCE IN COMPILING AND IMPLEMENTING PLAN FOR THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF MOSCOW'S PERVOMAYSKIY RAYON

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
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[Article by Konstantin Sergeyevich Buchin, first secretary of the Pervomayskiy CPSU Raykom in the city of Moscow, and Vladimir Petrovich Kasich, head of the sociopsychological research division of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Electrical Information in Moscow]

[Text] The 24th CPSU Congress set the task of turning Moscow into a model communist city. "This," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said at the congress, "is a matter concerning the honor of the entire Soviet population!"¹ The accomplishment of this task will depend largely on improvements in comprehensive planning for "economic and social development at enterprises and associations and in rayons and in cities."² Taking this into account, the Pervomayskiy CPSU Raykom in the capital is giving a great deal of attention to the compilation and implementation of a plan for the social development of the rayon and to procedural supervision of the work involved in drawing up plans of this kind at enterprises and institutions in the rayon.

The following could be considered the main social functions of the rayon as a territorial administrative unit: socio-administrative (political and administrative supervision, coordination and regulation of the activities of subdivisions); sociotechnical (automation, mechanization and so forth--that is, improvement of the sphere of application of labor); socioeconomic (regulation of the public standard of living and the sociodemographic structure of the labor force); sociocultural or sociopsychological (communist indoctrination, the development of education, culture and art and the regulation of interrelations within the collective).

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1. "Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1971, p 44.
 2. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 171.

In accordance with these functions, the plan for social development consists of four sections: the improvement of administration in the rayon; the socio-technical and technological factors connected with the development of enterprises, organizations and institutions in the rayon; enhancement of the well-being of the population and the workers; the formation and development of the socialist personality type. Sections of this type can also be found in the plans for the social development of all labor collectives in the rayon. This makes it possible to coordinate the five-year rayon plan with the annual plans of enterprises and branches.

The plan for social development takes in several unconnected problems which are directly related to the functions of the rayon. These include regulation of the multilateral activities of collectives of rayon subdivisions, regardless of their departmental jurisdiction; supervision of housing construction and the construction of utilities and cultural facilities; direct supervision of industry, transportation, construction and other industrial enterprises of local jurisdiction; supervision of the activities of public education, health, culture, trade and municipal and consumer service establishments and organizations and so forth; determination of the guidelines for the development of social processes and phenomena; active influence on the development of positive social phenomena and the creation of the necessary conditions for the eradication of negative phenomena.

The compilation and implementation of a rayon plan for social development can unite sectorial and territorial interests and eradicate many of the conflicts and shortcomings resulting from the disagreement or exclusivity of departmental interests.

When the rayon plan was being drawn up, consideration was also given to the possibility of establishing a single system of plan indicators, based on a study of the experience accumulated in the compilation of plans for the social development of various enterprises and organizations in the rayon, and of determining the most effective forms and methods of research and sources of material supplies for planned undertakings. This minimized the negative effects of using various methods and estimates employed on the local level in the compilation of plans for social development, which were making it difficult to analyze and summarize the results of plan fulfillment and determine the dynamics of certain social processes in the rayon.

An analysis of more than 150 plans for the social development of labor collectives located in the rayon and employed in various branches of the national economy resulted in their detailed description. It was learned that the compilation of these plans was sometimes "farmed out" to economic and technical specialists with only the most general ideas about problems of a social nature. These plans consisted mainly of numerical data. For example, they envisaged the reduction of personnel turnover by a specific number of percentage points, an increase in the number of skilled workers by a specific amount, etc. In view of the fact that they were not backed

up by any kind of serious sociological analysis, however, these preliminary outlines were not reinforced adequately with practical measures and were more of a declarative nature. In short, these were "plans that did not work." Other plans that "did not work" were those which consisted essentially of a set of "good intentions," such as "reinforcement," "improvement," "enhancement," "achievement" and so forth. In these cases, we suggested that administrators and party organizations change planning methods and do some serious work to make the content of these plans more specific.

The majority of the plans that were analyzed, however, were based on the result of sociological research, they were compiled with the aid of leading enterprise specialists and they contained indicators and measures which reflected social changes in the collectives and took territorial as well as sectorial ties into account.

Analysis showed that the most important element of the compilation of plans for social development consisted of the organizational and procedural aspects of this work and the total set of social information used in compiling the plan. This gives rise to the need for a comprehensive informational system to fill the social information needs of the rayon as a whole and of individual labor collectives.

In connection with this, a sociological center was set up as part of the Pervomayskiy CPSU Raykom. It was assigned the following tasks: the analysis and prediction of all characteristics of the sociodemographic structure of the labor force; the analysis of changes in the professional skills composition of the labor force under the influence of administrative, socio-technical, socioeconomic and sociopsychological factors; the elaboration of recommendations on the hiring, placement and efficient employment of manpower; the investigation and elaboration of recommendations with respect to the stabilization of labor collectives; calculation of the effects of plans for social development on the operational efficiency of labor collectives; the coordination of social programs with economic plans; the investigation of the role played by various social factors in the improvement of labor incentives and the enhancement of production efficiency; the establishment of a single system of social indicators to characterize the development of labor collectives; the organic combination of plans for the social development of labor collectives with the national economic plans of enterprises and associations and their coordination with rayon and city plans; the introduction of a system of advanced training in sociology and social psychology for administrators on all levels; the provision of information about changes and tendencies in the development of the conditions and forms of worker activity, the workers' way of life and their attitude toward labor and their own status.

The work of this center is supervised by a standing council for the planning of social development in the rayon, headed by the first secretary of the CPSU raykom. The members of the council include administrative and scientific personnel, VUZ instructors, representatives of sociological services, leading

specialists in public health, culture and various agencies of the rayon economy and the heads of task forces responsible for the compilation of specific sections of the plan.

Most of the day-to-day work conducted by the sociological center is performed by the council's procedure coordinating group. It draws up procedural documents and programs, organizes sociological research at enterprises and establishments in the rayon, analyzes research results, informs social planning commissions of analysis data and works with these commissions to draft the plan for the social development of the rayon.

The council's procedure coordinating group consists of four subdivisions engaged in coordination, research organization, the development of research methods and techniques, and the analysis of results. The group functions as a permanent sociological service in the rayon and oversees the collection, accumulation and analysis of social information received from intrarayon sources.

Plan enforcement functions are performed by the commissions responsible for compilation. This simplifies the system of plan fulfillment and enhances the operational efficiency and quality of council commissions. The commission in charge of the section pertaining to "The Improvement of Administration in the Rayon" is headed by the chief of the raykom organizational section. The commission in charge of the section on "Sociotechnical and Technological Factors Involved in the Development of Enterprises, Organizations and Establishments in the Rayon" is headed by the chief of the section for industry and transportation, the commission responsible for the section on "Enhancement of the Well-Being of the Population and the Workers" is headed by the deputy chairman of the rayispolkom, and the commission in charge of the section on "The Formation and Development of the Socialist Personality Type" is headed by the chief of the CPSU raykom propaganda and education section. Each commission is made up of 10-15 specialists in the appropriate field. In all, the council has 38 members, including the 19 members of the procedure coordinating group. At the same time, enterprises, organizations and establishments in the rayon have their own councils for the compilation of plans for the social development of labor collectives. Their organizational structure is similar to that of the rayon council.

For the purpose of training specialists in social planning, since 1974 the rayon has offered 1-month, 2-week and 3-day courses to enterprise, organization and establishment personnel who are permanently or temporarily engaged in the compilation of plans for social development. Seminars, conferences and consultations are also organized for the discussion of problems in sociological research and social planning. In December 1978, plans for the social development of scientific establishments in our rayon were used as the basis for conducting an all-union seminar at the USSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements to exchange progressive experience in "Social Planning in the Scientific Establishment."

In May 1978, the council resolved to check the progress of plan fulfillment over the first two and a half years of the five-year plan and the results of this work were discussed in September at a special plenum of the CPSU raykom. We will discuss this in greater detail.

When we organized the work on the section pertaining to "The Improvement of Administration in the Rayon," we proceeded from the fact that the existing demographic situation necessitated a comprehensive approach to the utilization of labor resources and, for this reason, it would be necessary to regard the territorial and departmental aspects of the problem as a single entity.

There are approximately 400,000 people living in the rayon, with women outnumbering men by 35,000. The average age of the inhabitants is 37. In spite of the constant birthrate, the population of the rayon is increasing (mainly as a result of migration). Analysis indicates that the group displaying the most intensive migration patterns is of working age. Around 70 percent of all adult inhabitants work within the rayon. For the purpose of plan compilation, the composition of the working population was analyzed separately from the composition of the total population; moreover, the worker category was divided into two groups--those living in Pervomayskiy Rayon and those living in other rayons in Moscow. This allowed for a differentiated and more substantiated approach to the resolution of many problems in rayon development, including the development of transport, consumer and cultural services.

Much is being done in the rayon to improve the system for managing the multifaceted activities of collectives. Various elements of systems for the efficient acquisition of information and for interaction by subdivisions of organizations, including computer-aided planning and management, have been developed and incorporated at 18 industrial enterprises and in 30 scientific collectives. Improvements in the elements of the administrative system alone have conditionally saved the labor of more than 3,000 individuals. Plans for the Moscow Thermal Automation Plant, the Moscow Tool Plant and other enterprises envisaged the improvement of working conditions for engineering and technical personnel, the incorporation of small-scale computer equipment and the creation of a favorable sociopsychological climate. These objectives were successfully attained.

The results of the work on the section on "Sociotechnical and Technological Sectors Involved in the Development of Enterprises, Organizations and Establishments in the Rayon" indicate that the rayon's industrial enterprises as a whole have kept up with plan assignments. High rates of increase in production output were achieved by the collectives of the Worsted Wool Factory, the Izmaylovo Weaving and Spinning Mill, Clothing Factory Number 4, the Rabochaya Odezhda, Start and Knitted Outerwear associations, and the Moscow Tool and Thermal Automation plants. This is indisputably to the credit of party organizations, communists and all workers, who waged an extensive campaign to promote the implementation of the decisions of the

25th party congress. Between 1971 and 1978, more than 20,000 square meters of production area was put to use, the capital-labor ratio increased almost 2.8-fold and labor productivity doubled.

All of the increase in production output during the first 3 years of the 10th Five-year Plan resulted from the augmentation of labor productivity. Production output increased by 4.6 percent while the number of employees decreased by 0.2 percent. The proportion accounted for by products with the State Mark of Quality in total production output reached 15.5 percent.

Numerous measures were taken at the rayon's associations, plants and factories for the further improvement of production organization, a rise in the technical level of production, the better use of production capacities, the mastery of the production of new items and the improvement of product quality. These successes resulted from purposeful work by party organizations for the fulfillment of socialist commitments envisaging the manufacture of 15 million rubles' worth of products over and above state assignments and the overfulfillment of labor productivity assignments by 1.6 percent.

During these 3 years, 39 automatic, semiautomatic and mechanized flowlines and more than 5,000 pieces of new and highly productive equipment, including machine tools with programmed control, were installed and started up at industrial enterprises. Productive assets in 1978 exceeded the 1975 quantity by more than a third.

Particular attention was devoted in enterprise plans to the elevation of technical production standards. Problems in the replacement of old equipment with modern highly productive units are being solved more quickly. Intersectorial and intrasectorial specialization is now widespread. It accelerates the mechanization and automation of production processes and the augmentation of labor productivity. This was the reason for the high rate of increase in production output at the Worsted Wool Factory, the Rabochaya Odezhda and Start associations, the Moscow Tool Plant, the Moscow Thermal Automation Plant and other enterprises.

In 1976 the CPSU raykom examined and approved a rayon comprehensive plan for the improvement of product quality, and this was reflected in plans for social development. Scientific and technical achievements and modern technology have served as the basis for the development and productive utilization of 212 new models of machinery, devices and equipment and the efficient production of 700 new types of consumer goods. The comprehensive plan for the improvement of product quality, compiled for each year of the five-year plan on the basis of the plan for social development, is being carried out successfully. In 3 years, the output of products of the highest quality category almost doubled.

A specially created rayon inspection commission, set up to oversee enterprise quality commissions, regularly receives reports from administrators on these matters. Around 10,000 people have participated in the inspections. More than 1,300 suggestions were submitted, and 800 of these were put to practical use. The economic savings resulting from these recommendations exceeds 700,000 rubles. The State Mark of Quality has been awarded to 194

items manufactured by rayon enterprises. The proportion accounted for by products of the highest quality category rose from 2.8 percent in 1976 to 14.8 percent in 1978. Here is a specific example: In 1975, 8.5 percent of the total output of the Moscow Tool Plant consisted of products of the highest category. The product quality improvement measures supervised by the party organization helped the plant collective to quadruple the output of items of this category in 1978.

The check on the progress of plan fulfillment indicated, however, that far from all opportunities have been utilized. For this reason, the rayon is now working on the completion of a territorial and sectorial system of work and product quality control. It will take social and sociopsychological aspects of quality control into account and will coordinate the activities of rayon enterprises and all ispolkom services more closely.

In accordance with the section of the plan pertaining to "Enhancement of the Well-Being of the Population and the Workers," much was done in the rayon during the first 3 years of the 10th Five-Year Plan to solve a major social problem--the need for improvement in the housing conditions of workers. During these years, a total of 500,000 square meters of residential area was made available, improving the housing conditions of more than 12,000 families, or 27,500 inhabitants.

The broad-scale development of housing construction in the rayon has brought the per capita housing availability level up to 9.5 square meters, as compared to the norm of 9 square meters. The implementation of plans for housing construction and for the capital repair of existing housing raised the technical convenience and comfort level of housing. Whereas in 1975 housing with no modern conveniences accounted for 3.7 percent of total available housing, in 1978 the figure was reduced to the minimum and is now equivalent to only 0.1 percent.

A city rayon is not only an administrative unit which is created for the purpose of accomplishing administrative tasks, but also a place where the public works and spends its social and family life. The quality and productivity of the labor of workers in the sphere of physical production will depend on the proper organization of services to guarantee the efficient use of non-working time by inhabitants (transportation, trade, medical establishments, consumer and municipal services and so forth). According to our data, up to 90 percent of all workers take advantage of the services offered at their place of employment. According to the results of the analysis of plan fulfillment during the first half of the five-year plan, tasks connected with the development of public services in the rayon are being carried out successfully on the whole. During 3 years, nine new consumer service enterprises were opened. Now the rayon has 245 enterprises of this kind (studios, workshops, reception centers, beauty salons, etc.).

One of the most important aspects of plan fulfillment is the work on the development of the public health system. Present conditions require that public health agencies engage in the detailed planning and implementation of measures in all areas of preventive medicine and treatment. The basic

principle governing public health care in the socialist society is the guarantee of normal working and living conditions for each individual.

A survey showed that the plan for the development and improvement of the public health care system during the 10th Five-Year Plan is being carried out successfully. During the first 3 years of this five-year plan, two new polyclinics capable of serving 750 adult out-patients each day began operating, and a pediatric stomatological polyclinic and a center for the treatment and prevention of trauma in children were opened, as well as a division for patients suffering from infarctions with an intensive therapy isolation room in the city's Clinical Hospital number 36, a rehabilitation division for children in the Municipal Pediatric Hospital number 3 and a rayon industrial gynecological division for working women.

A prominent place in the implementation of the plan for social development is occupied by the elaboration and introduction of measures to guard the rayon environment against the negative effects of human activity. The supervision of environmental protection is being carried out in accordance with a plan approved by the Moscow Gorkom and Moscow CPSU Committee, decisions of the Ispolkom of the Moscow Soviet and the Moscow Oblast Soviet of 15 December 1976 and a plan of measures approved by the ispolkom of the rayon soviet.

To prevent the pollution of the atmosphere with waste from industrial enterprises, 66 dust catchers and gas purifiers were built and remodeled at 22 industrial enterprises in the rayon during 1977 and 1978. The production facilities of Moselektropribor have been relocated outside the rayon. Raw leather is no longer processed in the branch of the leather plant. Air samples taken in 1978 indicate considerable improvement in the sanitary and hygienic condition of the atmosphere.

In their work on the fourth section of the plan, "The Formation and Development of the Socialist Personality Type," the party organization and the rayon public achieved substantial improvement in the activities of cultural establishments, enhanced their role in the communist indoctrination of workers and renovated the material and technical base of cultural enlightenment. The necessary conditions were created in the rayon for the productive use of leisure time and a rise in the cultural level of the workers: There are 10 tradeunion cultural centers and clubs, a pantomime theater, 154 libraries with 5.5 million books, and 7 music schools. The rayon's museum of local history, seven public cultural universities, rayon volunteer societies for the preservation of historical and cultural monuments and other institutions are operating on a public basis.

The material and technical base of cultural institutions has been improved considerably: The Sofiya movie theater has been built and four state public libraries, three music schools, the Rodina movie theater and several cultural centers and clubs have undergone capital repairs. Architectural monuments are being restored and the material and technical base of the Izmaylovo Park for Culture and Recreation is being improved.

The further improvement of ideological indoctrination on the neighborhood level is being promoted by 30 mass political work councils operating in the rayon. The rayon soviet supervises their work in line with a comprehensive long-range plan. Each neighborhood also has its own public law enforcement council and councils to work with youth in dormitories. Special mention should also be made of the experience of the party organizations of Housing Operation Office-25, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Building and the Rosrestavratsiya Association in the transformation of sports areas and playgrounds into model recreation sites.

During the process of carrying out the plan for the social development of the rayon, the active struggle of the workers to implement the instructions of the 25th CPSU Congress and to accomplish the task of turning Moscow into a model communist city has acquired great scope and has become more concrete and more purposeful. The precise qualifications required of participants in this movement have been defined. Measures have been elaborated and are being carried out to transform industrial and construction enterprises, scientific organizations, academic institutions and service enterprises into exemplary establishments.

Experience has shown that one labor collective cannot independently solve all of the problems arising during the fulfillment of its plan for social development. The resolution of many of these problems depends on branch, rayon and city organizations. For this reason, plans for the social development of enterprises, rayons and the city are compiled at the same time, and the information acquired during the course of sociological studies is used on all levels.

The plan for the social development of a rayon is not a summary plan; it is a comprehensive plan, in which all sections and objectives are organically interconnected. It serves rayon organizations as a source of information which makes it possible for them to plan more efficiently on their own levels.

"The party," Comrade V. V. Grishin, first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, said at a meeting with the voters of Moscow's Perovskiyy Electoral District, "teaches us to take a comprehensive approach. Our main objective is to work energetically, above all, toward the development of a material and technical base to provide for the fuller and fuller satisfaction of the healthy and intelligent demands of the people. In this process, it is important to concentrate our efforts in the most backward areas, wherever the gap between the demands of the Muscovites and the possibility for their satisfaction is most noticeable."³ These party aims lie at the basis of the work on social planning in the rayon.

The comprehensive approach to social planning has made it possible to take in all aspects of life in the rayon to the fullest, with consideration for local peculiarities, and to correctly determine the sequence in which tasks are to be accomplished.

3. Speech presented by Comrade V. V. Grishin at a meeting with the voters of the Perovskiyy Electoral District--MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 15 February 1979.

INVESTIGATION AND UTILIZATION OF MANPOWER RESERVES IN MOSCOW'S
SEVASTOPOL'SKIY RAYON

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[Article by Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Asoskov, first secretary of the
Sevastopol'skiy CPSU Raykom in the city of Moscow]

[Text] One of the main problems in economic development at the present time is the need to provide all links of the national economy with sufficient labor resources. The USSR has no unemployment, which is one of the major problems in bourgeois nations. On the contrary, our rapidly developing national economy is requiring more and more workers, and there is an acute manpower shortage in several parts of our nation, particularly in the large cities. There is no doubt that the principal method of making up for this shortage should consist in the augmentation of labor productivity, the incorporation of new techniques and technology and the improvement of the organization and methods of management. In reference to the development of the Moscow economy, Comrade V. V. Grishin, first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, stressed that the major guideline for this development "is not an increase, but a decrease in the number of workers as a result of the remodeling and technical re-equipping of enterprises, the reduction of manual operations and the thorough development of forms of self-service in the consumer service sphere."¹

A significant role in the satisfaction of manpower requirements can also be played by the involvement of retired individuals, non-working women and youths in productive activities. This could simultaneously contribute to the resolution of exceedingly important social and moral problems arising out of society's need for heightened social activity on the part of all population groups and a better system of labor training and vocational guidance for the younger generation, considering the fact that a certain percentage of school children still do not acquire the necessary ideological, moral and physical tempering in the academic process and that "many students have not developed labor skills or respect for the labor professions."²

Without denigrating the role of the raykom and enterprise organizations in the utilization of opportunities to satisfy the manpower demand by means of the accelerated incorporation of new techniques and technology, the improvement of labor organization, the elevation of labor standards and the more

effective management of production, we must stress the fact that these matters are within the jurisdiction of the highest agencies of national economic branches, ministries and departments and that the effectiveness of party work depends largely on the proper coordination of the activities of all concerned institutions. As for the search for social manpower reserves, local party organs will be expected to do much more in this field. An analysis conducted by the Sevastopol'skiy CPSU Raykom in the city of Moscow indicated that two-thirds of the enterprises, organizations and establishments in the rayon are experiencing a personnel shortage. The enterprises are trying to make up for the shortage of labor resources by hiring the maximum number of workers and employees, but this is creating new difficulties and can only be regarded as a temporary measure.

In order to find labor sources directly in the rayon, personnel of the unofficial division for sociological research of the CPSU raykom and the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences conducted a survey in 1978, which was expected to provide answers to the following questions: What percentage of the able-bodied population presently not employed in the production sphere would be willing to work and under what conditions? What would the specific conditions be for various population groups? What are the reasons and motives that keep people who wish to find temporary or permanent employment from taking part in productive activity? In what way can the optimal combination of indoctrinational activity by party organizations, the economic interests of the rayon and the personal interests of citizens making up the additional manpower reserve be achieved?

In addition to this, a poll of experts was conducted, involving the administrators of rayon organizations, enterprises and establishments and the consumer service sphere. This poll revealed that it would be possible to organize work in the home, to institute a part-time working day and to use a sliding work schedule at enterprises. The rayon's possibilities for improvement in the service sphere were also investigated (expansion of the list of services offered by the Zarya firm, an increase in home-delivery volumes, the introduction of modern types of service everywhere, etc.). Finally, plans for the social development of organizations, establishments and enterprises in the rayon were analyzed to investigate the possibility of including additional measures in these plans to provide working women with more benefits.

When we organized this survey, we were striving not only to find sources of additional manpower for rayon enterprises, but also to determine the economic and social impact of measures taken in this connection and to work out the procedure for organizing this kind of research under similar conditions or on a broader scale.

The results of our study showed that retired individuals made up the largest group of non-workers in the rayon. There are 64,000 pensioners living in the rayon. A third of them are still working. These are mainly pensioners who reached retirement age less than 5 years ago (men between the ages of 60 and 64 and women between the ages of 55 and 59). Around 60 percent of these pensioners are still working; as a rule, they have continued to work

at the same place, without interruption, even after reaching retirement age. Only 7 percent of all the pensioners surveyed had returned to work after a more or less lengthy interval.

A third of the non-working pensioners would be willing to return to production under certain conditions. Therefore, there is a significant discrepancy between the actual return of pensioners to socially useful labor and their desire to work.

The conditions on which pensioners would take permanent jobs differed. On the whole, the prevalent desire was for work under more relaxed conditions, providing an opportunity to use at least part of the pensioner's personal experience and knowledge. Around 40 percent of the respondents assigned the greatest importance to the following conditions: a place of employment close to home, the absence of excessive physical stress, the payment of pensions, and good relations in the collective. For 17 percent of the respondents, the most important condition was that the job be in their own special field, but not a particularly responsible position, and preferably with a work schedule calling for a partial working day or week.

Therefore, the resumption of professional activity by pensioners does not only depend on material incentives--for example, the payment of pensions to working pensioners, but also the creation of optimal working conditions, consistent with the physical and mental state of the aged and in line with their professional interests.

In most cases, the institution of measures to encourage pensioners to take jobs will depend on the initiative of enterprises and establishments in the rayon where the pensioners will work or live. The potential for improving the hygienic, psychological and social conditions of the labor of pensioners at enterprises exists, but it is not being sufficiently utilized as yet, and this is the reason for the relatively low indicator of the resumption of productive activity by retired individuals. Moreover, the resolution of several problems connected with the increased employment of pensioners is within the jurisdiction of central agencies. These include expansion of the group of professions providing material incentives in the form of pensions paid out in addition to wages, the provision of working pensioners with longer paid vacations and shorter work hours while paying them the same average monthly salary, etc.

Our study showed that there were not many women who were not engaged in production or academic studies. In August 1978, they accounted for only 0.25 percent of all women of working age in Sevastopol'skiy Rayon.

Women who are not professionally employed can be divided into two groups. The first is made up of those who have made a conscious decision not to work in the production sphere because this way of life is preferable to them. This group is comparatively small. The second group is made up of women who have resigned from jobs and intend to limit themselves to housework for some time, most usually in connection with the need to care for a child.

Therefore, most of the women who are not employed in production are mothers who have no place to leave their children or grandmothers who have volunteered to help their children raise their grandchildren. Only 10 percent of the women were not participating in professional activity for the reason that, as they put it, they could not find jobs they liked.

These data prove that the further expansion of the network of nurseries and kindergartens will be of great significance both in improving the quality of upbringing and in solving the labor problem. But the main objective is considerable improvement in the work of these institutions: Many of the respondents explained that it was impossible for them to participate in professional labor because, in their opinion, the childcare provided in preschool institutions is inadequate, as a result of which children are frequently ill and working mothers have to be absent from work often.

"The year of 1979 has been declared the International Year of the Child," speakers noted at the 23d conference of the city CPSU organization. "We should use this circumstance as an excuse to improve the health and upbringing of children and lavish even more care on them."³ There is no doubt that this kind of care will have a beneficial effect not only on the physical and moral development of the younger generation, but also on the productive labor of women.

For many women who are professionally employed, the economic aspect of productive activity is important, but it is not the most important aspect. The majority said that they would continue to work even if their husbands' salaries were increased by the amount of their own. This corroborates the findings of earlier studies conducted in our nation and in several other socialist countries, that married women experience some dissatisfaction if they isolate themselves from the labor collective and restrict their lives only to the home and the family.

When the manpower problem in the rayon is investigated, it must be borne in mind that the development of production will be accompanied by a constantly rising demand for skilled manpower. At the same time, the difficulties involved in combining the career and family roles of working women have a negative effect on the improvement of their skills. For this reason, all-round assistance to women in simplifying their household concerns will aid in solving another important problem--the need to improve their skills.

In the scientific and periodical press, women's considerable burden of housework has been repeatedly discussed, and it has been pointed out several times that the woman has, by tradition, always spent much more time on housework than the man. The fact that many establishments and organizations (this applies less to industrial enterprises) suffer considerable losses of work time due to overlong lunch breaks, tardiness and early departures from work is analyzed less frequently. But this is a matter of great economic and moral significance. And it is not only the administrators of establishments and the violators of labor discipline who are to blame. Much of the guilt must be assumed by the consumer service sphere.

The area of consumer facilities has been considerably expanded in recent years in Moscow, particularly at enterprises in our rayon, and the network of cafeterias, order desks and so forth has been enlarged. But we cannot take comfort in this fact. As the Accountability Report of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom to the 23d Conference of the Moscow City CPSU Organization noted, the improvement of the working and living conditions of laborers must be energetically carried on.

The involvement of young people in productive activity is of tremendous significance in the supplementation of labor resources. This work is multifaceted and must be carried out in different ways among different segments of the younger generation. Naturally, the young people who are trying to avoid socially useful activity require special persuasive measures. On the other hand, those who have not found the proper position for themselves, those who do not like their place of employment and those who are not well informed as to the possibilities of applying their talents must be assisted at any cost. Finally, there is a third group, and a quite large one, of young people--those who are attending schools, vocational and technical institutes, tekhnikums and VUZ's. Many of them could be encouraged to work in productive activity that pays an hourly wage. In addition to producing an economic impact, this would also be of great educative value, since it would aid in preparing adolescents and young adults for future labor careers, would develop their sense of responsibility and would keep them off the streets and avert criminal and asocial behavior.

Besides this, it is a well-known fact that practical labor activity considerably enhances the effectiveness of the vocational guidance provided by the family and the school. Many parents encourage their children to acquire a higher education without taking their actual interests and abilities into account. Compulsory participation in professional labor, beginning as early as adolescence, can substantially modify this "theoretical model" of the professional future of many young people and instill them with a taste for the worker professions.

Specialists in vocational guidance believe that if this work is organized properly, it will be possible to find people for every profession who will be happy with their work and will regard it as their calling in life. The greatest difficulties in this work arise from stereotypical ideas about the preferability of some professions and the low prestige of others, particularly professions in the service sphere.

One important aspect of vocational guidance is the provision of graduates of schools and vocational and technical institutes with information about working conditions and the nature of work at various enterprises, establishments and organizations. School children now tour enterprises in the rayon and regularly meet with veterans of labor and young workers. Enterprise party organizations are considering the possibility of publishing information bulletins.

The resolution of the labor problem will also depend largely on the reduction of personnel turnover, particularly among youth, as the most mobile social

group. The individual who leaves a job generally wastes a certain amount of time looking for a new job and, in addition to this, he often has to be retrained for the new job. In this connection, it is important to not only improve vocational guidance work, but also to give more attention to the professional and social adaptation of young people at enterprises.

Many unutilized opportunities also exist in the practice of enlisting the services of school, tekhnikum and VUZ students on a part-time basis.

Promising experience has also been accumulated in the creation of specialized student youth brigades--in line with the construction brigade experiment--to work in the service sphere and on important projects in the rayon in the summer.

In addition to placing young people in jobs, it is also necessary to work extensively with "problem" youths. Our research indicated that young people with a police record are more likely to refuse job placement services, change their place of employment and fail to meet output norms in production. Around 14 percent of all working youths cannot keep up with output norms, but the figure rises to 25 percent among youths who have committed crimes. They are responsible for up to 20 percent of all petty vandalism, theft and other misdemeanors at enterprises.

The problem of young people who are difficult to handle must be solved collectively by the family, the school and juvenile social organizations. Deviant behavior on the part of schoolchildren and the students of vocational and technical institutes is generally due to an entire group of causes, which include diminished enthusiasm for academic studies, the improper choice of leisure activities, little involvement in social work and a belated introduction to labor. According to the data of our research, more than 40 percent of all students in the 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th grades have no permanently assigned duties at home and are unable to perform the most elementary types of housework. We are not dealing here with such negative phenomena as drunkenness, the unhealthy atmosphere in some families, parental indiscretions or fights, etc.

Therefore, there is a direct relationship between the upbringing of the younger generation and the resolution of the manpower problem.

Much is being done at the present time in the capital's Sevastopol'skiy Rayon to implement the practical recommendations obtained as a result of sociological research. For example, bulletins listing job vacancies and specifications are being circulated to inform pensioners of employment opportunities close to home. Some polyclinics in the rayon plan to open geriatric offices which will not only provide medical services but will also determine the nature, content and conditions of labor for pensioners. A specialist in geriatrics has been made a member of the staff of the rayon public job placement service bureau to give pensioners information and recommendations concerning the nature and conditions of the work in a particular job.

A list of positions which should be filled primarily by pensioners has been drawn up in the rayon. The CPSU raykom has requested the administrators of rayon enterprises, establishments and organizations to create real opportunities for part-time work for 2, 4 or 6 hours a day so that each of these jobs can be filled with pensioners with varying levels of physical and psychological fitness for productive activity.

Work is simultaneously being done to determine the types of labor that can be performed in the home, and the demand for this kind of work among pensioners is being analyzed. There is no doubt that work in the home will be extremely convenient for women with small children, as well as women past retirement age who wish to combine the raising of grandchildren with productive activity. Our study showed that this applied to 43 percent of all non-working women of retirement age (55-65).

Working pensioners will be provided with incentives in the form of certain benefits: Work that is as close to home as possible, the right to obtain services at rayon service enterprises without standing in line; the possible improvement of their housing conditions; the right to have telephones installed without being put on a waiting list, etc.

Working with the Institute of Sociological Research, we plan to conduct a social experiment in the rayon to investigate the possibility of social assistance for families in order to determine the optimal methods of combining the professional and family roles of working women. The implementation of this program on a broader scale is expected to result in a higher birth rate, stronger marital and family relations, greater indoctrinational potential on the part of the family and the personal development of working women.

A great deal has been done in the rayon to ease the working and living conditions of working women even more and to provide working mothers with the necessary conditions for the successful combination of work and family obligations and their speedy return to the production sphere after the birth of a child. All of this work is being supervised by a special commission headed by a secretary of the CPSU raykom. As a result of the commission's activity, problems in improving the working and living conditions of women have begun to be discussed more frequently at sessions of party committees and bureaus and at party and trade-union meetings, and are now mentioned in collective agreements and plans for the socioeconomic development of labor collectives. Commissions to supervise the improvement of the working, living and leisure conditions of working women have been created at many enterprises in the rayon (the Emitron Plant, Metal Housewares Plant Number 6, the Cheremushki Clothing Production Association and others). New efficient work schedules, with longer rest breaks, have been instituted for working women at the Chayka Dry Cleaning and Dyeing Association. As a result, the enterprise's women employees are now less prone to fatigue, and labor productivity has increased noticeably. Background music is now played at the Cheremushki and Moskva associations to relieve the tedium. Virtually all industrial

enterprises and construction organizations now have agreements with the grocery stores of the rayon food administration, whereby groceries can be purchased on an advance-order basis.

The CPSU raykom and the executive committee of the rayon soviet are particularly concerned with the need to improve medical services, increase the number of preschool establishments and improve the quality of work in these establishments. In particular, special attention is being given to an analysis of the work of kindergartens where the rate of illness is comparatively high.

In a large city, the problem of labor resources must be solved with a view to the distant future, and in this connection it is naturally necessary to consider stimulation of the birthrate.

We know that the birthrate is declining throughout a large part of the USSR. The situation is particularly alarming in the large cities, where families with only one or two children are most common. According to the data of sociodemographic research, more than 40 percent of all working women in Moscow express a preference for the one-child family.

Naturally, much remains to be done in determining the precise reasons for the declining birthrate in the large cities and in investigating the possibility that the birthrate might be stimulated by society. It is already obvious, however, that if we create the necessary conditions to ease the family burdens of working women and give them help in caring for small children, we will be able to expect a rise in the birthrate or, at least, its stabilization.

Let us summarize our discussion. The rayon has ample manpower reserves. Obviously, these reserves also exist in all other rayons of Moscow and all other cities in our nation. It will be the responsibility of party organizations to thoroughly investigate these reserves and utilize them to develop the economy and enhance the well-being of the workers. The involvement of presently unemployed persons in active labor must be conducted in line with the general principles of indoctrinational work, it must be accomplished with a view to the personal interests of these people, it must promote all-round personality development and it must be based on public activity and initiative and on the experience that has already been accumulated in our nation and in other socialist countries.

The work of investigating reserves and finding manpower in the rayon is of a comprehensive nature and has been organized according to the following basic guidelines:

- 1) All-round expansion of the network of consumer services and the accelerated construction of preschool establishments;
- 2) Constant control over the activities of service enterprises, the continuous augmentation of the initiative and responsibility of administrative

personnel in this sphere, and the introduction of new progressive forms of service, aimed primarily at assisting families to fulfill their child-raising responsibilities and reducing the amount of time required for everyday family chores;

3) Investigation of the possibilities of instituting part-time schedules for pensioners, women and student youth and the use of sliding work schedules at enterprises and establishments;

4) The offer of several types of consumer services directly at the place of employment;

5) The exposure of persons who avoid socially useful labor and try to lead a parasitical way of life and the placement of these individuals in jobs;

6) The enlistment of the services of student youth in the interest of indoctrination and vocational guidance of better quality;

7) The elaboration of measures to provide working pensioners with various types of incentives and with information about places of employment, the nature of work and employment opportunities for pensioners, and to study their needs and interests;

8) The improvement of the working and living conditions of working women and more intensive family assistance on the part of labor collectives and the public.

The job of finding and utilizing labor reserves is an extremely difficult one and can only be accomplished through the combined efforts of scientists, party and soviet workers, and the administrators of enterprises, organizations, schools and preschool establishments. It will require systematic, and not episodic, research for the purpose of obtaining current information about labor resources, employment opportunities, and the effectiveness of the work that is being conducted, particularly measures which could contribute to the establishment of an integral system, within the framework of which professional labor would be organically connected with heightened social activity on the part of women and pensioners and with the indoctrination of youth.

At the November (1978) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, L. I. Brezhnev said: "We cannot ignore the fact that intensive factors of economic growth will have to be stressed even more in the 1980's, since other factors are losing much of their strength. This applies above all to the possibility of finding new labor resources."⁴ Implementing this directive, the rayon party organization is making a maximum effort to ensure that the involvement of manpower reserves in the production sphere is combined with the systematic improvement of personnel skills, particularly the skills of young workers and women, and the elevation of the moral standards of the working public and, consequently, the role of moral incentives for labor.

FOOTNOTES

1. "The 23d Conference of the Moscow CPSU City Organization. Report of the Moscow City CPSU Committee. Speech of Comrade V. V. Grishin, First Secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom," MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 26 January 1979.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Speech presented by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum--PRAVDA, 28 November 1978.

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CSO: 1806

CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN STRENGTHENING THE FAMILY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 36-45

[Article by Zoya Alekseyevna Yankova, candidate of historical sciences and leader of a demographic policy group at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] One of the most important social tasks facing party organizations, Soviet institutions and the public is to strengthen the family and increase the importance of its role in the improvement and development of the socialist way of life. In 1977 the Moscow CPSU Gorkom and the Moscow Soviet ratified the "Plan of Measures to Improve the Demographic Situation and Stimulate Natural Population Growth." The implementation of this plan called for studies of the external and internal mechanisms of family functioning and development.

In this article, we will examine the results of several local concrete sociological studies of some aspects of this problem, conducted in Moscow between 1975 and 1978.¹

The unit of observation was the family consisting of a married couple and their children under 18. This choice was dictated, firstly, by the fact that the nuclear family is now the most prevalent type of urban family (representing 52.9 percent of all families in Moscow) and, secondly, by the steady tendency toward a further rise in the percentage accounted for by this type of family, which is related to the intention of most young married couples to live apart from their parents and, in particular, to the general preference for small families.

We can find proof of this hypothesis in statistics. According to the data of the All-Union Population Census of 1970, there were 58.7 million families in the USSR at that time. Urban families represented 58 percent of this total, and 5.7 percent lived in Moscow. The average Moscow family was smaller than the national average, and consisted of 3.2 members. Moreover, 22.3 percent of all the families in Moscow were families without children, 52.7 percent were families with one child, 22.2 percent had two, and only around 3 percent had three or more children.

According to the same data, there were approximately 1,500 children for each 1,000 mothers in Moscow between the ages of 35 and 39. Considering the relatively low percentage of families with three children, we can assume that approximately half of the mothers in the capital will have one child by the end of their child-bearing years and slightly less than half will have two children.

Despite the process of nuclearization (that is, the reduction of the family to its natural nucleus: parents and children), Moscow also has families which are complex in composition, consisting of several generations of direct (and sometimes even indirect) relatives. There are few of these families in Moscow, just as in the nation as a whole. For example, of the 56 million families in rural and urban locations throughout the USSR, 36 million are nuclear families, 9 million are single-parent families and only 11 million are complex families. The same proportions applied for Moscow. In the capital, however, young married couples generally live with their parents temporarily, particularly in the first years of married life. For example, according to the findings of our sample studies, 64 percent of the couples surveyed lived initially with their parents after the wedding.

Therefore, the major demographic type of family in Moscow is a family consisting of a married couple, with or without children (58.9 percent). A related type, which also includes one of the parents of the spouses or other relatives, accounts for 15.4 percent. Finally, broken homes account for approximately 15 percent of all families in Moscow and more than 19 percent of all families with children,² which is primarily due to the high divorce rate.

These tendencies dictated our choice of the nuclear family with the model number of children of school age as the object of our research, as it is precisely in this stage of the family's life cycle, when it has to perform all of its functions in their entirety, that it encounters the highest number of conflicts and unsolved problems.

One of the hypotheses we wished to verify through our research was a hypothesis concerning the indirect effects of the emotional attitudes of spouses on their satisfaction with their marriage, the stability of the family and the successful performance of its main functions by the family. Another of the hypotheses that was being verified concerned the connection between a low level of emotional feeling in the family and the absence of special training to prepare young people for marriage.

Information was gathered with the aid of interview questionnaires containing test judgments and a Leary psychological test, adapted to the conditions of the Soviet way of life and the nature of sociological research. Before this information was analyzed, the sample group was divided into two basic categories, which were conditionally called "happy" and "unhappy" or "stable" and "unstable" families. This categorization was based on the views expressed by both spouses in regard to the family situation.

Our research findings indicated, above all, a strong connection between the moral and emotional atmosphere in the family and its stability (a Pearson coefficient equivalent to 0.51) (see Table 1).

Table 1

Dependence of Family Stability on State of
Emotional Feeling and Support in the Family, %

Level of Family Stability	Moral and Emotional Atmosphere in the Family			
	Emotional Communication and Support Strongly Developed	Emotional Communication and Support Poorly Developed	Emotional Communication Virtually Undeveloped in the Family	Emotional Communication Takes Place in Other Small Groups
Stable families	55	29	15	--
Intermediate group*	22	62	9	7
"	4	41	32	23
Unstable families	--	33	17	50
Average for all families	26	47	16	11

* The intermediate group consisted of families which were considered to be stable by one spouse and unstable by the other.

Table 2

Dependence of Family Stability on State of
Emotional Support and Mutual Assistance in It, % Values

Statements	Reactions to statements	1975		1976	
		Happy families	Unhappy families	Happy families	Unhappy families
When something unpleasant happens to me, I feel alone	Yes No Und.*	20.5 79.5 --	64 25 11	-- 77 23	59 27 14
When I am feeling bad, my husband (wife) becomes particularly sympathetic and attentive	Yes No Und.	73 23 4	33 61 7	77 13 --	32 68 --
My husband (wife) is always willing to support me when I have difficulties	Yes No Und.	77 23 21	16 63 --	73 14 --	18 68 --

* Undecided (here and hereafter).

Table 3

Reactions of Women to Statements About Emotional
Atmosphere in the Family, % Values

Statements	Reactions	1975		1976	
		Families		Families	
		Happy	Unhappy	Happy	Unhappy
My husband does not take my concerns to heart	Yes	23	55	5	59
	No	73	18	77	23
	Und.	--	--	--	--
My husband believes he is smarter than I am	Yes	18	71	--	--
	No	77	23	--	--
	Und.	--	--	--	--
My husband displays contempt for my work	Yes	5	65	--	--
	No	95	29	--	--
	Und.	--	--	--	--

Table 4

Proportional Weight of Variables Making Up the Factor
of "Emotional Support"

Test judgment	Factorial weight
When something unpleasant happens to me, I do not feel alone	0.46
When I am feeling bad, my wife (husband) becomes particularly sympathetic and attentive	0.78
My wife (husband) is usually tender and affectionate with me	0.57
My wife (husband) is always willing to give me support when I have difficulties	0.74
My wife (husband) has never s, rarely to me	0.41

The answers of respondents from families, differing in terms of their level of stability, to the test judgments we used in our 1975 and 1976 studies in Moscow indicate that unhappiness in the family was mainly due to the absence of emotional closeness between spouses, even in those cases when this did not result in overt conflict. Most of the husbands and wives in the unhappy families noted an insufficiency of emotional communication and mutual understanding (see Table 2).

The insufficiency of understanding and empathy was felt more keenly by women than by men. Several of the statements aroused a response only from women with unhappy marriages—for example: "My husband does not take my concerns to heart," "My husband rarely takes my mood into consideration," "I do not like to tell my husband about my feelings" and others (see Table 3).

As a rule, factors connected with the emotional atmosphere in the family were always of primary significance among causes of dissatisfaction. A study we conducted in 1978 in conjunction with the editors of RABOTNITSA magazine,⁴ we learned that both men and women put mutual understanding between spouses and sensitivity in their treatments of one another in first place, mutual respect and trust in second place, participation by the husband in bringing up the children in third place, and only then considered all other factors. This distribution of answers was corroborated by a control question about the factors having a negative effect on family stability. Mutual understanding, sensitivity and concern--that is, emotional factors--were again given priority. An analysis of the psychological personality traits of the spouses leads to the same conclusion. The qualities most highly valued in a spouse (both by men and by women) are kindness and responsiveness. In other words, people now regard marriage primarily as a source of empathy, understanding, interaction and emotional compatibility.

The findings of the 1978 study were used as the basis for a factorial analysis. The results of this analysis revealed three statistically significant factors affecting family stability. The first, which can be interpreted as "emotional support and mutual understanding in the family" includes five variables carrying the greatest "weight" (see Table 4).

As we can see from Table 4, all of the variables making up the first factor are close in value and pertain to the sphere of the emotional interrelationship of the spouses (concern, tenderness, sensitivity, etc.). The correlations between these variables are also high, and this attests to their interconnection and interdependence.

For example, the coefficient of correlation (Spearman coefficient) between the first and the third statements is 0.41, between the first and fourth it is 0.34, and between the first and second it is 0.36. There are also relatively high coefficients of correlation between all other characteristics which indicate such personal traits as sensitivity, concern and tact.

When the tests were being validated, it became apparent that these statements had a pronounced capacity for distinguishing between levels of family stability and could be used as an instrument in marriage forecasting. If the answers of both spouses to the test statements were to be assigned points (from 0 to 3), then the greatest difference between the number of points assigned to stable and unstable families would be seen in the statements pertaining to the factor of "emotional support and mutual understanding" (see Table 5).

Therefore, an analysis of concrete sociological data indicates that the absence of empathy, mutual understanding and emotional support between spouses leads to a situation in which the family does not perform one of its basic functions--the function of creating and preserving emotional and psychological comfort. If a relationship ceases to give emotional satisfaction to spouses, there is mounting dissatisfaction with the marriage, and this has a negative effect on the future of the family as a whole.

Table 5

Average Number of Points (for Answers of Both Spouses
to Test Statements)

Test statement	Families			Difference between point totals
	Stable	Unstable	Intermediate	
My wife (husband) has never spoken to me in a harsh tone	2.87	1.53	1.04	1.83
My wife (husband) and I almost always agree in our assessment of other people's actions	2.97	2.07	1.40	1.57
My wife (husband) does not take my concerns to heart	3.73	3.09	2.28	1.44
My wife (husband) is particularly tender and affectionate with me	3.40	2.76	1.96	1.44
My wife (husband) is always willing to give me support when I have difficulties	3.73	3.22	2.43	1.25
When something unpleasant happens to me, I do not feel alone	3.67	2.98	2.60	1.07

Table 6

Proportional Significance of Variables Making Up Factor
of "Preparedness for Marriage"

Test Statement	Factoral weight
It seems to me that my family obligations far outweigh my rights	0.47
It is not wise to give in to a wife (husband), as this will lead to submission	0.52
I did not expect family life to take so much of my time and energy	0.78
I did not expect marriage to put me in so many difficult situations	0.71

A factor, which can be interpreted as "preparedness for marriage" and which determines the spouses' satisfaction with their marriage, is significant in this connection. Our research findings proved that the variables making up this factor carry a great deal of factoral "weight" (see Table 6).

The correlation between the statements listed in Table 6 is quite significant, attesting to their interconnection (the coefficient of correlation between the third and fourth statements is 0.41, and between the first and second it is 0.32). A lack of preparedness for the difficulties of marriage (as revealed in responses to these statements) correlate with indicators of

emotional unhappiness in the family. Two of the statements--"I did not expect family life to take so much of my time and energy" and "I did not expect marriage to put me in so many difficult situations"--correlate with the statement "My mood is generally ruined at home" (a Spearman coefficient of correlation equivalent to 0.31). Moreover, there was a considerable difference between responses to this statement (see Table 7) in stable and unstable families. The average number of points assigned to the responses of both spouses in stable families was higher than in the unstable families by the following amounts--by 1.15 points for the statement "It seems to me that my family obligations far outweigh my rights," and by 0.71 points for the statement "I did not expect family life to take so much of my time and energy."

Table 7

Degree of Unpreparedness for Married Life, Measured as a Percentage Value of the Number of Persons Satisfied and Dissatisfied with Marriage*

Test statement	Reaction to statement	Men		Women	
		Satisfied with marriage	Unsatisfied with marriage	Satisfied with marriage	Unsatisfied with marriage
I did not expect marriage to bring me so much trouble and put me in so many difficult situations	Yes	10	28	12	48
	No	70	55	75	37
	Und.	20	17	13	15
I did not expect family life to take so much of my time and energy	Yes	12	25	12	50
	No	74	68	78	50
	Und.	14	7	10	10
It seems to me that my family obligations far outweigh my rights	Yes	10	40	3	43
	No	69	40	80	40
	Und.	21	20	17	17
I have no intention of changing my habits, even if my wife (husband) does not like them	Yes	35	35	12	37
	No	49	47	76	43
	Und.	16	18	12	20
It is not wise to give in to a wife (husband), as this will lead to submission	Yes	8	28	7	30
	No	80	52	80	57
	Und.	10	20	13	13
I try to suppress my bad moods at home	Yes	61	42	66	40
	No	12	38	22	43
	Und.	24	20	12	17

* According to the findings of the 1977 study.

A lack of preparedness for family life is reflected in a lack of knowledge about possible future difficulties, both physical and psychological in nature. The need to spend all of one's time on household affairs and to care for an infant is interpreted as a "loss of freedom." The dissatisfaction of young married couples is sometimes due to the inconsistency of

their expectations (romantic love) with the realities of life. Insufficient psychological maturity and an undeveloped sense of responsibility for the fate of the family and each of its members frequently lead to dissatisfaction with the marriage and with one's spouse. It is precisely for this reason that special instruction to prepare young people for marriage and counseling services for young families are acquiring particular significance.

Couples begin to encounter the difficulties of mutually psychological adaptation during the very first days of married life. Family life requires that all of one's interests, tastes and habits be made consistent with the interests and habits of another person; it calls for the ability to make compromises in conflict situations, to suppress negative emotions and to develop tolerance for the weaknesses of the other person and a desire to overcome one's own shortcomings. Family conflicts are less often caused by psychological differences than by the inability or, more frequently, the reluctance of spouses to make compromises and display restraint, tact and compliance. The ability to give in for the good and happiness of loved ones is the moral norm in marital relations and a necessary condition of normal family life. Respect for one's spouse and his opinions and patience even with his errors are extremely important in married life. The problem of mutual adaptation becomes particularly acute after the birth of a child, when additional difficulties and responsibilities arise and when the equality of men and women is replaced by some inequality in the home. Only those marriages in which the spouses try to understand one another and find mutually acceptable solutions to problems can take on responsibility and possess the necessary trustworthy emotional basis.

Marriage should satisfy one of the most important recognized human needs--the need for love, faith in the value, significance, uniqueness and inimitability of the personality of one's partner and one's own personality. It is in emotional contacts with a spouse that a person gains a sense of his own value, a recognition of his own "ego," and develops self-awareness and self-control. This "ego" can only be preserved and strengthened if it is constantly supported by the spouse. The underestimation of the personal worth of one spouse or the verbal expression of doubts as to the value of the person disrupts the stability and harmony of interpersonal relations in the family.

According to the results of research, including a study conducted by sociologists at Moscow University, the need for self-respect is often not satisfied in many families. For example, many women constantly criticize their husbands in front of their parents, friends and acquaintances, ask them to follow the examples of other men and thereby diminish their personal dignity. Insufficient respect in the family often motivates men to look to other groups or other individuals to satisfy this need and thereby engenders unhappiness and psychological discomfort in the family. In our study, 82 percent of the men believed that insufficient respect and understanding on the part of a wife is the main reason for family instability.

An analysis of the causes of divorces initiated by women, however, testify that these are largely related to the rudeness of men, their reluctance to consider their wives' opinions and their inability to give their wives support in difficult situations. In their opinion, the degree to which the partners are prepared for marriage also has a considerable effect on the stability (or instability) of the family (see Table 7).

Surveys of young couples during the first years of marriage indicate that the same problems give rise to different consequences in different families--ranging from acute conflicts to the absence of any negative reaction.

As we know, the mutual adaptation of spouses is generally considered to be a situation in which the actions of one agree with the expectations of the other. Moreover, there are various ways of accomplishing this adaptation--when one spouse or the other modifies behavior patterns so that they will coincide with the expectations of the other spouse, or when both strive for mutual accommodation. For example, in the opinion of Logswell researchers (United States), a marriage can only be successful when both partners have an individual capacity for adaptation, and this quality must be developed in childhood. The ability to adapt to family life should be regarded as the most important element when people are being prepared for marriage. We do not require any particular proof of the fact that people who are habitually impatient, unstable, oversensitive, demanding and so forth have less chance of establishing a strong and happy family. The capacity for adaptation depends on the psychological traits of individuals, as well as on their desire or wish to understand one another, their intention to actively work toward happiness in marriage and their preparedness for married life.

Our studies reveal a correlative relationship between indicators of the spouses' capacity for adaptation and their desire to adapt to the family situation (see Table 8).

Table 8

Reactions of Respondents to Statements Describing Attitudes
Toward Adaptation, % of Families Surveyed*

Test statement	Reaction	Families	
		Stable	Unstable
I have no intention of changing my habits even if my husband (wife) does not like them	Yes	11	56
	No	79	34
	Und.	10	10
It is not wise to give in to a wife (husband), as this leads to submission	Yes	16	56
	No	77	33
	Und.	7	11
I try to keep my bad moods from showing at home because I do not wish to upset other members of the family	Yes	79	16
	No	16	75
	Und.	6	9

* According to the findings of the 1975 study.

Table 9

Average Number of Points, Indicating Authority and Self-Confidence
of Chief Members of Unstable Families

Family member	Character Traits of Spouse			
	Authority		Self-Confidence	
	As evaluated by men	As evaluated by women	As evaluated by men	As evaluated by women
Husband	3	3	3.3	3.3
Wife	4.5	4	4.7	3.7

Table 10

Relationship Between Decision-Making Possibilities and Type of
Family, % of Families Surveyed

Method of making crucial decision	Families	
	Stable	Unstable
Made by husband	11.1	16.7
Made by wife	7.4	33.3
Joint decisions	81.5	50.0

According to the 1977 study, the difference between responses to statements in stable and unstable families was considerable--from 0.87 to 0.91 points. The correlation coefficient was 0.37 between the first and second statements and 0.31 between the second and third. Our research findings corroborated our supposition that men are more inclined to adapt than women during the initial stage of the marriage (the first 5 years). For example, in the case of 33 percent of the women, a situation in which the husband's behavior did not agree with the wife's expectations aroused pointedly negative reactions, conflict and a reluctance to make compromises. The husbands (44 percent of them), on the other hand, tried to avoid overt conflict, and 51 percent displayed a tendency to adapt. During the initial stage of the marriage, the husbands gave in more than 2.5 times as often as women when disputes arose. In the stable families, husbands and wives were more likely to make mutual compromises (70 percent) than in the unstable families (42 percent). In the stable families, husbands gave in 21 times out of a 100 while wives gave in 9 times, but the figures for unstable families were 14 and 7 respectively. In more than 17 percent of the unstable families, neither the husband nor the wife would agree to even the slightest compromise in a conflict situation.

Marriage involves an intricate complex of relations which are constantly developing and are influenced by a multitude of factors. The deterioration of marital relations and the appearance of undesirable character traits in the spouses or their negative interpretation are interrelated.

The research findings indicate a definite relationship between the woman's character, her inclination toward submission or domination, and the stability of the family. Women in stable families are much more likely to admit their tendency to give in, although they are also confident of their own strength. Almost all of the husbands in these families said that their wives had such characteristics as self-confidence, the ability to take care of themselves, and practicality, but they did not find their wives to be authoritarian. In the unstable families, women are more likely to display a tendency to dominate, both according to their husbands and according to their own admissions, but they also depend more on their husbands and are less self-sufficient. For example, 40 percent of the women like to give orders and 50 percent cannot bear to have their own actions dictated by someone else. Women in unstable families also have a higher average number of points indicating authority and self-confidence (see Table 9).

A more complex relationship is revealed in an analysis of the characteristics of husbands in families of both types. In 25 percent of the stable families, the husbands, according to their wives, "are sure of themselves," in 75 percent they "are able to stand up for themselves," and in 50 percent they "cannot bear to have someone order them about." At the same time, the number of women who said that their husbands were striving to control or rule the family was extremely low. Actually, the internal structure of families of this type is characterized by a definite "equilibrium." Neither of the spouses wishes to be overtly dominant, each strives for equality in the relationship and for mutual assistance, and an atmosphere of respect between the spouses reigns in the family. As we mentioned above, the men in a considerable percentage of the stable families are distinguished by compliance, which creates the necessary conditions for cooperation and collaboration, and this was actually perceived.

In the unstable families, the husbands are characteristically inclined either toward domination or toward submission: 45 percent are authoritative, 30 percent are easily influenced, 30 percent strive to avoid making decisions and 35 percent are dependent. In both cases, either one of the spouses dominates or both strive for leadership, which creates tension in the family.

The relationship that was found between the psychological traits of the spouses and the stability of the family is also reflected in the actual division of functions within the family. An egalitarian structure of authority is more often characteristic of stable families. Unstable families can have either an authoritarian or an egalitarian structure of authority, or even leadership by the wife (see Table 10).

It is possible that the dominant position of women in unhappy families is not always a result of the psychological peculiarities of their character, but is more likely to stem from the inability or reluctance of their husbands to concern themselves with family problems. Dissatisfaction with roles arises when a spouse must yield to an authoritarian decision or unilaterally make a crucial decision without having had any previous intention to play this role. Role dissatisfaction always leads to dissatisfaction

with the marriage. The changing structure of the family frequently results in more authoritarian behavior on the part of the wife. As a result, both husbands and wives become dissatisfied with their roles as these do not agree with their aims and expectations.

The analysis of research findings presented above provides grounds for several conclusions.

1. The most significant factor in the stabilization of the urban family turned out to be the complex factor of "the nature and content of emotional relations between the spouses and the expectations connected with them." This conclusion, which is based on the findings of local concrete sociological studies, should serve as a guideline in the future, not only in the search for ways of stabilizing the family, but also in the organization of propaganda--in the disclosure and description of the most significant factors determining the strength of family ties. Among these factors, particular importance should be attached to the development of emotional standards, particularly such personality traits as emotional sensitivity, restraint, the ability to control one's feelings and discretion in the display of emotions.
2. The stability of marriage and satisfaction with marriage are also guaranteed by the desire for mutual understanding, the ability to adapt to new, sometimes more complex, circumstances, and the incorporation of precise standards of family behavior and communication in family life. In this connection, indoctrinational work to "cultivate high standards of interrelations, responsiveness, kindness and congeniality" acquires particular significance.⁵ It is essential, V. V. Grishin points out, "to do everything possible to ensure that each Muscovite, at all times and in all places, experiences and personally cultivates a congenial atmosphere in keeping with the humane, truly democratic nature of the Soviet order and the socialist way of life and meeting the specifications of a model communist city."⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. I. Yu. Rodzinskaya and Ye. F. Safro helped with the research. The factorial analysis was conducted by V. S. Avanesov. The sample group consisted of 800 individuals.
2. Calculated according to data in "Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 g." [Results of the All-Union Population Census of 1970], Moscow, 1971, vol 7, pp 238-380.
3. In 1970 the rate was 5.4 per 1,000 inhabitants and 49 divorces for each 100 marriages--VESTNIK STATISTIKI, 1977, No 12, p 78.
4. See RABOTNITSA, 1978, No 12.

5. Speech presented by Comrade V. V. Grishin at a meeting of the voters of the Perovskiy Electoral District--MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 15 February 1979.
6. Ibid.

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PROBLEM OF CRIME PREVENTION IN BIG CITIES

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pp 46-55

[Article by Professor Genrikh Mikhaylovich Min'kovskiy, doctor of juridical sciences and sector head at the All-Union Institute for the Study of Causes of Crime and Crime Prevention Measures]

[Text] The objectives of communist construction and, above all, the indoctrination of the new man require that phenomena impeding the progress of the socialist society be expunged from life in this society. "The institution of the proper order wherever it is being violated--in the production sphere and in government and public life--represents a great reserve in the development of our society."¹

Legal offenders impose considerable moral and material harm on society, "have a pernicious effect on other morally unstable people and are capable of resurrecting the spirit of greed, selfishness and the standards of the bourgeois way of life."²

In the mature socialist society, the objective preconditions are taking shape and developing for the elimination of these phenomena, which are inconsistent by their very nature with our social structure, and their causes. In the last 50 years, the rate of crime in the nation has decreased approximately 3.5-fold, and during the postwar period it has decreased 2-fold.³

Nonetheless, law enforcement has not lost its tremendous significance under present conditions. "The higher our society rises in its development, the more intolerable deviations from socialist moral standards become.... In the struggle against such phenomena, it is necessary to make complete use of the opinion of the labor collective, criticism in the press, persuasive methods and the force of law--all of the means at our disposal."⁴

Effective struggle against crime and other legal offenses calls for a systemic, comprehensive approach. This is why the comprehensive planning of this struggle is being regarded more and more as a part of economic and social planning on all levels.⁵ Large-scale social measures for the enhancement of public well-being and the elevation of the cultural standards and consciousness of members of society neutralize and eradicate factors giving rise to

crime in addition to solving other problems. There is also a reciprocal effect: Purposeful preventive work eradicates or reduces the undesirable "expense" of some processes of social development. According to expert estimates, the comprehensive use of the possibilities of preventive activity could already be preventing seven or eight out of every ten crimes that are still being committed.

"Autonomous" plans for the fight against crime and other legal offenses have turned out to be largely ineffective, since planning of this kind is either confined to the framework of departmental (or interdepartmental) undertakings by law enforcement agencies or actually transcend the sphere of their competence, as they envisage measures which should be planned on the general social level with consideration for existing resources.

This struggle cannot be waged successfully out of the context of the actual conditions in a republic, oblast, city or rayon.⁶ For example, sample studies have shown that two or three times as many legal offenses might be committed in one settlement than in another with similar characteristics.

The possibilities inherent in the very nature of the socialist society and goal-oriented measures will guarantee a steady decline in the rate of crime and other legal offenses and reduce these to a minimum in settlements of any type, including big cities. For example, the rate of juvenile delinquency decreased by 25-30 percent in Moscow⁷ and Leningrad and by 11 percent in L'vov over the space of 10 years.

These data conclusively refute the theories of Western criminologists concerning the alleged fatal dependence of the crime rate on urbanization and migration patterns. In our society, the discovery of inauspicious criminal tendencies in certain cities, rayons and so forth testifies primarily to shortcomings in the planning and organization of indoctrination and preventive work and insufficient consideration for specific local conditions. After all, the legal offenses in a particular city or rayon do not stem from isolated factors, but from the entire complex of these factors.

When crime prevention work is organized in Moscow and other big cities, provision is made for the differentiated study of circumstances fostering crime: a) in terms of age groups, b) in terms of the territorial characteristics (rayon, neighborhood, residential building, school, enterprise), c) in terms of the distinctive features of the professional media. For example, the "geography" of microgroups with negative displays of behavior varies from one region to another, the type of employment determines the probability of contacts with negative influences in the immediate environment, the assimilation of negative stereotypes with respect to leisure pursuits, etc. Taking these features into account makes it possible to trace the workings of the lasting effects and variations of criminogenic factors in their interaction.

It is fundamentally incorrect to say that living conditions in big cities are more criminogenic than the rural way of life. The answer lies elsewhere. Conditions are more complex here, since more interconnected factors must be taken into account, particularly the following:

The size of the city, rayon or territory, population density and distribution patterns and neighborhood density;⁸

The rate of the city's development;

The functional characteristics of the city;

The structure of the population (sex, age, education, family, professional, skills, membership in public organizations, ratio of migrants to permanent inhabitants, breakdown of migrants in terms of reasons for migration, and percentage of individuals working in the city but living outside its boundaries);

The structure of enterprises and establishments (in terms of branches, dimensions, the stability of labor collectives⁹ and so forth);

Material and consumer conditions;

Possibilities for cultural pursuits in leisure time;

Possibilities for advanced general educational and professional training;

Organizational and resource characteristics of agencies and institutions carrying out indoctrination and preventive work.

Groups of problem situations of a criminological nature can also be clearly distinguished in a big city--namely, the following:

a) the complication of education and social control in the family in connection with the low birth rate, the rising percentage of broken homes, the decline of the educative value of housework, long distances between the place of employment and the place of residence, etc.;

b) the concentration of a substantial contingent (primarily youth) in communal quarters;

c) the anonymity of leisure pursuits; the distances, in many cases, between the preferred location of leisure pursuits and the place of residence, and the ease with which moves are made in the city and its suburbs;¹⁰

d) the difficulty of coordinating indoctrinational and preventive work in the neighborhood and the place of employment due to their separateness;

e) the presence of extensive job placement opportunities, which reduce the incentive of people without strong labor ties to continue working in a particular job;¹¹

f) the concentration of college applicants from small towns and rural locations, as well as from among tenth-graders in the given city, which leads to the formation of a certain group of individuals who do not enroll

in academic institutions and do not take permanent jobs anywhere while waiting for the next series of entrance examinations. The members of this group are 20 or more times as likely to violate the laws than other individuals of their age who are engaged in academic studies or permanent employment;

g) the concentration in big cities of large numbers of newcomers,¹² individual on business trips, vacationers and Soviet and foreign tourists, their overcrowding in certain spots (train stations, trade enterprises and so forth) and the related possibility of negative contacts involving them;

h) the appeal of big city conditions (where it is easier to "get lost" because of population density) to criminal elements;

i) the public preference for detached dwellings, many of which are left unguarded for long periods of time each day and are not properly equipped with alarms and locks;

j) the opportunity for people with antisocial attitudes to establish contact with one another and to form groups;

k) a broad network for the sale of hard liquor;

l) the arrival of many individuals, who have been negatively affected by their previous place of residence, on city construction sites and in some vocational and technical institutes.¹³

At the same time, the conditions of the big city establish the necessary prerequisites for effective indoctrination and preventive work. The cities, which "represent centers of the economic, political and spiritual life of the people and are the prime movers of progress,"¹⁴ possess a vast array of means and possibilities for the purposeful and positive development of the individuals and the guarantee of careers for members of society with consideration for their abilities and interests. The city is also distinguished by maximum concentration of resources for preventive work based on comprehensive planning. The idea of approaching the city as a single entity, necessitating the proportional and interrelated development of all elements and the coordination of economic, social, technical, legal and administrative aspects,¹⁵ organically includes aspects related to crime prevention.

This is precisely how the matter has been stated in connection with the objective of turning Moscow into a model communist city. The maintenance of "exemplary public order" has been called an essential element in the resolution of economic, educational and consumer problems.¹⁶ The Constitution of the USSR provides the necessary legal basis for this by designating law enforcement, the maintenance of public order and the protection of civil rights as compulsory functions of local authorities in addition to, and in conjunction with, all other functions (Art 146).

Judging by the experience that has been accumulated in Moscow and other big cities, we can single out three main levels on which crime prevention measures are included in the general system for the control of municipal social development:

The informative or signaling function, entailing the determination of optimal parameters of general social development;

The elaboration and implementation of measures to restrict or eliminate negative influences contributing to the commission of crimes or other legal offenses;

The elaboration and implementation of preventive measures and deterrents by law enforcement and other specialized preventive agencies to reduce the crime rate, prevent relapses into crime and rehabilitate criminals.

It is not enough to simply mention the "level of law enforcement" when the specific indicators of municipal development are being described.¹⁷ It is also not wise to exclude the objectives of crime prevention from the general social subject matter of municipal development.¹⁸ This does not mean that criminologists play the leading role among planners of economic and social development: Their task, as we have already pointed out, is one involving "maintenance." This is why it is difficult to agree with authors who include such elements in purely criminological studies as, for example, questions connected with the job placement of youth, the balance of labor resources and so forth. Criminologists can and should provide information about the possible effects of the existing situation on the level and structure of legal offenses. But the decisions connected with social measures "only indirectly perform an anticriminogenic function."¹⁹

At present, the effectiveness of the fight against crime depends largely on informational and analytical material and the condition of individual preventive work.²⁰

Criminologists who take part in the economic and social planning of municipal development should have information of the following types at their disposal: a) a statistical description of the current status of crime and other legal offenses, including latent delinquency;²¹ b) the processes and phenomena that correlate intensively with the status of crime; c) the influence of "external" factors (seasonal migration and so forth) on the crime rate in the region; d) the capabilities of preventive agencies operating in the region; e) the volume and structure of measures taken against offenders.

Experience has shown that the possible alternatives of development in a big city can be forecasted for a period of 3-5 years with an accuracy rate of up to 10-15 percent.²² This makes it possible to determine the "limits" of progressive changes, in general and in relation to individual types of offenses, contingents and objects, in semiquantitative form: the "stabilization," "slight reduction" and "considerable reduction" of the crime rate, etc.

The major facets of informational and analytical activity are the collection and summarization of data: a) on the particular contingents in which crime is most widespread; b) on the personality of the legal offender; c) on territories and objects with a high or low crime rate, including crimes committed by permanent residents (the rayons in a big city can be categorized in this connection as "exporters" and "importers" of crime). It is extremely important to precisely discern the sources of these data, including indirect (preventive and medical) records; the data of the internal affairs agencies, the administrations of enterprises and academic institutions, the social legal services of public health agencies and guardianship agencies; the materials of civil courts and job placement agencies; personnel records and so forth. It is also important to determine the particular points at which reports do not coincide on the level of the oblast, city, rayon or collective (so that these gaps can be filled by means of simple studies).

Centralized records of all types of criminal behavior on the citywide level are also useful. They provide the basis for summary indicators for the rayon, enterprise and so forth. The projected development of certain ASU subsystems ("city" and "association") seems promising.

During the process of informational and analytical activity, it is important to give some attention to data on the normative rights and resource possibilities of preventive agencies so that projected measures will be realistic.²¹

The proper organization of the collection, summarization, analysis and storage of information in a big city calls for the following: the distribution of functions among basic preventive agencies and the creation of statistical data "banks" covering a period of at least 10 years (by means of ongoing tables and graphs); the establishment of a permanent interdepartmental task force with computers and a programmer at its disposal. This will give rise to the need for the normative regulation and standard procedural control (at least on the regional level) of informational and analytical activity involved in the comprehensive planning of crime prevention measures.

One of the basic objectives of this activity is the creation of optimal conditions for individual preventive work. It is precisely in the transition from large-scale general social and special preventive measures to work with specific individuals or groups with criminal inclinations that considerable possibilities can be found for enhancing the effectiveness of all preventive activity.

The difficulties of individual preventive work are largely due to the scarcity of information about unhappy families and individuals displaying deviant behavior. According to available data, two-thirds of the unhappy families in Moscow with juvenile delinquents among their members were unknown to law enforcement agencies and the public until the crimes were committed. In some cities only one out of every six such families is known to the authorities in advance of the crime. This is the reason for one important aspect of comprehensive planning--the elaboration of measures envisaging the timely exchange of information on incidents and situations calling for indoctrination and preventive work.

Considering the peculiarities of the family structure in big cities, the timely determination of a pedagogically correct parental position is essential. Problems in the general pedagogical training of parents and the problem of "indoctrinating the indoctrinator" in general are of particular significance.²⁴ Data on legal offenders indicate, in particular, the special significance of work with so-called "weak" families. In contrast to "problem" families,²⁵ the pedagogical weak families are not distinguished by sources of overtly negative influence. Something else is obvious here: the unconscious setting of examples of disregard for spiritual values, alcohol abuse and coarse behavior. According to our data, 70 percent of the minors who committed crimes under the influence of alcohol had begun drinking in the home. For this reason, the intensive assistance of the collectives of academic institutions and the public in the creation of the proper educative atmosphere in pedagogically weak families is of great value in the early prevention of crime as well. One of the main forms of assistance is the extended day-care group. According to the estimates of V. D. Yermakov, approximately 50 percent of the children from families of this type are now enrolled in such groups. Besides this, two-thirds of the groups consist of pupils in the first through third grades. From the standpoint of prevention, however, it is extremely important to include more pupils in the fourth through eighth grades from pedagogically weak families in these groups.

The avoidance of the socially undesirable consequences of difficulties in the adaptation of some elementary schoolchildren to school life is acquiring particular importance to crime prevention in connection with the intensification of the academic process. This has led to a situation in which pupils from families with a low educational and cultural level (according to estimates, 5-10 percent) are in an unfavorable position from the beginning. The importance of not allowing this contingent to lag behind, which has been stressed in criminological information, has necessitated the elaboration of measures for the differentiated preparation of such children for school.

Information on the criminogenic consequences of the higher education ambitions of secondary school graduates is also necessary for the social planning of the development of general and professional education in a city. Obviously the problem consists in progressing from the narrow vocational guidance of graduates to socioprofessional guidance for the purpose of instilling them with the conviction to combine personal and public interests in the choice of a career.

Furthermore, we would like to point out the value of information on the prevalence, structure, causes and conditions of criminal offenses in the working public. In particular, in comparison to the total population of the city, twice as many of these offenders do not have an eighth-grade education and 3.5 times as many are dissatisfied with their profession, specialty and place of employment (two-thirds have been on their current jobs less than a year). These data constitute another argument in favor of the special planning of indoctrinational work with new arrivals at enterprises with a low educational level and no apparent prospects. The significance of this approach is attested to, for example, by the experience of the

ZIL Plant, where the rate of crime among young workers decreased 2.5-fold in 5 years. There is no question that a substantial part in this was played by the association's system of control over the adaptation, indoctrination and professional growth of young workers, which envisages the necessary organizational measures (including a foreman in each shop who engages exclusively in indoctrination), normative procedural information and differentiated groups of indoctrinational measures for persons who have been working less than 1 month, up to 6 months, up to 1 year and up to 2 years.

When we speak of the significance of criminological information for the development of the leisure pursuits of the public in a big city, it should be noted that existing cultural institutions are not being put to adequate use. In some cities, sports facilities are only used on a level equivalent to 30-50 percent of their capacity, approximately only one out of every ten schools has organized Saturday and Sunday clubs, etc. This is evidently due to the absence of a single center for neighborhood indoctrinational work. The cultural and indoctrinational work that is performed is frequently assessed in terms of the quantity of undertakings and their participants, while what is needed is an indicator of the actual satisfaction of demands for undertakings of a specific type (for example, in a rayon with _ number of persons registered in preventive roles, it would be expedient to encourage _ to join clubs, but the actual number is _).

The practice of assessing the final impact of measures should also be instituted (for example, the particular number of persons who modify their behavior after joining clubs or at least stay within the sphere of this work; according to some data, only 20-30 percent of problem adolescents can adapt to sports clubs or school).

Let us now take a look at specially planned preventive measures. This particular section of the plan for economic and social development places primary emphasis on the restriction and elimination of negative phenomena which are the immediate causes of crime and other offenses. In a big city, these primarily include drunkenness and alcoholism, long periods during which the individual does not engage in socially useful labor, situations in which students must repeat grades or drop out of school, unauthorized absences and other serious violations of labor discipline. Naturally, the harm incurred as a result of these phenomena consists in far more than the stimulation of criminal behavior. But they are extremely significant causes of crime. For example, one out of every three murders or serious physical injuries is preceded, according to sample data, by a drunken argument; two out of every five rapes are preceded by drinks with chance acquaintances.

In this connection, comprehensive measures to combat crime and other legal offenses should include the following types of measures: propaganda against alcohol and the development of public intolerance for alcohol abuse, the stimulation of social control by the family,²⁶ the improvement of social and medical services for the treatment of alcoholics (with priority assigned to the development of drug and alcohol abuse counseling in places of employment),²⁷ the modification of alcohol consumption patterns, the inculcation of proper drinking habits and the restriction of sales of liquor.

Measures to combat the evasion of work and school are also important in crime prevention. The group of persons leading a parasitical way of life is small, but it accounts for more than 15 percent of all crimes committed in the city. This is why primary significance is being attached to the timely discovery of such individuals.

Many of them were academic failures or "drop-outs"; moreover, in two-thirds of the cases, this was the result of a lack of discipline, laziness and irresponsibility, and it was only in 10 percent of the cases that the absence of the proper educational opportunities was to blame. The mechanism of improper personality development which leads to violations of labor discipline is analogous to this. Systematic unauthorized absences and other violations of labor discipline are followed by the commission of crimes in 60-65 percent of all cases. For this reason, comprehensive planning should include measures to ensure the complete and timely disclosure of such incidents and the proper reaction to them, as well as measures to combat their concealment.

An important aspect of the planning of specific preventive measures is connected with the timeliness and adequacy of indoctrinational work. Many of the employees of crime prevention agencies regard the registration of the names of people with criminal inclinations as an end in itself. At the same time, it has turned out that in half of these cases their direct indoctrinational contacts with these individuals have taken place less than once a week, and this is obviously not enough. It would seem that measures to ensure the proper intensity of individual preventive influence and control should be a mandatory part of comprehensive plans.

Another important shortcoming of preventive practices, which should be overcome through comprehensive planning, is the tendency to overemphasize the significance of educating the offender, while it is also essential to exert some indoctrinating influence on his immediate environment. Studies have shown that from two-fifths to one-half of all minors who committed crimes were not previously under the surveillance of preventive agencies, and if their crimes were not prevented this was generally due to the absence of measures to improve their surroundings.

Comprehensive planning also aids in the correct choice of persuasive measures, which should correspond to the individual's behavior, living conditions, upbringing and so forth. This gives rise to the need for recommended procedures in dealing with individuals who differ in terms of age, degree of social neglect, characteristic pastimes, and relationships in the family, in personal life and on the job. It is necessary to work toward three major goals in dealing with individuals whose behavior and contacts indicate the possibility of criminal behavior: the restoration and development of normal interpersonal communication, a sense of social responsibility and discipline.

An investigation of preventive practices also suggests the need for the more thorough planning of measures to eliminate situations which invite crime (the patrolling of streets by police, the installation of alarm systems in residences and storage facilities, the installation of antitheft devices in

motor vehicles, etc.). In spite of their seeming simplicity, these measures are quite effective. According to the sample data of A. S. Shlyapochnikov, for example, the installation of locks in entryways, day-patrolling of residential areas and other measures reduce the rate of residential burglary by 30 percent or more.

Another important aspect of the comprehensive planning of crime prevention in a big city is connected with convincing the public of the inevitability of punishment for crimes. Measures to ensure the complete registration of all crimes and to bring criminal incidents to the attention of the population (particularly those with great public repercussion) aid in lowering the crime rate considerably. It also appears promising to measure the correlation between the practice of applying legal measures to criminal patterns in the city (the methods used by D. O. Khan-Magomedov) and to plan for the periodic disclosure of public opinion in regard to the effectiveness of law enforcement activity.

A study of several plans for crime prevention work showed that (according to the data of A. F. Tokarev) from 30 to 60 percent of the projected measures were connected with the investigation and discussion of the crime rate. Despite all the importance of this aspect of the work, it is obviously necessary to place more emphasis on measures which are directly connected with limiting the effects of criminogenic factors and eliminating these factors, as well as disseminating the positive experience accumulated in preventive work with individuals. In the group of plans we studied, procedural measures represented around 10 percent of all those envisaged, which is obviously not enough.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, after discussing the application and observance of legislation concerning the maintenance of order and the combating of crime by prosecuting and internal affairs agencies, specifically stress the need for "a comprehensive approach to the resolution of problems in crime prevention and the unification of the efforts of government agencies, schools, the family, public organizations and labor collectives in this important field."²⁸

In this connection, one of the main responsibilities of the compilers of comprehensive plans is to ensure the effective use of the strength and capabilities of administrative, economic, indoctrinational and law enforcement agencies. According to estimates, existing normative acts envisage direct participation by more than 40 different government and public agencies in preventive work on the level of the city and rayon. Our sample study showed, however, that participation by trade organizations in special preventive measures was actually only envisaged in 10 percent of the plans, participation by public health agencies was envisaged in 25 percent, participation by municipal services and housing agencies was envisaged in 30 percent and participation by enterprise legal offices was not envisaged at all.

Considerable attention should also be given to the need for constant territorial interaction in the big city. This means that it is necessary to modify general objectives in relation to the conditions and possibilities of the rayon (and, later, the neighborhood and the collective) in combination with coordinated preventive work by rayon agencies and the same type of agencies in other rayons on the horizontal level. This latter aspect is still being given insufficient consideration on the rayon level of social planning.

A system for planning crime prevention in a big city is now taking shape. It consists of the following: 1) a group of measures pertaining to the basic areas of economic and social development; 2) a group of goal-oriented preventive measures, concentrated in a special section of the plan for economic and social development; 3) detailed interdepartmental programs for the resolution of specific problems; 4) departmental plans for measures stipulated in the comprehensive plan.

Sociological analysis of the avenues for the further improvement of this system and the generalization of past experience will indisputably have a positive effect on the status of the fight against crime.

FOOTNOTES

1. Brezhnev, L. I., "On the Constitution of the USSR," Moscow, 1977, p 41.
2. Grishin, V. V., "O rabote Moskovskoy gorodskoy partiynoy organizatsii po osushchestvleniyu kompleksnogo podkhoda k vospitaniyu trudyashchikhsya v svete resheniy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [On the Work of the Moscow City Party Organization in the Implementation of a Comprehensive Approach to the Indoctrination of Workers in Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1977, p 29.
3. See Shchelokov, N. A., "Strengthening Law and Order," PRAVDA, 23 Jan. 1977; Ostroumov, S. S. and Yakubovich, M. I., "O prestupnosti i nakazanii" [On Delinquency and Punishment], Moscow, 1976, pp 8-10.
4. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 78.
5. See Kudryavtsev, V. N., "Sociological Problems in the Study of Anti-social Behavior," SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, 1974, No 1; Baimbetov, A. A., "Social Problems of the Fight Against Crime in Planning for the Development of a Big City," author's abstract of candidate's dissertation, Moscow, 1977; "Teoreticheskiye osnovy preduprezhdeniya prestupnosti" [The Theoretical Bases of Crime Prevention], edited by V. K. Zvirbul', V. V. Klochkov and G. M. Min'kovskiy, Moscow, 1977; "Sotsial'naya profilaktika pravonarusheniy v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve" [Social Prevention of Crime in the Socialist Society],

edited by D. A. Kerimov, A. V. Mitskevich and T. M. Shamba, Moscow, 1978.

6. It has been established that around 250 social factors correlate with the crime rate in a big city.
7. The data presented here and further on have been taken primarily from sample studies of the crime rate among minors and young adults. This is due both to the particular significance of planning for crime prevention work among these groups and to the fact that this subject matter has been studied relatively thoroughly. Premises illustrated by these data, however, are of general significance.
8. The extent of mutual contacts by neighbors and, consequently, the effectiveness of this form of social control are diminished as the number of stories in residential buildings increases.
9. The rate of crime in a collective is inversely proportional to the degree of its stability.
10. Up to 20-25 percent of the legal offenses committed by young people in many city rayons are committed by individuals who come into these neighborhoods from other rayons or even from other populated points.
11. From two-fifths to four-fifths of all young citizens who commit crimes have already changed their place of employment at least once.
12. Around 2 million individuals arrive in Moscow each day.
13. For example, according to the data of sample studies, new arrivals account for 60-70 percent of the total student body of some vocational and technical institutes, and one out of every four of these has been brought up under adverse conditions.
14. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 23, p 341.
15. See Bocharov, Yu. and Lyubovnyy, V., "The City as an Integral Socio-economic Complex," KOMMUNIST, 1979, No 2, pp 50, 58.
16. Grishin, V. V., Op. cit., pp 11-12.
17. See, for example, Borshchevskiy, M. V., Uspenskiy, S. V. and Shkaratan, O. I., "Gorod. Metodicheskiye problemy kompleksnogo sotsial'nogo i ekonomicheskogo planirovaniya" [The City. Procedural Problems in Comprehensive Social and Economic Planning], Moscow, 1975.
18. See, for example, German, I. M. and Mal'tsev, V. I., "Sotsial'noye planirovaniye v gorodskom rayone" [Social Planning in the Urban Rayon],

Saratov, 1976. The authors' discussion of special preventive measures includes the development of amateur artistic activity, technical modeling and the study of the fundamentals of Soviet law (p 118), although these have broader social purpose.

19. "Kompleksnoye izucheniye sistemy vozdeystviya na prestupnost'" [The Comprehensive Study of the Crime Deterrent System], edited by P. P. Osipov, Leningrad, 1978, p 55.
20. It is the defect of some comprehensive plans that they attempt to directly reflect individual indoctrination and preventive work (for example, by including a point such as "the disclosure of the names of all individuals who take unauthorized absences from work"). It is obvious that such points in the plan formally reproduce a list of the day-to-day duties of indoctrination and law enforcement agencies: Plans should envisage general measures to analyze the existing situation and influence it.
21. This refers to the specific percentage of crimes which remain unknown to law enforcement agencies. The absence of data on the extent of latency makes it impossible to draw accurate conclusions in regard to the urgency of specific aspects of preventive work or in regard to the volume of resources to be allocated.
22. We cannot agree with the view that the main thing in social planning "is not to determine the precise level..., but to scientifically reveal tendencies and the exact workings of negative phenomena" (German, I. M. and Mal'tsev, V. I., *Op. cit.*, pp 112-113). It is not likely that one could be achieved without the other.
23. This kind of analysis points up, in particular, the lack of correspondence between the volume of functions and the resources available to juvenile affairs commissions. Although they are expected to perform three or four times as much work as juvenile courts, they have only one staff position. In a big city, it is possible to maneuver staff reserves to compensate for this inconsistency.
24. See Kharchev, A. G. and Alekseyeva, V. G., "Obraz zhizni, moral', vospitaniye" [The Way of Life, Morality and Indoctrination], Moscow, 1977, pp 67-68.
25. This problem is also quite urgent. Suffice it to say that there were four or five times as many previous offenders and five or six times as many drunks in families with juvenile delinquents than in the control group. But these families are comparatively easy to discover and the proper legal measures have been taken.
26. The results of surveys indicate that approximately 70 percent of all cases of alcohol abuse begin with the tolerance or encouragement of one's peers.

27. Their work is more effective than the work of industrial medical treatment and preventive care offices, since the individual who abuses alcohol stays in his customary collective and is affected by its positive influence.
28. PRAVDA, 18 January 1979.

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PARTY AND KOMSOMOL EDUCATION

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE CONTEMPORARY IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 56-65

[Article by Nikolay Mironovich Keyzerov, doctor of philosophical sciences and professor at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee]

[Text] In the developed socialist society, the keeping of constant records on public opinion is a constitutional principle and derives from the essence of Soviet democracy, representing the development of its Leninist tradition. V. I. Lenin wrote: "We want the government to always be under the control of national public opinion."¹ In contrast to this, the bourgeois state, carrying out the dictates of the monopolies, ignores the interests, wishes and opinions of a huge segment of the working public. This is the reason for the insurmountable conflict between imperialist state policy and public opinion.

World public opinion actively supports the principles of the peaceful co-existence of states with differing social structures, international detente and the further consolidation of peace and the security of peoples. It resolutely condemns the intrigues of imperialist reactionary and aggressive forces and all direct and indirect violations of the generally accepted principles governing relations between states on the basis of nonintervention in their internal affairs.

The intensification and complication of the ideological struggle during the current stage of international development have given rise to the important need to further activate world public opinion. This calls for the more thorough study of its social nature and internal structure, the natural laws governing its formation and developmental dynamics, and its role and functions in the ideological process and the struggle of ideas in the international arena.

Marx summed up the essence of public opinion in an apt phrase--the "judgment of the people."² Works by the founders of Marxism-Leninism contain a thorough description of the class nature of public opinion, an in-depth differentiated analysis of public opinion and a demonstration of its organic connection with its concrete repositories and means of expression.

Soviet sociologists interpret public opinion as the active side of public awareness, the judgments of large and stable groups of individuals in regard to socially significant issues of common interest.³ The ideologists of anticommunism have a diametrically opposed interpretation of public opinion.

Bourgeois sociologists generally approach the definition of public opinion from the idealistic standpoint, taking it out of the context of the material conditions of life in society. They generally ascribe the active characteristic to "elite opinion," while representing mass opinion as an "inert force" following the lead of the ruling class' "leaders of opinion." According to the traditional view of bourgeois scientists, public opinion signifies the judgment of the most well-informed members of society, who are more highly developed in the intellectual and moral sense than others, on a specific issue. This judgment is persistently disseminated and inculcated by bourgeois propaganda, as a result of which it is frequently taken up by fairly broad circles of capitalist society as their own view. In many Western scientific publications, public opinion is interpreted as "individual opinion or the opinion of a small group of individuals who, by virtue of circumstances, have an opportunity to be heard."⁴

In contrast to bourgeois sociologists, Soviet researchers list the following as characteristics of public opinion: its class, concrete historical nature, its vulnerability to politics, its dynamism and intensity, and its direct connection with an issue or situation in relation to which a particular group of individuals act as a single entity and publicly express their point of view or position.⁵

It is indicative that in capitalism's initial stages, during the era of bourgeois revolution, social philosophy and political science regarded public opinion as an active creative force, representing a factor of social progress and an important element of sociopolitical life and public administration.⁶ As soon as the bourgeoisie took power, however, and particularly in the imperialist age, the assessment of public opinion became more and more politically reactionary--the conservative or antidemocratic approach to public opinion as a negative and irrational destructive force became increasingly apparent; it is now treated as the incompetent "judgment of the men in the street," threatening the disruption of public order and political stability. Active public opinion now suggests to the ideologists of the antidemocratic current that "something is wrong in government."

These Western theoretical concepts are consistent with the political practice of ignoring public opinion and distorting its essence and value. Monopoly dictatorship in the system of the mass information and propaganda media nullifies the possibility of expressing the opinions of workers who are defending their own views and positions in the heated ideological struggle.

Some Western sociologists have had to admit that there is an obvious connection between the activation of public opinion and the exacerbation of social conflicts. For example, R. Dawson studies public opinion as a factor

contributing to the aggravation of political conflict and crises, since the interests of citizens are not expressed through such traditional political channels as ruling parties, representative institutions and elections.⁷ This is the reason, he goes on, that public opinion becomes uncontrollable and gives rise to "political disorder," among which the author includes worker demonstrations, the civil rights movement of the blacks, the fight against racial discrimination, the student movement, the activities of the New Left, peace demonstrations and so forth.

The political struggle in the capitalist society reflects the irreconcilable conflict between the opinions, interests and values of the average citizen on the one hand and the policies and actions of government, reflecting the interests of the capitalist monopolies, on the other. There is a fundamental difference between the bourgeois reformists and revolutionary types of participation by public opinion in the resolution of social conflicts. R. Dawson, just as many other bourgeois sociologists, advocates "overcoming conflicts within the framework of the system," although he does admit that the "policy of reconciliation" has given rise to new forms of political conflict between public opinion and the authorities instead of lessening social conflicts. Dawson has to admit that conflicts in public opinion, which result from the division of society into haves and have-nots, are being supplemented by new contradictions in the way of life, the system of values and the moral code, which is enhancing the role of public opinion in the struggle of ideas.

Public opinion is playing an exceptionally important role in the contemporary ideological struggle. In the first place, the struggle of ideas is not an end in itself, but is being waged for the minds and hearts of people. In the second place, public opinion is itself actively involved in ideological confrontation, corroborating some positions and views and contradicting others. In the third place, the results of ideological battles become part of public opinion in the form of attitudes toward the programs of political parties, social and political institutions, value systems, etc. In the fourth place, the positions and attitudes of public opinion are not rigidly fixed; they change under the influence of the dynamics of the ideological struggle and increased political activity on the part of the working class and the progressive public.

French writer Louis Oury remarks that the pursuits and views of the bourgeoisie reflect the "meaninglessness of their vacuous world" and contrasts these to the positions and opinions of the workers. "The main distinction," he writes, "is that there are also certain fighters--whose courage I particularly admire--who are unknown to me and who pass out leaflets in the morning, before work begins, offering them to our engineers and our supervisors. The ability to express one's opinion so frankly in the view of the very people on whom one's future totally and completely depends--this, in my opinion, attests to the grandeur of the individual's spirit and the strength of his character, and is in striking contrast to all of the nonentities who are capable of all sorts of loathsome actions just to keep from ruining their pathetic little careers."⁸

The cohesive basis of world public opinion consists of the opinions and positions of the international working class and the increasing authority of the Marxist-Leninist communist and workers parties, representing the intelligence, integrity and conscience of our era. Despite the active use of all possible methods of public misinformation by anticommunist propaganda, support for the policies of the communist parties is obviously growing in various social strata in the capitalist countries.

The increasing influence of the world socialist system on the course of international development is the major tendency of the current era. "Socialism," L. I. Brezhnev says, "is already having an enormous effect on the thoughts and feelings of hundreds of millions of people on earth." The qualitative shift in public opinion in favor of socialism is frightening the strategists of imperialist policy, who are subsidizing the West's numerous "brain trusts" searching for new means of counteracting this objective process.

When we examine the attitude of public opinion in the capitalist countries toward the world's first socialist country from the global standpoint, we naturally see the dominant tendency in its evolution, which can be traced quite clearly over more than 60 years of socialist construction: The acute confrontation of ideas is bringing an increasingly profound realization of the advantages of socialism to the working class and to all laborers and is constantly increasing the number of socialism's supporters in the labor intelligentsia and the middle strata.

A scientific explanation of the complex and contradictory ideological process by which socialism gains increasing support from the foreign public was provided by V. I. Lenin in the first years after the socialist revolution in Russia. He predicted that this tendency would be the prevailing one in the future. According to V. I. Lenin, the support and sympathy of the working masses constituted one of the main reasons for the failure of the imperialist powers' attempts to carry out their criminal plans and the evil "deed of openly and immediately suffocating Soviet Russia."¹⁰

"The first responsibility of any party of the future," V. I. Lenin said, "is to convince the majority that its programs and tactics are correct.... We in the Bolshevik Party have convinced Russia."¹¹ One important aspect of the development of Lenin's ideas, connected with gaining the sympathy of world public opinion, became the further elucidation of CPSU foreign and domestic policy, the advantages of socialism and its achievements, and the exposure of bourgeois propaganda's insinuations about socialism.

The natural and constant enhancement of the prestige of socialism in world public opinion is attested to by the most varied objective criteria and sources. These include the data of sociological questionnaires, interviews granted to journalists by prominent political and public spokesmen, outstanding cultural figures and representatives of the scientific community, travel diaries, journals, essays, articles, speeches, letters and other "human documents."

A tremendous quantity of documented material, which deserves thorough sociological investigation and summarization, is concentrated in the anniversary publications issued in our nation and abroad to commemorate Great October as the major event of the 20th century.¹² They reflect the substantial shifts in world public opinion in favor of socialism.

The main reasons for socialism's increasing appeal are rooted in the humane basis of its genuine democracy--the social opposite of capitalism and monopoly dictatorship. The foreign public's sympathy for socialism was increased considerably by the nationwide discussion and adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, which evoked widespread international response.

After carefully and thoroughly analyzing the activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet and summarizing a huge quantity of factual material, American writers J. Pittman and S. Sudman proved the groundlessness of anticommunist allegations that there is no "free exchange of views" in the highest organ of Soviet authority. Meaningful discussion of important political issues in a profoundly democratic atmosphere is an integral part of the daily practical activity of Soviet organs of authority on all levels. The American scientists conclude that, in contrast to bourgeois democracy, which reflects the irreconcilability of class conflicts and essentially represents dictatorship by the bourgeoisie, socialist democracy is permeated by the desire to achieve a consensus of opinion: the optimal alternative decision is chosen after detailed and thorough consideration of the opinions and judgments of all deputies and the encouragement of experts to serve on standing commissions.¹³

Article 9 of the new Constitution of the USSR states: "The principal guideline for the development of the political system of Soviet society is the further evolution of socialist democracy: broader participation by citizens in the management of government and societal affairs, the improvement of the machinery of state, increased activity on the part of public organizations, stronger public control, the reinforcement of the legal bases of state and social life, broader public awareness and the constant recording of public opinion."

The Declaration of the Moscow Convention of the Warsaw Pact States (Moscow, November 1978) contains an appeal addressed to all states and peoples: "Let us resolutely initiate firm adherence to the policy of peace, detente, the refusal to use force or threats of force in international relations, the peaceful settlement of all disputes, the unconditional condemnation of aggressive wars, the complete exclusion of war between states from the life of mankind, the curtailment of the arms race and the total eradication of all remaining traces of the cold war."¹⁴

The attention of the world public also centers around questions connected with the establishment of a new economic order and struggle against colonialism, hunger and poverty, exploitation, discrimination, racism and fascism--against all of the ominous phenomena accompanying militarism. Vivid proof of the authority of world public opinion can be seen in the growing movement

against the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction, particularly the campaign to protest the neutron bomb, which radically contradicts all principles of humaneness and morality.

Despite the fact that the mass news and propaganda media in the West ignore or play down all manifestations of public opinion in support of peace, this opinion is becoming an increasingly strong social force and important factor in international life.

V. I. Lenin once wrote that "the mood, enthusiasm and conviction of the masses should be manifested and are being manifested in the form of action."¹⁵ We could cite many examples of the activation of public opinion, not only in connection with specific intrigues and aggressive actions on the part of imperialist reactionary forces in the "hotspots" of the world, but also in relation to issues of a general nature, pertaining to the further normalization and democratization of international relations.

The Chicago branch of the Council on Foreign Relations has published the extremely interesting results of an American public opinion poll on U.S. foreign policy issues.¹⁶ Many Americans (33 percent) favor cuts in foreign policy programs (military "aid," the sale of weapons, CIA operations overseas, military spending, etc.) and the assignment of priority to domestic problems, such as the acute shortage of energy resources, the trade deficit, unemployment and others. Nonetheless, the majority (60 percent) expressed an interest in foreign policy and favored an active role for the United States in international affairs in the present and future.

Researchers of public opinion have ascertained the clearly expressed "amazing reluctance" of the population to expand U.S. military commitments to other nations, and to belong to NATO and other military blocs (this was advocated by 25 percent, while the opposite view was only expressed by 5 percent). The public also quite categorically supported reduced army influence on foreign policy.

A survey conducted by the University of Cleveland proved that U.S. public opinion, in spite of the ideological diversion of the CIA, resolutely supports the further normalization of international relations. For example, three out of every four Americans believe that detente is a "good thing," and the overwhelming majority of the American public supports the conclusion of nuclear disarmament agreements with the USSR. Almost half of the respondents criticized the "human rights campaign" launched by the new American administration and said that "questions of Soviet domestic policy are none of our business." In view of the fact that the foreign policy line of the imperialist states is inconsistent with the wishes of the public, broad social strata in the capitalist countries are demanding that public opinion play the deciding role in setting foreign policy priorities and that the influence of the military-industrial complex on foreign policy-making be reduced and, eventually, eradicated.

Contemporary bourgeois sociological publications also contain statements, however, that denigrate the role of public opinion in the assessment of foreign policy issues. The allegations that the antimilitaristic current in public opinion has passed through its active phase and that interest in foreign policy has diminished and is disappearing are untrue.

Secretary-General Gus Hall of the Communist Party of the United States of America has noted a revival of mass antiwar demonstrations and movements in the United States and an increase in the number of people supporting peace. For example, 71 percent of all Americans polled favor detente in relations with the Soviet Union, and the data of the last public opinion poll conducted by the Harris service indicate that the attitudes of the masses have undergone considerable changes since 1977, when many respondents favored the production of the neutron bomb, and that the majority now objects to this.¹⁷

As G. Hall points out, however, the forces of political reaction in the United States, which are constantly growing more active, are using exceedingly subtle methods of public misinformation and the latest means of manipulating public opinion. The method of the "mass" approach is quite indicative in this respect. This consists in the computer-processing of data on the mass mood and public opinion trends in each region and in each ethnic and professional group with its specific interests. After determining the issues evoking the most heated public response, the mind manipulators calculate (again with the aid of computers and tests) the "effectiveness" of the demagogic thesis of militaristic propaganda in regard to the "Soviet menace" and the "threat of lay-offs" or "reduced employment" as a result of the deescalation of the arms race, the intensity of the effects of propaganda describing SALT as "surrender to Moscow," etc.

Incidentally, so-called public opinion "polls," which are conducted by special services in the West, are closely connected with government circles and the military-industrial complex, they often present an obviously falsified picture of the actual positions and judgments of the public and they frequently become a means of deceiving the population and an instrument for the exertion of psychological pressure on the voters.

V. I. Lenin wrote that what lies behind the facade of bourgeois democracy is not "freedom of the press" and the expression of opinions in the true sense of the word, but the "freedom" to "purchase and fabricate 'public opinion' in the interest of the bourgeoisie."¹⁸

Ruling circles in the capitalist countries conduct public opinion polls to stimulate individual activity in the reinforcement and stabilization of the system and to intensify the obsession with ephemeral "personal success." During this process, every opportunity is taken to discredit any efforts to change the status quo, and conservative stereotypes and biases are cultivated.¹⁹

Due to the growing severity of the crisis of bourgeois society, public opinion is becoming the object of the most subtle manipulation on the part of the dominant class, which has monopolistically usurped the mass news and propaganda media. Bourgeois propaganda is distinguished by its desire to soothe public opinion, which has been upset by political scandals, by presenting the matter in such a way that all of the blame is assigned to individuals rather than to the capitalist society as a whole. This is the reason for the hoax represented by the current strategy of "personalizing politics."

All of the varied methods of manipulating public opinion, used as a tool of monopoly dictatorship, primarily boil down to misinformation, the cultivation of false ideas about socialism, and the advertising and justification of capitalism. Everything possible is done to "extinguish the audience's interest in reality," muffle dissatisfaction and arouse a thirst for consumption."

Several Western sociologists have noted that the ruling elite is using various maneuvers to unethically control the views and behavior of individuals by creating false ideas about reality, omitting and distorting facts, misrepresenting opposing views, concealing accurate information, transmitting false testimony, etc. American sociologist M. Schiller categorizes the false ideas lying at the basis of manipulative control in terms of five "myths": 1) the myth of personal freedom and individual choice as a specific behavioral life style in a society based on private ownership, private enterprise and free competition; 2) the illusion of the neutrality of all key social and political institutions (government, the mass media, the educational system, science, etc.), which allegedly take an unbiased stand "above conflicting interests"; 3) the myth of the invariability of human nature (for example, discussions in the Freudian spirit about man's aggression complex; 4) false ideas about the absence of social and racial conflicts and the denial of the class division of society through the creation of illusions of "social harmony"; 5) the myth of the pluralism of the mass media, as a unique type of "informational abundance."²⁰

One definite tendency in the development of public opinion in the Western countries is increasingly loud criticism of capitalism as a social system and the energetic expression of protests against its inequities.

Soviet scientists (Yu. A. Zamoshkin, A. Yu. Mel'vil' and others) who have analyzed the status of U.S. public opinion at various times and on various levels, have noted the "erosion" of traditional values, the loss of faith in major political institutions, the mounting "bitter dissension and conflict" within the nation and in relations with allies, uneasiness in connection with the outburst of political violence, a "guilt and failure complex," a "new wave of social criticism" and so forth. Various symptoms of acute dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the nation are particularly characteristic of American public opinion. According to the data of L. Harris' Institute for the study of public opinion, the number of persons dissatisfied

with the economic and sociopolitical situation in the nation has risen constantly during the last 10 years: Whereas in 1966 dissatisfaction was expressed by 29 percent of all respondents, the figure had reached 59 percent in 1974 and, by March 1976, 61 percent of all Americans were already experiencing feelings of dissatisfaction and disillusionment.²¹

In connection with the attempts of ideologists of rightist leanings to understate the scales and significance of negative public feeling and to give this feeling another direction, it is important to stress the fact that the criticism and protest of the workers in regard to imperialist foreign and domestic policies are actually even more widespread than these polls indicate. The false logic of bourgeois researchers of public opinion generally takes the system "beyond criticism" and depicts discerning segments of the public as isolated groups of personal failures who have been unable to achieve success because they do not have enough will, talent, industry and other purely personal qualities.

There is absolutely no basis for the position of American theoreticians who try to put the blame for negative public opinion on "fault-finding stereotypes," on the leftist and liberal intelligentsia. The increasingly critical tone of public opinion stems from objective causes: the economic, ideological and political crises, the bankruptcy of the imperialist bourgeoisie's foreign and domestic policies, the dominant position of the military-industrial complex, the concentration of power in the hands of top-level representatives of the ruling class, the corruption within this class, the lack of solutions for racial and ethnic problems, the dehumanization of labor and the entire way of life, etc.

It is indicative that the "spectrum of dissatisfaction" takes in the most important and sizable areas of the bourgeois society's functioning. From the data of American public opinion polls, Soviet researchers have drawn the conclusion that profoundly qualitative, as well as quantitative, changes took place between 1966 and 1976 in the thinking of enormous segments of the population.²² The Harris Institute has noted the following signs of profound dissatisfaction in the American population, characteristic of the last 10 years: Many Americans (61 percent) express the belief that "the people in charge of the country do not care what happens to me" (26 percent in 1966); the number of Americans who feel "alienated" from what is going on around them was equivalent to 42 percent of the population in 1976 and had more than quadrupled since 1966 (9 percent in 1966); in 1976, 64 percent of the U.S. population believed: "It does not matter what I think" (37 percent in 1966).

In 1975, 70 percent of the Americans were dissatisfied with the work of Congress, and a year later only 9 percent of the Americans expressed a high degree of trust in Congress, and only 11 percent expressed trust in the executive branch. The results of 1976 polls testify that 63 percent of the Americans believe that "people with power use people like me in their own interests" and 68 percent were convinced that "the people in Washington" do not know what is going on in the country.

Here are the opinions of the majority of respondents: "The government takes freedom away from people" (62 percent); "people with power do not evoke more trust" (82 percent), "moral standards in the nation are low and are still declining" (73 percent), "there is no justice for the poor" (47 percent). These symptoms of social protest must be used more extensively to expose capitalism's apologists.

The strategists of the imperialist bourgeoisie fully realize the danger of the increasing radicalization and critical potential of public opinion on urgent social problems and are using every means within their power to counteract the growth of feelings of disillusionment, dissatisfaction and despair, which are characteristic of increasingly broad segments of the population in the capitalist countries.

The attempts of bourgeois propaganda to depict the incurable ills of capitalism as some kind of "blessing" are quite indicative in this connection. When the outburst of passions over the Watergate affair in the United States reached its peak, imperialist propaganda began to manipulate public opinion for the purpose of turning this criticism of capitalism to its advantage by interpreting the crisis in the political system in the apologetic spirit of mythical "proof" of the superiority of the "Western model" of democracy "to other democratic forms of government." Famous propaganda expert T. Sorensen declared without a trace of embarrassment that the "settlement of the Watergate case" could only be described as a symptom of the "strength of the U.S. political system."²³

Whereas public opinion in the capitalist society is used for the purpose of political and ideological manipulation and social maneuvers, the opinion of the public and the opinion of labor collectives in the socialist society represent an important, deciding factor in the system of state and public administration.

The November (1978) CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted the tremendous significance of broader businesslike initiative, deriving from the very midst of the masses and capable of arousing and inspiring millions of people, and then turned its attention to the current objectives of mass political and ideological work. L. I. Brezhnev said the following: "Not long ago, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee discussed letters that had been sent to the Central Committee and pertained to aspects of ideological work. Communists and persons with no party affiliation write that this work has risen to a new level in recent years. Many letters, however, stressed the fact that here, just as in any other type of work, requirements are rising, tasks are becoming more complex and the present level is already not high enough."²⁴

The elucidation of the following questions will be of great practical and scientific value: To what degree, by what means and in which form is the ideological struggle actually reflected in public opinion? Answering these questions will necessitate not only the investigation of key theoretical and

methodological problems concerning the place, role and functions of public opinion in the struggle of ideas, but also the concrete study of specific ideological situations in various regions, with consideration for the unique reactions of public opinion to particular facets of ideological confrontation.

Experience has proved the groundlessness of the theories and views of bourgeois mind manipulators who regard socialist public opinion as "a passive observer of the battle" between the two ideologies, as a passive object of influence, recording and accumulating "positive" information about the bourgeois way of life and the "negative stereotypes" of anti-communist propaganda.²⁵ The truth is that bourgeois ideology and propaganda are usually not "passively reflected" in the public opinion of the new world, but are resolutely rejected.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Present Status and Measures for the Improvement of Propaganda Lectures" stresses that ideological work under present conditions "must be systematically conducted in all collectives, it must be profoundly scientific in content and vivid in form, it must be irreconcilable and militant in the struggle against bourgeois, Maoist and revisionist ideologies, it must provide exhaustive answers to important and vital questions and it must serve as an effective means of developing and studying public opinion."²⁶

In ideological confrontations, the communists oppose the "charters," "declarations" and "opinions" of anti-Soviet slanderers, cooked up according to the recipes of imperialist special services, with the real voice of the public and irrefutable arguments concerning the truth about socialism and the facts of life in the fraternal republics; they oppose nationalist distortions with internationalist convictions.

Our press, radio, television, soviet and party institutions and public organizations are receiving a huge and constantly growing quantity of responses to the decisions of party congresses and plenums, published party documents and speeches about the socialist way of life and the advantages of socialist democracy. Many of these "human documents" attest to exceptionally vivid and fresh perceptions and all of them attest to the broadest public support for party policies. The "Readers' Opinion" section of PRAVDA and other publications of the Soviet press which reflect the process by which the decisions of the November (1978) CPSU Central Committee Plenum are being implemented are quite indicative in this connection.

Socialist public opinion actively forms not only communist views and convictions, but also an offensive stand in the struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideologies. This is why mass news and propaganda media on all levels must express the positions of the Soviet public on current issues as fully and efficiently as possible.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 35, p 19.
2. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 15, pp 441-444, 450-455.
3. Uledov, A. K., "Public Opinion and Its Purposeful Guidance," POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE, 1975, No 7; Safarov, R., "Public Opinion in the Developed Socialist Society," KOMMUNIST, 1977, No 12.
4. See "Amerkanskoye obshchestvennoye mneniye i politika" [American Public Opinion and Politics], Moscow, 1978, p 31.
5. Ibid., p 32.
6. See Ganochauol, C., "Opinion publique et changement social chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau," REVIEW FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 1978, No 5.
7. Dawson, R. E., "Public Opinion and Contemporary Disarray," N.Y., 1973.
8. Oury, L., "The Proletarians," Moscow, 1977, p 116.
9. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 16.
10. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 44, p 293.
11. Ibid., vol 36, p 172.
12. These include the following outstanding collections: "Druz'ya Oktyabrya i mira" [The Friends of October and Peace], Moscow, 1967; "France Faced by October," Paris, 1967; "Ya videl budushcheye. Pisateli i deyateli kul'tury zarubezhnykh stran o Soyuze Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik. 1917-1977" [I Have Seen the Future. Foreign Writers and Cultural Spokesmen on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 1917-1977], vol 1-2, Moscow, 1977; and others.
13. Pittman, J. and Sudman, S., "By Public Mandate. How Soviet Authority Works," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1977, No 5.
14. PRAVDA, 24 November 1978.
15. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 11, p 58.
16. "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1975," Chicago, 1975.
17. Hall, G., "The Exacerbation of Conflicts and Mass Action," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1978, No 12, p 8.

18. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 44, p 79.
19. The book "Amerikanskoye obshchestvennoye mneniye i politika" contains interesting information about the manipulative means of influencing public opinion.
20. See Schiller, M., "The Mind Manager," Boston, 1973.
21. THE HARRIS SURVEY, 29 March 1976.
22. "Amerikanskoye obshchestvennoye mneniye," pp 201-204.
23. WORLD TODAY, 1974, vol 30, No 12, p 502.
24. KOMMUNIST, 1978, No 17, pp 15-16.
25. Connor, W. D. and Gitelman, Z. N., "Public Opinion in the European Socialist System," N.Y., 1977.
26. POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE, 1978, No 4, p 4.

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APPLIED RESEARCH

PECULIARITIES OF MIGRATION PROCESSES IN NATIONAL REPUBLICS OF SIBERIA AND THE FAR EAST

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 66-72

[Article by Vladimir Mikhaylovich Gas'kov, graduate student at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress envisage the comprehensive development of the economy in regions of Siberia and the Far East, an increase in the mining of nonferrous, rare and precious metals and diamonds, the construction of large electric power stations in West Siberia, the commencement of work on the development of the South Yakut territorial production complex and more intensive work in the development of productive forces in the Baykal-Amur Trunkline zone.¹ The significance of the development of eastern regions as an important area of party socioeconomic policy was reaffirmed during the Siberia and Far East tour of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in April 1978.

The fulfillment of party decisions is indissolubly connected with the development of the necessary labor resources with the required qualitative composition in these regions. The augmentation of the population of working age in East Siberia, particularly its autonomous republics, is lagging far behind the requirements of the rapidly developing economy. According to our estimates, the annual increase in manpower requirements in Buryat and Yakut cities exceeds the rate of natural population growth by 30 percent, and the figure is 60 percent in cities of the Tuva ASSR. Rural locations in the Buryat and Yakut ASSR's, however, have a relative surplus of labor resources, with a natural rate of increase which annually exceeds the demands of agriculture by approximately 1.5-fold, and even 3.5-fold in the Tuva ASSR.²

Consequently, one important socioeconomic objective in the development of eastern regions is the creation of the necessary conditions for a distribution of labor resources that would, on the one hand, guarantee their efficient utilization and, on the other, aid in encouraging native ethnic groups to enter the leading branches of physical production and in augmenting the growth rates of ethnic segments of the working class and the technical intelligentsia. The redistribution of the population in connection

with the territorial distribution of productive forces, the maintenance of a particular level of spatial mobility and the modification of the qualitative composition of regional populations represent the social functions of migration processes.³ This means that the study of factors determining the direction and intensity of migration in newly developed regions is acquiring greater practical scientific value.

Our objective is to determine the specific characteristics of the structure and factors of migration processes in the autonomous republics of Siberia and the Far East--the Buryat, Tuva and Yakut ASSR's. The data for this article were obtained as a result of a sample survey of workers employed in national production, conducted by the author in 1977-1978. Respondents were selected according to quotas based on the sex and age structure of the population (according to the 1970 census). Members of ethnic minorities were selected separately to guarantee that the results would be representative. The sample group consisted of 2,650 individuals.

The calculated rate of error in representation did not exceed 20 percent in comparison to statistical indicators. Considering the fact that the rate of error in the registration of migrants in materials of the USSR Central Statistical Administration reaches 10-13 percent,⁴ we can consider this sample survey to be sufficiently representative.

As we know, the eastern regions of the RSFSR are distinguished by a high rate of population mobility, a less complete process of structural formation and a lower level of stability. The composition of the population, which evolves under the influence of objective conditions, is, in turn, a major factor in migration. In scientific publications, these factors are called demographic, genetic and ethnic.⁵ In the republics of East Siberia, the native population represents a relatively high percentage in rural areas (79 percent in the Tuva and Yakut ASSR's and 30 percent in the Buryat ASSR) and a small share of the urban population (11-15 percent in the Buryat ASSR and 24.7 percent in the Tuva ASSR). The ethnic composition of the population as a factor of migration largely determines the specific effects of genetic and demographic sectors. The concepts of the ethnic factor of migration patterns reflect, above all, differences between ethnic groups based on language, material and spiritual culture, everyday life, customs, habits, etc.⁶ V. I. Perevedentsev believes that these differences are not a significant obstacle for Russian migrants, but they are a substantial impediment to the migration of the native population outside republic boundaries.⁷ According to A. V. Topil'an, the ethnic factor only impedes individual migration.⁸

The data in Table 1 indicate, however, that there was little difference in the intensity of the departure of Russians and Buryats from Buryat cities to cities outside the republic in 1977, while the intensity of migration to rural areas outside the republic was 3 times as high for the native population in cities than for Russians. The high intensity of external migration by the Buryat population is due to the presence of large administrative complexes (mainly in agriculture) with a Buryat population in the neighboring areas of Irkutskaya and Chitinskaya oblasts.

Table 1

Intensity of External Migration by Buryat Urban Population

Nationality	Direction of migration flow	
	To urban areas	To rural areas
Russians	0.9	0.7
Buryat	0.8	2.2

Indicators of the intensity of migration from Tuva cities to rural locations were twice as high for the native population as for Russians, and were equivalent to 1.5 and 0.8 respectively. Indicators of migration from rural to urban locations were 10 times as high for the Russian population as for the Tuvins and were equivalent to 3.5 and 0.34. The ethnic factor could significantly reduce the intensity and impact of the migration flow of non-native nationalities to rural locations. Table 2 presents data which testify that the intensity of migration by the native population from Buryat cities to rural areas is 4 times as high as the indicator for Russians.

Table 2

Intensity of Intraregional Migration of Buryat Population

Nationality	Direction of migration flow			
	Urban-Rural	Rural-Rural	Rural-Urban	Urban-Urban
Russians	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.9
Buryats	2.8	1.0	1.0	1.3

Some authors believe that the intensity of migration by the native population depends little on economic factors.⁹ At present this is only true in cases of interregional migration and the economic sector connected with the presence of job vacancies in industry. Migration by the native population from rural areas to cities also increases under the influence of differences in living conditions. For example, the levels of intensity for Russians and Buryats are the same in the Buryat ASSR, as the percentage accounted for by each nationality in the migration flow is equivalent to their proportional representation in the population.

Migration patterns still differ widely in connection with the time of arrival. Table 3 shows that the percentage accounted for by Russian newcomers in Buryat rural areas is 1.5 times lower than the percentage accounted for by Buryat newcomers, and that Russians represent 41.6 percent of independent migrants who have been in the area for up to 5 years, while Buryats represent 74.9 percent of this total. The distribution of newcomers is the same in urban settlements; at the same time, the percentage of Russian independent migrants who have lived in the new location for up to 5 years differs significantly in contrast to rural figures, from the same indicator for Buryat

migrants. A comparison of the data in tables 2 and 3 suggests the presence of sociodemographic groups in the native population of the republic which has displayed a high degree of migration activity, and this has led to some equalization of migration indicators for the total population of the republic.

Table 3

Distribution of Migrants in Terms of Time of Arrival in Rural Areas and Urban Settlements of the Buryat ASSR, % of number surveyed

Composition of migrants	Have resided in this location for:				
	Up to 1 year	1-2 years	2-5 years	5-10 years	More than 10 years
Rural areas					
Russians	11.7	14.3	15.6	37.7	20.7
Buryats	19.4	22.2	33.3	19.4	5.7
Urban settlements					
Russians	5.4	10.0	27.2	27.2	30.2
Buryats	26.9	3.8	15.4	34.6	19.3

Table 4

Proposed Duration of Stay in a Location, % of Number Surveyed

Population composition	Proposed duration of stay				
	Up to 1 year	2-3 years	4-6 years	Permanent	No Undecided response
Rural locations					
Russians	2.6	3.0	0.9	73.4	2.7
Buryats	0.8	5.8	2.5	58.4	1.7
Urban settlements					
Russians	2.0	4.2	1.5	58.4	1.7
Buryats	5.3	10.5	0.0	55.3	2.6

Table 5

Proposed Duration of Stay by Migrants with Different Times of Arrival in Location (Buryat Rural Areas), % of Number Surveyed

Time of arrival	Less than 1 year	2-3 years	4-6 years	Permanent	Undecided	No response
Less than 1 year ago	11.1	11.1	0.0	27.8	44.4	5.6
1-2 years	9.5	4.8	0.0	28.6	57.1	0.0
2-5 years	11.1	11.1	0.0	37.0	40.7	0.1
5-10 years	2.7	2.7	2.7	56.8	32.4	2.7

In our opinion, this explains why young natives of the republic have begun to play the leading role in migration processes. They adhere less to the traditions of their ethnic group with respect to migration behavior.

In order to estimate potential migration, we can compare the data in tables 2 and 4, where responses are distinguished according to attitudes in regard to migration behavior.

Table 4 indicates that the potential intensity of departure by the Russian and native populations from Buryat rural locations will be virtually identical in the next 3 years, which corresponds to the data in Table 2, where the anticipated intensity of departure from Buryat rural locations is also identical for Russians and Buryats. At the same time, the potential intensity of migration by the native population from urban settlements in the next 3 years will be 2.5 times as high as the same indicator for the Russian population, which corresponds to the data in tables 1 and 2, according to which the intensity of departures by the native population from Buryat cities to rural locations, to republic cities and to rural locations outside the Buryat ASSR exceeded the same indicators for the Russian population 4.7-fold, 1.4-fold and 3.1-fold respectively, and the levels of migration intensity for these nationalities coincided in other respects.

The genetic structure of the population--that is, the distribution of individuals by groups depending on their place of birth and the time of their arrival--plays an important part in the regulation of migration processes in Siberian republics. When we divide population into natives, old residents and newcomers, we can say that the intensity of migration is directly proportional to the percentage of newcomers in the population.¹⁰ The eastern regions in general have a higher percentage of newcomers in both urban and rural areas than other parts of the nation. For example, this indicator is 1.5 times as high in Yakut and Tuva cities as the average indicator for East Siberia, and twice as high as the indicator for West Siberia. At the same time, the percentage accounted for by newcomers in Tuva and Yakut rural regions is much lower than in the Buryat ASSR and does not exceed the indicators for West Siberia.

According to our research findings, presented in Table 5, there is a considerable difference between the potential duration of the stays of migrants who arrive at different times. The reduction in the group of migrants who arrived in the given rural location within the last year or two and the percentage of those proposing to leave within the next 1-3 years is apparently connected with the fact that the more active newcomers have already changed their place of residence again.

Migrants choose the regions of their birth as a new place of residence in those cases when living conditions are worse in the region they are leaving. The role of the genetic factor can be described with the aid of a migration repetition index.

Let us assume that the intensity of departures is directly proportional to the percentage accounted for by all newcomers and inversely proportional to that accounted for by newcomers who came from the particular location. The index of repeat migration from cities in the region will have the following appearance:

$$I_{urb.} = \frac{\text{Number of newcomers in cities}}{\text{Number of newcomers arriving from urban and rural locations in the given region}}$$

For rural locations, it is the following:

$$I_{rur.} = \frac{\text{Number of newcomers in rural locations}}{\text{Number of newcomers who have arrived from rural locations in the region}}$$

The denominator for $I_{urb.}$ includes newcomers who have arrived from cities and rural locations, since migrants who move to cities from rural locations in the same oblast are distinguished by the highest level of acclimatization.¹¹ At the same time, the newcomers who are most likely to remain in rural locations have migrated from other rural settlements in the same republic. The percentage accounted for by newcomers in the total group of migrants or in the total population can be substituted for the number of newcomers.

Therefore, a higher index indicates more intensive repetitive migration under the influence of the genetic factor. The data in Table 6 suggests the probable greatest intensity of repetitive migration in the population of the Yakut ASSR, which is distinguished as a whole by a higher percentage than other regions of newcomers who have arrived from outside its boundaries.

The index of repeat migration changes under the influence of interaction by the genetic and ethnic factors, which can be seen from the different percentages accounted for by newcomers in the native and Russian populations of republics. The data in table 3 and 7 show that the native population of the Buryat ASSR is characterized by the most active migration patterns. The percentage accounted for by newcomers in its urban and rural locations exceeds the same indicator for the Tuvins, Yakuts and Russians living in the Buryat ASSR. At the same time, the migration patterns of the native populations of the Tuva and Yakut ASSR's are 2-4 times less active than the patterns of the Russian population.

The high percentage of newcomers among the Buryats is the reason for their intensive repetitive migration, which, according to the data in tables 1 and 2, takes place in Buryat rural locations and in neighboring autonomous national formations and is frequently somewhat in the nature of a commute. The relatively low percentage of newcomers in the Yakut and Tuva native populations, however, attests to the fact that newcomers of other ethnic groups are unlikely to remain in these ASSR's.

Table 6

**Indices of Repeat Migration by Population of Siberian
Autonomous Republics**

ASSR	Urban	Rural
Buryat	2.6	4.6
Tuva	2.7	5.8
Yakut	4.0	6.3

Table 7

Newcomers	Buryat	Tuva	Yakut
Urban			
Russians	7.4	14.7	22.3
Natives	21.0	8.7	11.2
Rural			
Russians	6.2	--	23.7
Natives	17.5	--	5.0

The interrelationship between the genetic factor and the ethnic factor composition of the republic population is also apparent in the restricted migration patterns of some ethnic groups. V. V. Vorob'yev believes that the tendency toward migration by native nationalities within specific ethnic boundaries will continue to exist through the foreseeable future.¹² Apparently this assumption is accurate mainly in the case of Yakut and Tuvin migration patterns and less accurate in the case of the Buryat native population.

Therefore, migration processes in the republics of Siberia and the Far East are taking on specific features, which are typical of the eastern regions in general and the ethnic composition of their population in particular. Migration in these regions is regulated by the particular economic factors which, on the one hand, increase the population influx (the constant shortage of manpower, wage supplements and certain benefits) and, on the other, do not guarantee the anticipated results of these moves. The effect of economic factors of migration in the national republics has a distinguishing feature connected with the fact that the accelerated development of industrial production is leading less to an influx of the native population from rural locations than to increased migration from outside, which is due to the ethnic peculiarities of the employment of the native population in national production.

The effect of migration factors varies from one ethnic milieu to another. Internal migration by the Buryats from rural to urban locations is as intensive as the movement of the Russian population. At the same time,

the Yakuts and Tuvins living in rural areas are distinguished by a high degree of stability. The role of the ethnic factor is also evident in the low rate of migration by the non-native population in republic rural locations.

Siberia and the Far East are experiencing an increasing demand for permanent skilled personnel for industry, construction, transportation and so forth. The large number of small ethnic groups and their excellent adaptation to local natural and climatic conditions make it possible to regard them as a stable personnel reserve for the republic economy. One of the results of migration processes is the increased number of urban inhabitants in the small ethnic groups. For example, according to census data, in 1970 21 percent of the Yakuts were urbanites (17 percent in 1959), 24 percent of the Buryats (17 percent in 1959) and 17 percent of the Tuvins (9 percent in 1959). But the rate of migration by the native ethnic groups to the city is still low and the employment of rural migrants is frequently limited only to the non-production sphere, which reduces the economic impact of migration. This problem could be better solved with the aid of such measures as the organization of a system for the vocational guidance and professional training of young people of the native ethnic groups of the autonomous republics in special fields related to the labor traditions of the local population, the consideration of population settlement patterns when the distribution of enterprises is being planned, the elimination of one-sided production specialization which restricts the employment of women, and the situation of enterprises for the processing of agricultural raw materials directly in republic rural locations.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 227.
2. See Begzi, A. D., "Socioeconomic Factors Enhancing Production Efficiency in the Tuva ASSR," in the collection: "Puti povysheniya effektivnosti obshchestvennogo proizvodstva v Tuvinskoy ASSR (Materialy konferentsii)" [Ways of Enhancing the Effectiveness of National Production in the Tuva ASSR (Conference Materials)], pt 1, Kyzyl, 1976, p 88; Aykarov, A. N., "The Formation of National Working Class Cadres in Yakutiya," in the collection: "Sotsial'naya struktura naseleniya Sibiri" [Social Structure of the Siberian Population], Novosibirsk, 1970, p 92; Dyrkheyev, P. S. and Khalbeyev, M. N., "Quantitative and Qualitative Changes in the Composition of the Buryat Working Class (1960-1970)," in the collection: "Chislennost' i sostav rabochikh Sibiri v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma" [The Number and Composition of Workers in Siberia Under the Conditions of Developed Socialism], Novosibirsk, 1977, p 142.
3. See Zaslavskaya, T. I. and Rybakovskiy, L. L., "Migration Processes and Their Regulation in the Socialist Society," SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, 1978, No 1, p 56.

4. Pod'yachikh, P. G., "The Status of Migration Statistics in the USSR and Measures for Their Improvement," in the book: "Problemy migratsii naseleniya i trudovykh resursov" [Problems of Migration and Labor Resources], Moscow, 1970, p 125.
5. See "Metodologicheskiye problemy sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya mobil'nosti trudovykh resursov" [Methodological Problems in the Sociological Study of the Mobility of Labor Resources], edited by T. I. Zaslavskaya and R. V. Ryvkina, Novosibirsk, 1974, p 80; Rybakovskiy, L. L., "Regional'nyy analiz migratsiy" [Regional Analysis of Migration], Moscow, 1973, pp 74-100.
6. See Perevedentsev, V. I., "Migratsiya naseleniya i trudovyye problemy Sibiri" [Migration and Labor Problems in Siberia], Novosibirsk, 1966, pp 118-119.
7. Perevedentsev, V. I., "Metody izucheniya migratsii naseleniya" [Methods of Studying Migration], Moscow, 1975, pp 125-126.
8. See Topilin, A. V., "Territorial'noye pereraspredeleniya trudovykh resursov v SSSR" [The Territorial Redistribution of Labor Resources in the USSR], Moscow, 1975, pp 92-93.
9. See Litvinenko, L. T. and Pokrovskaya, T. K., "The Main Trends in RSFSR Migration Patterns in Terms of Space and Time," in the book: "Problemy migratsii naseleniya v SSSR" [Problems in Migration in the USSR], Moscow, 1976, p 27.
10. Rybakovskiy, L. L., "Regional'nyy analiz migratsii," p 53.
11. Zayonchkovskaya, Zh. A., "Novosely v gorodakh (Metody izucheniya prizhivayemosti)" [Urban Newcomers (Methods of Analyzing Adaptability)], Moscow, 1972, p 85.
12. See Vorob'yev, V. V., "Naseleniye Vostochnoy Sibiri" [The Population of East Siberia], Novosibirsk, 1977, p 136.

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PERSONNEL TURNOVER PATTERNS AT PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ENTERPRISES

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[Article by Anatoliy Nikolayevich Mal'kov, candidate of medical sciences and head of the Concrete Sociological Research Sector of the Laboratory for the Scientific Fundamentals of Labor Organization of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Organization, Management and Economics of the Petroleum and Gas Industry, and Valeriy Davydovich Pivovarov, candidate of medical sciences and senior research associate in the same sector]

[Text] One of the necessary conditions for the resolution of problems in enhancing national production efficiency and labor productivity in all national economic spheres is the more efficient use of labor resources. The substantial socioeconomic losses incurred as a result of high rates of personnel turnover call for systematic and in-depth study of this process for the purpose of elaborating measures to correct the situation.

The relatively high rate of turnover among oilmen is largely due to the specific production and social conditions of the industry. These specific features include the working conditions (frequently reaching the extreme) on open-air work sites and the fairly long distances between work sites and populated points, which creates difficulties in cultural and consumer services, leads to great losses of time in travel to and from work, necessitates guard work and makes it difficult for workers to continue their education.

Working with normative research centers in the branch, we gathered statistical material over the entire 1972-1974 period at the enterprises of 21 petroleum industry associations.¹ Personnel information was grouped according to profession, age, term of service at the particular enterprise, level of education and skills category. This information was used as the basis for an analysis of the termination and turnover of personnel in the main petroleum professions: in drilling and assay work--diesel operators, electricians and fitters; in the major repair of oil wells--drillers, their assistants and hoist operator-mechanics; in minor oil well repairs--hoist operators and mechanics, as well as riggers.

Tables 1 and 2 contain data on the composition of personnel in the two leading professions involved in the drilling of oil and gas wells: drillers and their assistants.

Table 1

Branchwide Compositional Dynamics of Driller Group
Over a 3-year Period, %

Год (1)	(2) Возраст, лет				
	до 20 (5)	21-30	31-40	41-50	старше 50 (6)
1972	0,8	25,2	43,7	26,1	4,2
1973	0,5	26,6	43,0	25,7	4,2
1974	0,3	18,7	42,2	31,9	6,9

	(3) Стаж работы на данном предприятии, лет					(4) Образование			
	до 1 (7)	1-5	6-10	11-20	свыше 20 (8)	неполное среднее (9)	среднее общее (10)	среднее специальное (11)	высшее (12)
1972	15,8	44,6	22,8	15,3	1,5	61,6	22,9	14,5	1,0
1973	16,3	44,7	23,2	13,7	2,1	59,4	23,2	15,9	1,5
1974	11,5	37,5	22,3	21,5	7,2	65,5	20,4	12,3	1,8

Table 2

Branchwide Compositional Dynamics of Assistant Driller
Group Over a 3-Year Period, %

Год (1)	(2) Возраст, лет				
	до 20 (5)	21-30	31-40	41-50	старше 50 (6)
1972	5,6	53,5	25,5	12,7	2,7
1973	5,6	53,4	24,0	14,0	3,0
1974	5,0	49,9	25,3	16,3	3,3

	(3) Стаж работы на данном предприятии, лет					(4) Образование			
	до 1 (7)	1-5	6-10	11-20	свыше 20 (8)	неполное среднее (9)	среднее общее (10)	среднее специальное (11)	высшее (12)
1972	38,0	50,4	6,8	4,2	0,6	62,8	29,7	7,2	0,3
1973	40,5	44,9	10,2	3,8	0,6	61,6	30,7	7,4	0,3
1974	31,7	47,8	12,0	7,2	1,3	64,5	29,4	5,8	0,5

[Key for tables 1 and 2 on following page]

Key:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Year | 7. Under 1 |
| 2. Age | 8. Over 20 |
| 3. Number of years at enterprise | 9. Partial secondary |
| 4. Education | 10. Secondary general |
| 5. Under 20 | 11. Secondary specialized |
| 6. Over 50 | 12. Higher |

As we can see from Table 1, the largest age group of drillers is the 31-40 group, and the smallest group consists of drillers under 20. In comparison to previous years, there was a rise in 1974 in the proportions accounted for by workers between the ages of 41 and 50 (from 26.1 to 31.9 percent) and over the age of 50 (from 4.2 to 6.3 percent), which attests to the slight "aging" of this profession.

When we analyze the data on the drillers' term of service, we see that the largest group has been working from 1 to 5 years: 44.6 percent in 1972 and 37.3 percent in 1974; the smallest group has worked more than 20 years.

Many of them have only a partial secondary education. There is an apparent tendency toward increase in the relative proportion of this group--from 61.6 percent in 1972 to 65.5 percent in 1974. There is no question that this should be drawn to the attention of enterprise and association administrators, since the work of the driller is becoming increasingly complex under the conditions of technical progress in the petroleum industry and requires that workers constantly update their knowledge.

During the period in question, the relative number of drillers of the highest (sixth) skill category increased (from 62.9 percent in 1973 to 63.3 percent in 1974).

As we can see from Table 2, more than half of all assistant drillers, in contrast to drillers, are between the ages of 21 and 30. Also in contrast to drillers, more of the assistant drillers are under the age of 20 (5.6 percent in 1972 and 1973 and 5 percent in 1974), but the relative number of these workers over the age of 50 is decreasing. The fact that this contingent of workers is growing younger, in contrast to the aging of the drillers, can largely be explained by the fact that the work of the driller requires a certain amount of training and, as a rule, drillers are more experienced individuals with more seniority than assistant drillers, or they are workers who have taken special training courses. An analysis of the categorization of assistant drillers in terms of seniority indicates a considerable increase in the relative number of these workers with terms of service of under 1 year and from 1 to 5 years. Apparently, the assistant driller with a longer term of service is promoted to the position of driller or leaves the drilling brigade to go to work at another enterprise.

In comparison to other educated groups, the group of assistant drillers with only a partial secondary education is fairly large (61.6-64.5 percent), but

there are more assistant drillers than drillers with a secondary general education, which is probably due to the placement of individuals who have just graduated from secondary school in these jobs.

An analysis of personnel termination² at enterprises of the petroleum industry showed that it decreased noticeably over the 1972-1974 period among drillers and their assistants: by 6.9 percent among drillers and by 8.3 percent among their assistants. On the whole, however, the rate of termination is still quite significant for assistant drillers. The highest rate is seen among workers between 21 and 30 years of age who have been at the enterprise for less than a year, which could be related to the insufficient vocational guidance and adaptation of youth at petroleum industry enterprises.

The indicator of termination (mainly for the period in question) declined somewhat for other professional groups, but it was still fairly high among riggers and assistant drillers in shops for the major repair of oil wells: For example, the indicator for the latter in the Dagneft' Association was 104.9 percent in 1974, and the indicator for Komineft' riggers was 105 percent.

An analysis of information on personnel turnover³ showed that the rate fell 2.9 percent for drillers during the period in question and 6.7 percent for their assistants. The highest rate of turnover was seen in the following groups: drillers between the ages of 31 and 40, with less than 5 years of service, with a partial secondary education, and in the sixth skill category; assistant drillers between the ages of 21 and 30, with less than 1 year of service, with a partial secondary education, and in the third skill category.

Among workers engaged in the minor repair of oil wells, the rate of turnover declined during the period in question for operators and mechanics. Although there was a tendency toward decline among riggers (by 6.1 percent), the rate of turnover stayed on an extremely high level in some associations (76.8 percent in Komineft', 59 percent in Grozneft' and 52.1 percent in Saratovneftegaz).

The next stage of our research involved the processing of "complaint" questionnaires, used in a survey of workers who resigned of their own accord.

When we compared the data of these questionnaires, we gave special attention to the procedural side of the matter. We deliberately avoided the identification of causes of turnover with the reasons given for resignation. This kind of identification, in our opinion, is hardly applicable, since the reasons given for resignation reflect the respondent's subjective feelings about his action and may not coincide with the factors determining his behavior. The motives for resignation take shape in a situation distinguished by a complex system of interrelated production factors and the presence of several subjective factors (the influence of social stereotypes present in the thinking of colleagues in regard to the causes of turnover; the emotional state of the respondent in connection with the particular situation which resulted in his resignation, etc.). As a result, these motives are either not quite identical to the causes of turnover or the respondent essentially refuses to divulge his actual reasons for resigning.

The following experiment was conducted at enterprises of this branch. The respondents were first asked to divulge their reasons for resigning and then to evaluate all components of the system of production and other factors from the standpoint of their possible bearing on the decision to leave the enterprises. After this, the respondents were once again asked to give their reasons for resigning. In 70 percent of the cases, the reasons were modified considerably (their sequence was rearranged and new reasons were added). The results of this experiment testify that the motivational functioning of respondents is related to phenomena on a level at which the essence of the turnover process is reflected only partially, in a fragmented or even distorted manner.

Taking this into account, we worked with sociologists in the scientific research center of Glavtyumenneftegaz on the elaboration of a set of methods in which the analysis of reasons for resignation plays a secondary role, and the reasons themselves are only recorded for the purpose of calculating percentage correlations between groups of production and non-production motives and personal reasons--that is, the most general tendencies. A form to be filled out by workers resigning of their own accord was prepared, in which the basic components of the production and non-production situation were to be evaluated in sequence according to the following procedure: "Do you find this satisfactory?" and "Did this have any bearing on your resignation?" The worker was first asked to estimate his degree of satisfaction with the particular facet of work or personal life, and then immediately calculate the degree to which this influenced his decision to resign.

This procedure, in our opinion, lets the respondent record his emotional responses to these components, mediated by retrospection. The ordering of the respondent's thoughts, aimed at enhancing his ability to differentiate, was accomplished along with the expression of emotional responses to the components and factors to be evaluated, which were grouped in two subsystems: production and non-production. The production factors included the following groups: 1) working conditions on the job; 2) nature of work; 3) organization and servicing of work position; 4) work schedule; 5) professional skill requirements; 6) wages; 7) personal relationships on the job; 8) socio-psychological atmosphere in the collective. Among the non-production factors, the main groups were the following: 1) housing conditions; 2) conditions of life in the city (or settlement); 3) local climatic conditions; 4) availability of child care; 5) distance between work site and place of residence.

All of these groups were represented by a set of referents for the fullest possible reflection of the objective content of the group. The groups of conditions were evaluated by the sociologists when the questionnaires were processed by summarizing the opinions voiced by respondents in regard to components in the group. The results of the experiment with the "complaint" questionnaires demonstrated the futility of attempts to acquire responses to complex factors directly from respondents.

We analyzed the structure of factors contributing to turnover on the basis of the respondents' evaluations of specific working conditions. The

quantitative measurement of the significance of groups of conditions made it possible to analyze the groups according to three categories: strong, intermediate and weak factors (this division was relative, since the intermediate factors as a whole had as much significance in the majority of cases as strong factors).

We will cite the results of experimentation with the complaint form in the Sakhalinneft', Belorusneft', Komineft' and Glavtyumenneftegaz associations.⁴

The strong factors contributing to turnover at the Sakhalinneft' Association included wages and working conditions on the job. The prime component of the wage group was the "size of wages" (this had a bearing on the resignation of 45.1 percent of all respondents). The size of wages depends, on the one hand, on factors influencing this (the stability of wages, the procedure for calculating wages, etc.) and, on the other, on the production indicators of the local petroleum industry. The size of wages was more significant as a factor of turnover at Sakhalinneft' than at other associations, which is evidently due, to some extent, to the production peculiarities of this region. At the same time, at Sakhalinneft' and Glavtyumenneftegaz, where the amount of wages as a factor of turnover has slightly less significance, an important role is played by the component of the "stability of wages."⁵ In the drilling divisions of the Sakhalinneft' Association, the significance of the stability of wages is matched by the importance of the "size of bonuses" (this had a bearing on the resignations of 16.1 percent of the respondents), and in construction divisions the "size of bonuses" (31.8 percent) and the "form of salary payment" (31.8 percent) were quite significant.

Working conditions are practically equivalent to wages in significance. Around 53.4 percent of the workers said that this was one of the reasons for their resignation (to a great extent for 26.5 percent and to a lesser extent for 26.9 percent). In this group, the most significant components were "production hazards" and "weather conditions." For example, in drilling divisions the weather had a bearing on the resignation of 31 percent of all respondents, and in construction divisions it was one of the reasons given by 25 percent. The noise of drilling had a bearing on the resignation of 26.4 percent of all respondents, and vibration affected the decision of 17.2 percent.

In the group of intermediate factors of turnover for the Sakhalinneft' Association, the most significant were "professional skill requirements," which influenced the decisions of 37.9 percent, and the "nature of work"--38.3 percent. The "organization of labor" and "personal conditions on the job" were of slightly less significance in the group of intermediate factors. Housing conditions represented the other component in this group, having considerable bearing on the resignation of 18.6 percent and a slight effect on the decision of 9.5 percent.

The distance between the places of employment and residence was of minor significance as a factor of turnover. The availability of child care and

the work schedule were of least importance as factors of personnel turnover at Sakhalinneft'.

In the Belorusneft' Association, on the contrary, housing conditions were a strong factor, having a bearing on the resignation of 23.1 percent of all respondents.

The group of factors considerably influencing the decision to resign includes the nature of work, the distance between work sites and places of residence,⁶ the work schedule and working conditions on the job. Such factors as wages, living conditions in the populated point and the organization of labor on the job were of slightly less significance.

An analysis of the groups pertaining to "the nature of work" and "the work schedule" indicated that the significant components in this association were the "correspondence of work to the level of education" and the "work shift," which were of influence in the resignation of 20.9 percent and 17.2 percent respectively. We can assume that one of the significant factors of turnover in the Belorusneft' Association is the presence of conditions at its enterprises for continued education for the workers. The group of weak factors in this association includes professional skill requirements, relations within the collective, personal conditions on the job, the availability of child care and climatic conditions.

The strongest factor of turnover in the Komineft' Association was the component of professional skill requirements, influencing the decision of 45.6 percent of workers surveyed (a major influence in the case of 22.5 percent and a minor influence in the case of 23.1 percent). Besides this, the group of strong factors included working conditions on the job, wages and the organization of labor on the job, which were practically equal in significance.

The intermediate factors of turnover here included the nature of work, housing conditions and living conditions in the populated point. Weak factors were local weather conditions, relations within the collective, personal conditions on the job, the work schedule, the distance between work and the place of residence and the availability of child care. The most significant component in this category was the weather, and the least significant was child care.

When we analyzed the group pertaining to professional skill requirements in the Komineft' Association, we noted that "a lack of correspondence between the work and the specialty" was of greatest significance (this influenced the decisions of 13.4 percent of the workers who resigned). Next in line were "opportunities for vocational and technical education and advanced training" and the "possibility of transfers to other jobs." The main component in the group pertaining to working conditions on the job in this association is "physical stress," which is particularly characteristic of drilling divisions (cited by 34.9 percent of all respondents). Significant

components of the group pertaining to the organization of labor on the job in drilling divisions were "the level of mechanization," which had a bearing on the resignation of 18.3 percent of all workers surveyed, and "timely transport to and from the job" (15.8 percent).⁷

The category of strong factors of turnover in Glavtyumenneftegaz consisted of housing conditions (having a major effect on the decision of 30.9 percent of all respondents and a minor effect on the decision of 11.7 percent) and wages (24.7 and 19.4 percent respectively).

The category of intermediate factors of turnover included professional skill requirements, the organization of labor, living conditions in the populated point, working conditions on the job, the nature of work and personal conditions on the job. Weak factors were the distance between work sites and places of residence, the availability of child care, the work schedule and the weather.

The structure of factors in various subbranches differed considerably from the structure for Glavtyumenneftegaz as a whole. In the extraction branch, the main factors were professional skill requirements, relations with immediate supervisors and the nature of work, which constitute the nucleus of factors peculiar to this subbranch. It is noteworthy that workers who were dissatisfied with the administration's efforts to provide them with advanced training represented 29.8 percent of all those who resigned.

In the construction subbranch, wages were a much more significant factor of turnover than in the fields of extraction and drilling. Here 28.7 percent were greatly dissatisfied with the "stability of wages" and 25.8 percent were not completely satisfied. Satisfaction with the organization of labor is also much lower in construction than in drilling and extraction.

In the drilling subbranch, "housing conditions" were in first place, "wages" were in second, and "professional skill requirements," "working conditions on the job" and "the organization of labor" were next. Each of these had approximately equal influence on the rate of turnover.⁸

An analysis of the main motives⁹ for resignation showed that the classification of motives as production motives, non-production motives and personal reasons¹⁰ (see Table 3) was quite informative. The value distribution of production motives in different associations correlates with the level of job satisfaction (see Table 4).

An analysis of the relative significance of factors of turnover in personnel groups differing in age and in term of service showed that factors connected with production conditions were of greater significance for workers in the younger age groups and workers with shorter terms of service, while factors connected with living conditions grew more important as workers grew older and gained more seniority.

Table 3

Distribution of Groups of Motives by Associations, %

Associations	Production motives	Non-production motives	Personal reasons
Glavtyumenneftegaz	41.5	33.3	25.2
Belorusneft'	68.9	24.7	6.4
Sakhalinneft'	63.6	14.7	21.7
Komineft'	61.1	34.1	4.8

Table 4

Level of Job Satisfaction*

Associations	Points					Average point value
	+1	+0.5	0	-0.5	-1	
	Fully Satisfied, %	More satisfied than dissatisfied, %	Neutral, %	More dissatisfied than satisfied, %	Totally dissatisfied, %	
Glavtyumenneftegaz	50.2	20.5	7.0	14.8	7.5	+0.45
Sakhalinneft'	25.8	31.1	10.2	20.8	12.1	+0.19
Belorusneft'	3.4	8.3	--	70.6	17.7	-0.45

* The study of job satisfaction in the Komineft' Association did not enter into the research program due to the extremely high rate of personnel termination.

An examination of the sociodemographic breakdown of factors contributing to turnover showed that the most mobile workers were under the age of 30 and had been at the enterprise less than a year. The characteristic production factors of turnover for these groups of workers were "professional skill requirements," the "nature of work," the "organization of labor on the job" and "wages." Therefore, production factors, on which job satisfaction depends, represent a significant reserve for the reduction of personnel turnover.

Our studies of personnel turnover at enterprises of the petroleum industry also indicated that production motives were more significant as a whole than non-production motives in petroleum associations. The combination of motives pertaining to "wages" and "housing conditions" was equivalent to a total ranging from 25.3 (in Komineft') to 46 percent (Glavtyumenneftegaz), and this means that other motives connected with production and personal conditions are of considerable significance. The reduction of the number of

workers resigning for these reasons can be accomplished on the level of the enterprise and on the level of the branch association, and this fact must be given primary consideration when measures are being planned for the stabilization of the personnel staff.

The proposed method for analyzing the actual reasons for personnel turnover in terms of the degree to which working and living conditions influence the decision to resign produces, in our opinion, more valid results than the analysis of resignation motives alone, and makes it possible to plan not only general recommendations in regard to personnel stabilization, but also specific measures at each enterprise for the improvement of conditions connected with production and the personal lives of workers.¹¹

The considerable reduction of personnel turnover in petroleum associations which systematically analyze the actual reasons for turnover and work out specific measures to stabilize the personnel staff can be regarded as a practical result of the implementation of this method at branch enterprises. For example, personnel turnover in 1977 was 4.3 percent lower than in 1972 at enterprises of Glavtyumenneftegaz and 5.2 percent lower in Komineft' (throughout the branch as a whole, it decreased from 21.6 percent in 1971 to 18.1 percent in 1977).

FOOTNOTES

1. In 1972 the petroleum industry had 22 production associations.
2. The term "termination" signifies the departure of workers from enterprises, regardless of the reasons for the departure.
3. The term "turnover" signifies the administrative dismissal of workers and resignation by workers "of their own accord" (Article 31 of the Labor Code).
4. The limited length of this article does not allow for the presentation of data pertaining to other associations, and the ones examined here are located in different geographic zones and are the most representative or promising associations in these zones.
5. Whereas the stability of wages is valued at 21.6 percent and 21.5 percent respectively in Sakhalinneft' and Glavtyumenneftegaz, the figures for Komineft' and Belorusneft' are 5.4 and 2.6 percent.
6. It should be noted that the factor of "work sites far removed from the place of residence" influences the rate of personnel turnover more in the Belorusneft' Association than in others, and mainly in the drilling and construction of oil wells (it was cited by 63.3 and 81.8 percent of all respondents respectively).

7. It should be noted that the factor of "timely transport to and from work" applies to persons engaged in the drilling of oil and gas wells in all associations.
8. No leading factors were apparent in the drilling subbranch, as, for example, professional skill requirements in extraction or wages in construction. These factors are of equal significance, but this assumption cannot be automatically applied to individual enterprises, each of which has its own peculiarities.
9. The main motives are those listed first by respondents.
10. Production and non-production motives correlate with the subsystems of production and non-production factors mentioned above. The group of personal reasons includes family obligations, the state of health, the desire to move to locations where new deposits are being worked, etc.
11. When we assess these results, we must remember that data on the structure of turnover factors in an association or, in particular, in the branch as a whole, cannot be simply extrapolated when measures are being planned for the reduction of turnover at specific enterprises: A factor categorized as weak or intermediate in the case of the association or branch as a whole could be a strong factor at a particular enterprise, and vice-versa.

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STUDY OF SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF INDIVIDUAL SELF-ASSERTION

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 82-89

[Article by Vladimir Petrovich Kashirin, instructor at the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin]

[Text] The 25th CPSU Congress pointed out the need to instill Soviet people with a spirited outlook on life, "communist awareness and the willingness, desire and ability to build communism."¹ In connection with this, it is becoming increasingly important to study topics which will increase our understanding of the mechanisms by which the individual is socialized. One of these is self-assertion, which can take different forms. "Both egotism and selflessness," the founders of Marxism remarked, "can be, under certain circumstances, necessary forms of self-assertion for individuals."²

K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin proved that the conditions and opportunities for the individual to display and assert his individuality depend on the developmental level of society and the nature of social relations and that conditions of complete equality and freedom are the most favorable for genuine self-assertion. They also stressed the fact, however, that personal characteristics also influence the specific ways in which the person displays his individuality. Their works contain many valuable statements about the nature, essence, meaning and forms of self-assertion.³

Self-assertion is a process by which the individual interacts with the social environment and realizes his desire to present himself in specific ways in the performance of various social roles and, thereby, gain specific results and a specific degree of public and personal importance.

The problem of self-assertion in a collective is being given increasing attention by scientists, but there have been no concrete studies of this problem as yet.

The purpose of our study was to determine the distinctive features of self-assertion in a VUZ academic collective, the conditions governing this

process and the means by which it is influenced by various external (group) and internal (personal) determinants.

Empirical information was collected in three military institutes of the same type, where students were between the ages of 17 and 25. The following methods were used: observation of the behavior and activities of 343 students and 75 spontaneously formed microgroups; on-the-spot observation of two classes (with 25 students each) for 3 years; conversations with students, instructors and supervisors of the academic and indoctrinational process (333 talks in all); group interviews conducted according to eight types of discussion lists--670 individuals, and four types of questionnaires--970 individuals; sociometric studies in 15 classes for the purpose of discerning the dynamics of the development of the psychological structure--two or more times; the grouping of independent characteristics. In three classes, beginning with the first year, and in two, beginning with the second, structural experiments were conducted with the use of the methods listed above for a period of 3 years, the purpose of which was to judge the possibility of control over the self-assertion process.

Since self-assertion is present in all people, the criteria of the success of this process are of practical interest. In our study, these were subdivided into external and internal criteria.

The external criteria of successful self-assertion were the following:

A--characteristics of individual activity and behavior: academic ability, discipline, indicators in sports, creative pastimes and so forth;

B--influence and attitudes of supervisors and elders (encouragement and advancement in position and title, trust, assignment of social duties and so forth;

C--attitude of collective as a whole (respect, trust, election to collective organs, recognition of individual's authority, etc.);

D--attitude of classmates and their groups (requests for assistance from the individual, friendships and so forth).

The collective indicator of this group of criteria could be defined as recognition by others.

The internal (personal) criteria of successful self-assertion were:

E--individual's evaluation of attitudes of elders and supervisors;

F--individual's evaluation of attitudes of comrades in collective: "People take me seriously and are friendly," "People look up to me and ask me for advice" and so forth;

G---self-evaluation of attitude toward the collective: "My interests do not diverge from collective or common interests," "I like to spend time in the collective," "I feel I am needed by the collective," "I miss the collective when I am away from it for a long time (because of vacations or illness)" and so forth;

H--self-evaluation of activities and role in the collective: "I have importance and prestige in the collective," "Others follow my example and I can influence the state of affairs in the collective," "I make an important contribution to general collective affairs" and so forth.

The collective internal indicator of successful self-assertion can be defined as the individual's satisfaction with his status in the collective.

Obviously, these subgroups of criteria are not equivalent in terms of significance. An expert analysis of these criteria by 39 specialists in psychology indicated their essential agreement that the most significant external and internal criteria were in subgroups A, C, F and H. An investigation proved that, in principle, they were sufficient to determine the success of individual self-assertion in the collective. The rest of the criteria are only necessary for the more complete and precise evaluation of self-assertion characteristics and better control over this process.

Table 1

Dependence of Individual's Immediate Goals on Success
in Self-Assertion, % of total students in group*

Immediate goals of students	Self-assertion	
	Successful	Unsuccessful
To complete current course of study successfully and with high marks	60	75
To occupy a higher position in the official role structure of the collective	7	42
To acquire more prestige among fellow students	83	90

* The study was conducted in eight classes of first- through fourth-year students.

Self-assertion is related to many sociopsychological factors, primarily those which determine the specific ways in which the individual acts in the social milieu--the establishment of oneself in the collective, authority, leadership, conformity and others. The establishment of one's individuality is similar to self-assertion and coincides in some cases. The problem of self-establishment has been studied in depth and comprehensively

by the school of Academician A. V. Petrovskiy.⁴ Authority has two facets: objective (the place in the official role structure of the collective, knowledge, etc.) and subjective, which depends on personal characteristics. Our study showed that in the process of self-assertion, the individual is frequently striving to attain primarily objective prestige. It is not surprising that there was a noticeable difference between the immediate goals of those who were successfully asserting themselves and those who were unable to satisfy their need for self-assertion (see Table 1).

But it is possible that the process of self-assertion might not coincide with the process by which the individual acquires and maintains authority: The first process always presupposes activity on the part of the individual, while the second can be the result of the mere possession of certain personal qualities. Moreover, the individual can even acquire authority when he is not striving for this at all.

Table 2

Changes in Structure of Microgroups as Class Collective Develops,
N = 26 individuals*

Year and microgroup composition	Microgroups								
	No 1	No 2	No 3	No 4	No 5	No 6	No 7	No 8	No 9
1975									
Leaders	18	7	9	17	8	23	14	11	24
Members	12	19	5	10	26	22	21	4	20
	2	16	25	3	13				
	15								
1976									
Leaders	21	7	9	17	8	23	14		24
Members	18	19	5	10	1	26	11		20
	2	16	25	3		13			
	15			22					
	12								

* The numbers signify the student's ordinal number in the total list. Students are arranged in microgroups in order of declining status. The leader is first.

We studied leadership in 75 spontaneous groups and 5 classes over a period of 3 years, beginning with the time they were formed.

The data we obtained testify that students who are most active and display the most initiative become leaders of the collective or its microgroups within the first 3 months of the collective's existence. The psychological structure of the student collective, however, only acquires a fairly stable framework during the second academic semester. Leaders characteristically

try to retain their status throughout their academic career and, if they should lose it, they make an energetic effort to regain this status or form a new microgroup. The composition and quantity of these groups change constantly as the collective develops and the students interact more and more, but the leaders rarely change (see Table 2).

As we can see, two groups (No 2 and No 3) remained the same for more than a year (the data were collected at the beginning of the first semester in 1975 and at the end of the first semester in 1976), group No 8 disintegrated, groups 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 underwent changes in composition but no change in leaders, and only group No 1 experienced a change in leaders. The situation was approximately the same in other classes.

A study of the peculiarities of individual behavior in spontaneous groups indicates that the main reason for the birth of the latter was the individual's desire to assert himself and display his individuality. But since the development of the individual and of the social group is a dialectical process, part of the microgroup (around 40 percent, according to our study) is modified during the course of interaction by self-asserting individuals (although the same people remain group leaders in the majority of cases) or the group disintegrates.

A significant number of students (more than 70 percent) have peer groups outside the academic institution, which attests to the person's constant need to expand the sphere in which he displays his individuality.

An interrelationship was established between self-assertion in spontaneous microgroups and in the collective as a whole. For example, more than 30 percent of the students who had successfully realized their desire for self-assertion in microgroups were unhappy if they failed to assert themselves in the academic collective as a whole. On the other hand, some of the students who had successfully asserted themselves in the collective and had sufficiently high prestige and recognition here but were unable to occupy the position they had hoped for in the microgroup were also dissatisfied at not being able to display their potential to the fullest. They regard their self-assertion as an unfinished, incomplete process.

As we can see, two converging tendencies are quite clear: from self-assertion in the group to self-assertion in the collective and from self-assertion in the official structure of interrelations in the collective to self-assertion in its unofficial, psychological structure.

The general tendency in this process is one in which the individual strives to assert and establish himself primarily in the most prominent spheres of activity, constantly expanding the sphere for the application of his efforts and potential. The diversity of spheres in which the individual asserts himself is an indicator of his spiritual wealth and potential.

Another peculiarity of the self-assertion process was also established: It becomes more active under conditions requiring heightened cooperation, joint or collective action and increased mutual contact.

Table 3

**Relationship Between Personal Characteristics of Students and
Success of Their Self-Assertion in Collective***

Student characteristics	Average evaluations of characteristics of students whose self-assertion has been:							
	Successful				Unsuccessful			
	K ₁	K ₂	K ₃	Avg.	K ₄	K ₅	K ₆	Avg.
Desire and attempt to excel	5	5	5	5	4.3	3.7	2.3	3.4
Interest in future profession	5	5	5	5	4.7	4.3	3.3	4.4
Degree of social activity	4.7	5	5	4.9	3.7	2.7	2.3	2.9
Desire to lead	4.7	4.7	5	4.8	4.3	3.3	5	4.2
Desire to gain prestige in collective	4.7	5	5	4.9	4	3.7	4	3.9
Intolerance for violators of military discipline	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	3.3	3.0	2.7	3
Prestige in collective	4.7	4.3	4.7	4.5	3.3	2.7	2.3	2.8
Persistence in self-education and self-indoctrination	4.7	4.7	5	4.8	4	3.3	2	3.1
Sense of responsibility to collective	5	4.7	4.7	4.8	3.7	3.3	1.3	2.7
Concern for collective interests	4.7	4.7	5	4.8	2.7	3.0	1.3	2.3
Kindness and tact in treat- ment of collective members	5	5	5	5	3.7	4	1.3	3
Rendering of selfless assist- ance to others	5	4.7	5	4.9	4	3.6	3.3	3.6
Summary evaluation of individual	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.8	3.8	3.5	2.6	3.3

* Students displaying the most success (K₁, K₂, K₃) and failure (K₄, K₅, K₆) in self-assertion were taken as an example. Personal characteristics were evaluated on a scale of 5 (five points signified the most obvious display of the particular quality). The evaluations were made by the secretary of the Komsomol organization, the senior member of the study group and the curator, and were then averaged.

The data obtained from the study of the degree to which the success of self-assertion depends on microgroup, collective and personal factors testify to the leading role of the latter. For example, in 75 percent of all cases (219 individuals in all), the deciding factor in the realization of the individual's desire for self-assertion was his positive personal qualities (tact, academic progress, the willingness to help others and so forth).

The negative qualities impeding self-assertion in the collective include a weak will, reticence, egoism, arrogance, conceit, moral degradation, passivity, hypocrisy, dishonesty and irresponsibility.

Comparative data on the personal characteristics of students whose self-assertion in the collective was successful or unsuccessful are presented in Table 3.

It is indicative that the students who had difficulty in realizing their need for self-assertion were able to admit that they had been considerably impeded by their own inadequacies.

At the same time, according to our research findings, other factors were of deciding significance in 25 percent of all cases of successful self-assertion--such factors as official position, the assistance and support of comrades, collective leaders, elders, etc.

During the course of this study, three possible forms of treatment of the individual by the collective were discerned:

The individual is supported by the collective;

The collective is indifferent to the individual, neither supporting him nor opposing him;

The collective has a negative attitude toward the individual.

It is quite obvious that the first variant is the most conducive to self-assertion. It is the most common variant; the second variant is encountered less frequently, and the third is even more rare.

The collective generally feels indifferent about an individual who chooses to take a passive stand of "coexistence" with the collective.

The collective can also oppose individuals:

If the individual tries to oppose the collective;

If the individual's personal values, norms and attitudes do not agree with those of the collective or group.

The study showed that the following groups of needs lie at the basis of a student's desire for self-assertion in the collective:

a) the need to have friends, to be part of the collective and to be useful to others--28-34 percent;

b) the need to assert oneself, verify one's potential and strength, and to understand oneself--8-13 percent. This group of needs is more prevalent in lowerclassmen, particularly first-year students (more than 20 percent);

c) the need to gain public and personal recognition, respect and the trust of one's comrades--55 percent.

Depending on the values of the individual, these needs function as motives in his choice of goals and means and methods of self-assertion. The success of self-assertion is most highly influenced by the consistency of the individual's ambitions to his capabilities and the requirements of his social environment. An indicator of the level of these ambitions can be found in self-evaluation.⁵ In our study, we discovered nine possible correlations between the individual's self-evaluation and his position in the collective (Table 4).

Table 4

Possible Correlations Between Self-Evaluation and Position in Collective

Position in system of collective interrelationships	Self-evaluation		
	1 Accurate	2 Overestimated	3 underestimated
A. Corresponds to actual potential of individual under given conditions	A-1	A-2	A-3
B. Higher than actual potential of individual under given conditions	B-1	B-2	B-3
C. Lower than actual potential of individual under given conditions	C-1	C-2	C-3

Students who can evaluate themselves realistically are distinguished primarily by positive action aimed at retaining their position when this position is slightly higher than their potential (B-1) or at occupying a higher position in the system of relationships (C-1). They are more likely to be satisfied with their position (with the exception of the C-1 correlation).

Students who overestimate themselves generally make vigorous attempts to occupy a higher position in the collective and are not satisfied enough with their current position, and sometimes even with themselves, which frequently has a negative effect on their individual development.

Students who underestimate their value and their potential display shyness, timidity and excessive caution in their actions and behavior, which diminishes the success of their self-assertion. These students are distinguished by highly unstable behavior and fluctuating moods, they are more vulnerable to external influences, etc. When they gain a position in the collective which surpasses their capabilities, they often try to concede it to others,

and they perform their duties without confidence. In the absence of adequate assistance and support from others, these students often acquire new negative characteristics.

It was also learned that the success of self-assertion depends more on the consistency (than on the inconsistency) of the individual's self-evaluation with his evaluation by instructors, superiors, comrades and the collective as a whole, which can be seen in Table 5.

Table 5

Relationship Between Success of Self-Assertion and Correlation of Individual Self-Evaluations with Evaluations of Instructors, Collective Supervisors and Collective as a Whole, % of Total Group*

Correlation of self-evaluation to evaluations of instructors, supervisors and collective	Self-assertion	
	Successful	Unsuccessful
Relation of self-evaluation of knowledge to evaluation of instructors		
Equivalent	78	28
Higher	6	6
Lower	16	66
Relation of self-evaluation of behavior to evaluations of supervisors and elders		
Equivalent	70	32
Higher	23	62
Lower	7	6
Relation of self-evaluation of personal qualities to evaluation of collective		
Equivalent	78	38
Higher	7	56
Lower	15	6

* The study was conducted in eight classes of first- through fourth-year students.

Our findings testify that the success of self-assertion is connected more with the satisfaction of the individual's need for the appreciation of his activity, behavior and personal qualities by his social milieu than with the failure to satisfy this need. For example, self-assertion was successful in more than 90 percent of all cases involving students whose need for appreciation was essentially satisfied, but the figure was only 21 percent in the opposite group. This points up the importance, in the interests of controlling the process of self-assertion, of organizing accurate, pedagogically sound and expedient evaluation activity in the collective, as well as the training of each individual to assess his own value accurately.

Some of the recommendations regarding control over the process of self-assertion in the collective, obtained as a result of the experiment, were the following:

The provision of the individual with the correct, emotionally positive attitude toward his social environment, the objectives of his work, the roles he must play and his assigned functions;

The correct organization of the social environment and the nature, purpose, breadth and intensity of communications within this environment, and the gradual expansion of spheres of communication for the individual who is asserting himself, from the work and business sphere to the personal and leisure sphere;

The training of students in the methods of becoming a part of the collective and the social milieu, communicating with others and responding correctly to various types of collective influences;

The timely stimulation of the morally healthy self-assertion of each student, in line with the peculiarities of his position and the social milieu.

The results of our study of the self-assertion process proved that it is extremely important to investigate this phenomenon for the purpose of heightening the effectiveness of actions taken by the supervisors of collectives to consolidate the latter and accomplish indoctrinational tasks.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, pp 71-77.
2. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 3, p 236.
3. Ibid., vol 1, pp 342, 357, 359; vol 2, p 438; vol 3, pp 32, 68, 236-237; vol 27, pp 11-12; Marx and Engels, "Selected Early Writings," Moscow, 1956, pp 559-577, 590-599; V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 16, p 40; vol 29, p 194; vol 38, p 75.
4. See Petrovskiy, A. V., "Classification of Psychological Phenomena of Behavioral Uniformity," in the collection: "Materialy IV Vsesoyuznogo s"yezda Obshchestva psikhologov SSSR" [Materials of the Fourth All-Union Congress of the Psychologists' Society of the USSR], Tbilisi, 1971; Petrovskiy, A. V., "Experiment in the Construction of a Socio-Psychological Theory of Group Activity," VOPROSY PSIKHOLOGII, 1973, No 5; Petrovskiy, A. V., "An Enquiry into the Construction of a Socio-psychological Theory of the Collective," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1973, No 12; Petrovskiy, A. V., "Some Phenomena of Interpersonal Relations in the

Collective," VOPROSY PSIKHOLOGII, 1976, No 3; Petrovskiy, A. V. and Shpalinskiy, V. V., "Sotsial'naya psikhologiya kollektiva" [The Social Psychology of the Collective], Moscow, 1978, p 175.

5. Lipkin, A. I., "The Psychological Aspects of the Schoolchild's Self-Evaluation," author's abstract of a doctoral dissertation, Moscow, 1974, p 27.

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FACTS, COMMENTS AND REMARKS (FROM THE SOCIOLOGIST'S DESK)

PART-TIME FEMALE EMPLOYMENT

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pp 90-92

[Article by Leonora Mikhaylovna Kuleshova, junior research associate at the Scientific Research Institute of Labor, and Tat'yana Ivanovna Mamontova, senior research associate at the Scientific Research Institute of Labor]

[Text] One of the main social policy objectives of the communist party and the Soviet State is all-round improvement in the conditions of the labor and personal life of working women. The "Basic Guidelines for National Economic Development During 1976-1980" state: "We must create broader opportunities for women with children to work a partial day or a partial week or to work in the home."¹

The question of part-time work for women was already being raised by speakers at the 20th CPSU Congress. In 1970, the "Fundamentals of Labor Legislation of the USSR" (art 26) secured the right of workers to conclude agreements with the administration on part-time work. To a certain extent, however, this article of law was a policy-planning statute, set forth with a view to the developmental prospects of our economy. This kind of work schedule is not being widely used in our nation as yet.

For the purpose of studying this matter more thoroughly, the full-time and part-time employees of 120 enterprises in light industry, machine building, trade, passenger transport, local industry and consumer services in ten union republics--Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan and Kirgizia--and the administrators of these enterprises were surveyed in 1977 at the request of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Labor and Social Problems. The purpose of this survey was to determine the possible and actual motives for women's transfers to part-time work, to determine the desirable and established length of the part-time workday and to determine the factors impeding an increase in the number of part-time jobs.

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 217.

Around 76.1 percent of the women surveyed who worked a full day expressed a desire to work part-time; 51 percent expressed a preference for a partial workday and 25.1 percent opted for a partial workweek. Only 23.9 percent of all the working women surveyed were completely satisfied with the established work schedule.

The main factors motivating women to work part-time were the following: the need to raise children--62.3 percent (47.4 percent had preschoolers and children of elementary school age), the desire for more free time--14.2 percent, the need to take care of household affairs--10.7 percent, and unsatisfactory health--6.8 percent. The last two reasons were the main ones for women over 35. Only 15.2 percent of the women who wished to work part-time expressed a preference for a 4-hour day, 21.1 percent wanted to work 5 hours a day, and the majority (63.7 percent) were in favor of a 6- or 7-hour day.

The results of our survey indicate that a transfer to part-time work generally leads to improvement in product quality, a reduction in the percentage of defective goods and an increase in the number of persons whose products are accepted upon first submission and who have been assigned a personal stamp. The women who have transferred to part-time work are more likely to perform special duties which do not require much time--consequently, they become more extensively involved in social work. In many cases, the shorter work day allows women to combine their work with part-time academic studies without any detriment to their family obligations.

What is impeding the more widespread use of part-time work schedules?

The opinions expressed by administrative experts during the course of our survey are listed in the table.

Experience in the use of part-time schedules has shown that the least difficulties arise in connection with their introduction in those cases when it is possible to establish a brigade in which all members work the same number of hours in each shift and week. The experts, as we have seen, mention the insufficient number of persons willing to work part-time (although many administrators are also afraid that there may be a mass transfer to shorter schedules). As a rule, this difficulty arises in those cases when a brigade is made up only of workers from a single enterprise, without cooperation with others. On the other hand, the survey showed that the population is almost unaware of the possibility of working part-time, as a result of which the only alternative to full-time employment for many is no work at all. A poll of non-working women indicated that 57 percent of them would like to work part-time.

The economic losses resulting from the transfer of some women from full-time to part-time work are partially compensated for by the fact that the average hourly productivity of those who work 4-6 hours a day is 15-30 percent higher than the productivity of full-time workers. This is because the workday of the former stops before the time of the sharp decline in labor productivity due to end-of-shift fatigue.

Administrators' Opinions Regarding Factors Impeding Spread of Part-Time Work

Factors impeding spread of part-time work	Opinions of administrators from sections where part-time schedules are:	
	Used, % (N=520 persons)	Not used, % (N=618 persons)
Difficulty of combining these schedules with brigade method of work	17.9	21.2
Aggravation of manpower shortage	14.8	11.9
Decrease in wages to conform to decrease in work hours	13.1	20.4
Shortage of persons willing to work part-time	11.0	7.5
Disruption of shift schedules	9.1	13.9
Material liability	--	8.0
No response	34.1	17.1

Some administrators believe that the material liability of workers in trade, public catering and consumer services precludes the possibility of using part-time schedules. In the Tallin Trade Center, however, 80 percent of the part-time workers are sales clerks and cashiers—a total of more than 150 of them.

As for the "aggravation of the manpower shortage" resulting from transfers from full-time to part-time work, 22.4 percent of all the women surveyed, as we have already pointed out, said that they would not be working at all if they had not been able to transfer to a more convenient schedule. On the average, these women expect to work part-time for around 4 years, after which they will return to the more conventional schedule. Consequently, the transfer to part-time work kept them from leaving the production sphere, preserved their skills, and reduced the possible production losses that would certainly have resulted from their resignation. It is indicative that the average length of the shift worked by these women is 4.83 hours, while the average shift of full-time workers is 5.71 hours.

It is just as economically expedient to offer part-time employment opportunities to the aged. In our survey, women between the ages of 55 and 77 represented 4.3 percent of all part-time workers, and the average length of their workday was 4.6 hours. Calculations have shown that, on the average, each of them has already worked around 4,000 hours on a part-time basis after reaching retirement age and plans to work another 2,500 hours. Some of them work 10 years or more on this basis. There is no question that work on a conventional schedule would be beyond their strength. Therefore, the more extensive use of part-time schedules will help resolve the problem of involving able-bodied pensioners in national production; they will make the transition from full-time work to no work at all gradually and this will ease the strain in the manpower balance.

Our study also showed that the more extensive use of part-time schedules is now being impeded mainly by the negative attitude of enterprise and establishment administrators. This attitude stems from the underestimation of sociopsychological factors in the production sphere, the lack of experience in organizing part-time work schedules and the lack of incentives for their introduction. It is indicative that many administrators use the manpower shortage as an explanation for their reluctance to institute part-time schedules, but the refusal to offer women convenient work schedules aggravates this shortage, since this causes many of them to resign so that they will have time to take care of family obligations.

In connection with this, ministries and departments should give more serious thought to the introduction of part-time schedules at enterprises under their jurisdiction, particularly for women with small children. Plant sociological laboratories, norm-setters and technologists should work with line supervisors to determine the sections, brigades and jobs in which part-time workers could be used; these points should also be included in plans for the social development of collectives. Public organizations, especially trade unions, must also do everything within their power to assist in this work, which "is consistent with the policy of the party and the Soviet State concerning the constant...improvement of the status of women as workers, mothers who are raising children and housewives."²

2. Brezhnev, L. I., "On the Constitution of the USSR," Moscow, 1977, p 56.

METHODS OF DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL FACTORS ON THE LENGTH OF THE CAREERS OF ELDERLY MINERS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 93-96

[Article by Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Polzik, junior research associate at the Sverdlovsk Scientific Research Institute of Labor Hygiene and Occupational Disease, and Vladimir Sergeyevich Kazantsev, junior research associate at the Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics of the Ural Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The number of people in the older age groups in our nation has increased in the last decade. During the interval between the censuses of 1939 and 1970, the relative number of persons aged 60 or over doubled (from 6.7 percent to 13.2 percent)¹ and in 1978 there were 30.8 million old-age pensioners in the nation.² This poses a number of problems for society.

The fact is that demographic forecasts indicate a reduction in the natural growth rate of the working-age population. This means that the role of the older age groups as an additional source of manpower must be reassessed. The party and government are giving these matters a great deal of attention. For example, the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures to Further Improve the Employment of the Aged and Disabled in the National Economy and the Additional Benefits Connected with This" of 14 September 1973 notes that existing opportunities for enlisting the services of pensioners in public labor are not being used sufficiently as yet, and that additional measures should be taken to involve them in production activity on a much broader scale.³

For the resolution of this problem, it would seem important to determine the particular factors affecting the decision of an elderly worker to retire on a pension. It is only in this way that we can expect to control this social process and predict the probable duration of the professional activity of elderly workers, which will be of value in the calculation of manpower resources.

Therefore, the purpose of this study was to find answers to these questions for the mining and extractive branch of industry.

We analyzed data on mine workers in six copper mines in the Central Urals, who had the option to retire at the age of 50 if they had worked "underground" for 10 years.

The study of the effects of various factors on the length of the miners' term of professional service was conducted with a group consisting of 982 individuals. We analyzed data on each worker's term of service, profession, requests for medical assistance during the pre-retirement period (45-50 years), social and personal living conditions, etc. The materials for our analysis were the documents of personnel divisions, the pension files of social security divisions, the out-patient charts of medical units and the data of a personnel survey using the method of the standardized interview, mainly consisting of questions about the social and personal living conditions of miners during the period preceding retirement age.

We analyzed the degree to which the probability of transfers (at any time after retirement age) to lighter work ("partial retirement")⁴ and of full retirement on a pension was influenced by professional production factors ("underground" work, the term of service in mining prior to the 50th birthday, the worker's age at the beginning of his career, his age at the beginning of his work "underground" and working conditions in jobs held by miners other than in the mining industry) and social and personal factors (income and living space per family member, the level of housing convenience, the presence of subsidiary plots, excessive smoking and drinking, the state of health, the frequency of visits to health resorts and preventive care establishments, and systematic involvement in physical culture). We will discuss the influence of some of these in greater detail.

As we can see from the table, the probability of transfers to lighter work and of full retirement is higher for individuals in the "face" professions, which is most likely due to the heavier labor and more harmful conditions of their work. The probability of retirement was lower for persons who began working underground between the ages of 40 and 49. This is due to the higher percentage of persons who do not have enough "underground" service (10 years) when they reach 50 years of age. For example, whereas only 3.5 percent of the workers who went "underground" before their 30th birthday do not have a 10-year term of "underground" service, the figure is 74.5 percent in the group of workers aged 40 to 49.

When we analyze the effect of the term of service in the mines, we find a clear tendency toward earlier retirement⁵ in people with more than 20 years of service, which can be associated with the known dependence of the state of health on the length of production service in jobs with unfavorable working conditions. The worker's age at the start of his career and the working conditions in jobs outside the mining industry had no strong bearing on the probability of retirement by elderly miners.

Probability of Transfers to Lighter Work and Full Retirement by Miners, Depending
on Conditions of Professional Activity and Some Personal
and Medical-Biological Factors, %

(1) Факторы	(2) Группы факторов	(3) «Математический прогноз»				(4) Пятилетний прогноз			
		в 49 лет	в 50 лет	в 51 лет	в 52 лет	в 53 года	в 54 года	в 55 лет	в 56 лет
(10) Наличие профессии	Забойная	32,30	32,04	31,20	30,36	29,52	28,68	27,84	27,00
(11) Возраст в начале подземной работы	Незабойная	17,78	18,51	19,24	20,00	20,76	21,52	22,28	23,04
(12) Горный стаж	До 20 лет	25,70	26,34	27,00	27,66	28,32	28,98	29,64	30,30
(13) Желание работать	20-29 лет	28,67	29,31	30,00	30,66	31,32	31,98	32,64	33,30
(14) Горный стаж	30-39 лет	19,36	20,00	20,66	21,32	21,98	22,64	23,30	23,96
(15) Горный стаж	40-49 лет	10,01	10,66	11,32	11,98	12,64	13,30	13,96	14,62
(16) Горный стаж	10-14 лет	21,70	22,36	23,02	23,68	24,34	25,00	25,66	26,32
(17) Желание работать	15-19 лет	16,17	16,83	17,49	18,15	18,81	19,47	20,13	20,79
(18) Желание работать	20 и более лет	29,67	30,33	31,00	31,66	32,32	32,98	33,64	34,30
(19) Желание работать	Благоустройство	19,37	20,03	20,69	21,35	22,01	22,67	23,33	23,99
(20) Желание работать	Неблагоустройство	19,46	20,12	20,78	21,44	22,10	22,76	23,42	24,08
(21) Желание работать	Есть	19,10	19,76	20,42	21,08	21,74	22,40	23,06	23,72
(22) Желание работать	Нет	21,35	22,01	22,67	23,33	23,99	24,65	25,31	25,97
(23) Желание работать	До 50 руб.	23,82	24,48	25,14	25,80	26,46	27,12	27,78	28,44
(24) Желание работать	50-70 руб.	21,82	22,48	23,14	23,80	24,46	25,12	25,78	26,44
(25) Желание работать	71-100 руб.	15,0	15,66	16,32	16,98	17,64	18,30	18,96	19,62
(26) Желание работать	Более 100 руб.	13,82	14,48	15,14	15,80	16,46	17,12	17,78	18,44
(27) Желание работать	До 20 руб. в сутках	15,16	15,82	16,48	17,14	17,80	18,46	19,12	19,78
(28) Желание работать	Более 20 руб. в сутках	23,13	23,79	24,45	25,11	25,77	26,43	27,09	27,75
(29) Желание работать	Много	19,71	20,37	21,03	21,69	22,35	23,01	23,67	24,33
(30) Желание работать	Мало	23,13	23,79	24,45	25,11	25,77	26,43	27,09	27,75
(31) Желание работать	До 8 руб.	22,73	23,39	24,05	24,71	25,37	26,03	26,69	27,35
(32) Желание работать	Более 8 руб.	20,23	20,89	21,55	22,21	22,87	23,53	24,19	24,85
(33) Желание работать	До 8 руб.	22,73	23,39	24,05	24,71	25,37	26,03	26,69	27,35
(34) Желание работать	Более 8 руб.	20,23	20,89	21,55	22,21	22,87	23,53	24,19	24,85

Key:

1. Factors
 2. Factorial variations
 3. "Partial" retirement
 4. Full retirement
 5. Up to age 49
 6. Up to 50
 7. Up to 55
 8. Up to 60
 9. Up to 65
 10. Underground work
 11. Age at start of underground work
 12. Term of service in mining
 13. Housing conveniences
 14. Private subsidiary plot
 15. Income per family member
 16. Degree of tobacco abuse
 17. Degree of alcohol abuse
 18. Average number of visits to physician each year (between the ages of 45 and 50)
 19. Face work
 20. Not face work
 21. Under 20 years of age
 22. 20 or more years
 23. Many conveniences
 24. Few conveniences
 25. Yes
 26. No
 27. Up to 50 rubles
 28. More than 100 rubles
 29. Up to 20 cigarettes a day
- [Key continued on next page]

[Continuation of key]

30. More than 20 a day

31. High

32. Low

33. Two or less

34. More than two

Neither the amount of living space per family member nor the convenience level of housing had a noticeable effect on early retirement. The existence of private plots, however, fostered this, which was evidently connected with diminished interest in wages and greater interest in freeing a family member to work.

The probability of early retirement was higher for persons with the minimum (up to 50 rubles) and maximum (over 100 rubles) incomes per family member. We can assume that a high level of family financial security, which makes it possible to accumulate savings (or attests to the existence of other family members with fairly high wages), diminishes the pensioner's incentive to continue working under the difficult conditions of "underground" labor. As for the group with the minimum income, further analysis revealed that it was distinguished by a high percentage of individuals with private plots, and this factor, as we noted above, fosters early retirement.

The excessive use of tobacco and alcohol considerably increases the probability of early retirement by elderly miners, which is due to the negative effect of these factors on the health. The dependence of more or less early retirement on the state of health was also demonstrated by means of direct data (the state of health was assessed on the basis of the frequency of requests for medical treatment between the ages of 45 and 50). The probability of early retirement was much lower for persons who visited physicians twice a year or less than for those who requested medical treatment three or more times a year.

Since most of these factors are obviously interrelated, it is important to investigate the comprehensive influence of all factors on the duration of professional activity by elderly workers.

To assess the effects of the entire set of professional, social and medical-biological factors listed above, our research findings were processed on a BESM-6 with the use of mathematical pattern recognition methods. An analysis of these data pointed up the "influencing" factors. These include the worker's age at the beginning of his work "underground," the "underground" profession, the term of service in mining, income per family member, private plots, excessive smoking and drinking, involvement in physical culture and the state of health in the pre-retirement years. On the whole, this was corroborated by data derived during processing with the aid of a "breakdown" table.

The results of our study indicate that the decision to continue working after retirement age is most affected by social factors, while transfers to lighter work prior to retirement age were mainly influenced by professional production factors.

The complex of factors we defined contains some which obviously can be manipulated to a certain degree for the purpose of increasing the length of the individual's period of work. For example, the expediency of limiting the length of time spent in face work might be considered in connection with the much greater probability of retirement by persons in the "face work" group even before retirement age. The timely transfer of these individuals to other jobs could prolong the term of their professional and general ability to work.

The fight against such harmful habits as smoking and drinking is working toward the same end. Systematic involvement in physical culture could obviously also play a definite role in prolonging the individual's career.

Our data on the influence of the worker's age at the beginning of his work "underground" corroborate existing assumptions of the inexpediency of hiring individuals under 20 years of age for "underground" work.

In connection with the specific nature of "underground" labor, the complex of factors we have defined can only be used for forecasting in the field of "underground" professions, with consideration for the local peculiarities of each region.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Chebotarev, D. F., "The Medical and Social Aspects of the Aging of the Population," SOVETSKOYE ZDRAVOOKHRANENIYE, 1977, No 6, pp 8-13.
2. See "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1977 g." [The National Economy of the USSR in 1977], Moscow, 1978, p 439.
3. See "Resheniya partii i pravitel'stva po khozyaystvennym voprosam" [Party and Governmental Decisions on Economic Matters], vol 9, Moscow, 1974, p 646.
4. "Partial" retirement signifies the following: for professions involving face work--a transfer to non-face jobs in the mine or to above-ground work; for non-face underground jobs--a transfer to lighter non-face work or an above-ground job.
5. Here and below, more or less "early" retirement signifies the amount of time elapsing after the 50th birthday, which gives the individual the option to retire.

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE COLLECTIVE AND PRODUCTION DISCIPLINE OF YOUTH

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 97-99

[Article by A. B. Vinogradov and E. A. Kyuregyan]

[Text] Public opinion in the collective is the most important sociological normative factor affecting the formation of the individual's system of values and actions (behavior). Collective opinion plays this role "mainly through moral supervision of the activities and behavior of individuals."¹ The labor collective plays a particularly important indoctrinating role in dealing with young workers.

Table 1

Projected Scale of Values of Non-Violators and Violators
of Discipline, % of Number Surveyed

"In your opinion, what is the most valuable personal achievement in a young person's life?"	Those who adhere to discipline and actively oppose its violation		Violators of discipline	
	Percentage	Position on scale	Percentage	Position on scale
Success in a career	42.2	3	24.2	4
A good education	28.1	4	24.5	3
The respect of co-workers	47.5	2	37.3	2
High financial status	5.9	6	8.3	6
The ability to benefit others	52.7	1	37.6	1
Independence of other people and circumstances	6.5	5	8.9	5

The system of standards in the production collective generally reflects the system of social requirements and, for this reason, the collective serves as a connecting link between society and the individual. Adherence to the standards of collective life is an essential condition for the existence and

solidarity of the collective. Under social conditions, the absence of private property reinforces the collective nature of the aims and values of individuals, and this, in turn, aids in reinforcing the peer-group role of the labor collective.

Table 2

Actual Scale of Values of Non-Violators and Violators
of Labor Discipline, % of Number Surveyed

"What are the basic goals you are pursuing?"	Those who adhere to discipline and ac- tively oppose its violation		Violators of discipline	
	Percentage	Position on scale	Percentage	Position on scale
Success in a career	62.2	1	29.2	3
A good education	30.3	4	42.5	1
The respect of co-workers	34.8	3	28.4	4
High financial status	6.1	5	6.7	5
The ability to benefit others	39.9	2	37.6	2
Independence of other people and circumstances	1.3	6	3.4	6

Table 3

Change in Number of Violations of Discipline in Relation to Degree
of Awareness of Collective Affairs, % of Number Surveyed

Knowledge of social affairs of collective	Survey of 4 April		Survey of 30 May	
	Those who adhere to discipline and actively oppose its violation	Violators of discipline	Those who adhere to discipline and actively oppose its violation	Violators of discipline
Good knowledge	52.5	17.7	53.1	23.7
General knowledge	36.5	37.0	34.1	40.2
Some idea	7.0	17.7	6.1	16.1
No knowledge or undecided	4.0	27.6	6.7	20.0

The data of a public opinion poll of youth (up to the age of 30), conducted in April and May 1978,² indicate that young people are potentially oriented toward collective standards in their own value (see scale positions 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1). In order to obtain the approval of the collective, however, the individual strives to achieve success in the specific forms of activity that constitute the object of collective evaluation. This is attested to by the respondents' choice of currently dominant values (see the scale positions in Table 2).³

Table 4

**Relationship Between Percentage of Violators of Labor Discipline
Among Total Respondents and their Emotional State**

Worker categories	"How are things going in your life at present?"				
	Absolutely well	Quite well	Not as well as could be expected	Very Difficult poorly to say	
Those who adhere to discipline and actively oppose its violation	42.4	36.2	27.5	23.4	21.5
Violators of discipline	10.0	10.6	15.7	20.0	35.0

Table 5

**Distribution of Violators of Labor Discipline
Among Levels of Skills, %**

Worker categories	Worker qualifications			
	Unclas- sified	Low levels, 1-2	Average levels, 3-4	High levels, 5-6
Those who adhere to discipline and actively oppose its violation	24.1	27.4	35.1	56.5
Violators of discipline	11.7	10.0	5.4	3.5

Collective opinion is most effective wherever the results of labor depend on the coordinated efforts of collective members. Our research findings testify that the number of persons who actively oppose violations of labor discipline is 15-20 percent higher on the average in situations in which the final result of labor depends on the combined efforts of the brigade (it is precisely for this reason that such forms of collective labor as the brigade contract are of great indoctrinating value). For example, 56.5 percent of the highly skilled workers at industrial enterprises, 54.5 percent of manual laborers in agriculture and 58.8 percent of machine operators actively opposed violations of labor discipline, while the figures are only 35.8 percent in the case of engineering and technical personnel and 34.8 percent in the case of employees.

Therefore, the normative approach to the assessment of violations of labor discipline is important primarily in situations where the results of labor depend on the coordinated efforts of all workers and where each violation of labor discipline disrupts the total chain of operations.

Public opinion in the collective can effectively influence the individual only if he has sufficient knowledge of the standards and expectations of the collective. A prerequisite for this kind of understanding is a high level of awareness of collective affairs. The data of our initial survey and our follow-up poll demonstrate a constant relationship between the degree to which people are aware of collective affairs and their discipline (see Table 3).

A low level of awareness is sometimes due to the individual's relative alienation from collective life. The reasons for this are not always to be found in the individual's own behavior. There are collectives in which biased, unobjective opinions are formed for various reasons in regard to the actions of a member. In such cases, collective opinion is not regarded as the norm by the individual. It is also necessary to consider the individual character traits or unsatisfactory emotional state of the member. Our data attest to a correlation between the emotional state of the individual and his violations of labor discipline (see Table 4).

Strict adherence to collective standards does not mean that its members lose their independence or their individuality. Personal initiative and the creative ambitions of individuals must always be taken into account, as situations in which the content of labor does not correspond to the skills and interests of the worker indisputably tend to increase the number of violators of labor discipline, which is attested to by the data in Table 5.

This is why one of the important responsibilities of the collective is to instill a patriotic attitude toward labor in the individual and to inform the individual of the social significance of his work. The causes of violations do not stem only from the individual, but also from the conditions in which these violations take place and, above all, the absence of effective judgment in collective opinion. For this reason, the most effective way of combating violations of labor discipline could consist in the further augmentation of the role of collective opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1. Uledov, A. K., "The Increasingly Important Role of Public Opinion in the Life of the Labor Collective," in the book: "Ideyno-vospitatel'naya rabota v proizvodstvennom kollektive: opyt, problemy" [Ideological Indoctrination Work in the Production Collective: Experience and Problems], Moscow, 1976, p 65.
2. This study, conducted by the Scientific Research Center of the Komsomol Central Committee's Higher Komsomol School and the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee in Leningrad, Kaluzhskaya, Saratovskaya and Chelyabinskaya oblasts, Primorskiy Kray and the Georgian, Kazakh, Moldavian, Ukrainian and Estonian SSR's, was timed to coincide with the 18th Komsomol Congress and was carried out in

three stages (follow-up studies): on 4 April, 28 April and 30 May. The data of the first (4,015 respondents) and third (3,155 respondents) stages are used in this article. The survey was taken by means of a questionnaire, which was issued to all respondents on the same day.

3. The study also revealed an intermediate group with "no particular remarks to make in regard to discipline." This group is not discussed in this article. The data in the table columns add up to more than 100 percent because more than one alternative response could be chosen.

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DYNAMICS OF YOUTH'S HIGHER EDUCATION AMBITIONS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 100-103

[Article by Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kinsburgskiy, junior research associate in the sector on the sociological problems of youth and education of the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Sociological studies of youth's orientation toward higher education have acquired particular significance in the last decade in connection with the development of other types of professional education and the aggravation of the manpower problem. An indicator of this orientation can be seen in plans for VUZ enrollment expressed by young people who were surveyed. Higher education now occupies a different place in the plans of young people than it did in the mid-1960's: The percentage of tenth-graders planning to enroll in VUZ's has decreased to approximately half the previous figure.¹ The verbally expressed plans of youth, however, do not always coincide with their actual behavior. "An analysis of the preferences expressed by secondary school graduates for particular VUZ's and the actual applications submitted indicates," M. Kh. Titma writes, "that their plans are being modified in the direction of the rejection of higher education (one-third of those who plan to enroll in VUZ's never actually apply), and that considerable changes also take place in their assessment of the preferability of particular VUZ's."²

We attempted to compare and supplement the dynamics of plans of young people who intend to acquire a higher education with their actual behavior. The number of persons taking VUZ entrance exams was used as an indicator of the latter. The absolute number of persons taking these exams provides an indicator of "absolute" orientation toward higher education, and the percentage accounted for by those who take the exams in a particular category of youth gives us an indicator of the "relative" VUZ orientation of this category.

The time period we researched was 1970-1977. This period was distinguished by the completion of the transition to universal secondary education, the accelerated development of vocational and technical education and the further expansion of the system of higher and secondary specialized education.

By 1970 the results of VUZ enrollment were essentially no longer affected by the specific conditions of preceding years which were connected with the graduation of twice as many students from the tenth and eleventh grades of general education schools in 1966.

If we use 100 percent to signify the number of persons taking entrance examinations in 1970, then by 1977 the number of VUZ applicants for all types of courses increased by 4.8 percent and applicants for day courses increased by 11.5 percent. The number of persons taking entrance exams for night and correspondence divisions remained virtually unchanged during the entire period. The total increase in the "absolute" orientation of youth toward higher education was completely centered in VUZ day divisions.




Figure 1




Figure 2

Most VUZ applicants are graduates of secondary schools. In 1977 they represented 84.5 percent of applicants for all types of courses and 94.8 percent of all applicants for day courses. The overwhelming majority were graduates of day secondary schools (graduates of night (or shift) schools in 1971 represented 7 percent of all VUZ applicants and the figure has displayed a constant tendency toward a decline). In general, the increase in the total number of applicants was also accounted for by graduates of secondary day schools.

Most of them enroll in VUZ's in the same year that they graduate from school. In 1977 they represented 48 percent of applicants for all types of courses and 65.6 percent of all applicants for day courses. Between 1970 and 1977 the proportion accounted for by them among all applicants rose by 17.7 percent, and the figure was 20.2 percent in the case of applicants for day courses (see Figure 1).

At the same time, the graduating classes of secondary academic institutions also grew rapidly. Secondary school graduation figures increased by 15.2 percent during the 8 years, while the number of VUZ applicants among them increased by only 2.1 percent. The decline in the "relative" VUZ orientation of graduates of day and night (shift) schools who take VUZ entrance exams in the same year that they graduate can be calculated quite precisely. For the graduates of secondary day schools, it dropped from 47.9 percent to 36.9 percent in the 8 years, and for graduates of night (shift) schools it dropped from 10.2 percent to 2.8 percent. Their "relative" orientation toward VUZ day divisions declined respectively from 41.5 to 32.7 percent and from 4.8 to 1.1 percent (see Figure 2).

Graduates of tekhnikums and other secondary specialized academic institutions represent a 15.5 percent of all VUZ applicants in 1977, 5.2 percent of all applicants for day divisions and 34.5 percent of all applicants for night and correspondence divisions. During the period in question, the increase in the total number was 22.8 percent, and in day divisions it was 34.5 percent. At the same time, the graduating classes of tekhnikums only grew by 14.8 percent. This indicates an increase in the "relative" VUZ orientation of this category of young people, in contrast to the graduates of secondary schools.

The majority of VUZ applicants who are secondary school graduates apply to day divisions, while the majority of those who have graduated from tekhnikums and other secondary specialized academic institutions enroll in night and correspondence divisions. This indicates that school graduates are more likely to attend day VUZ's and the graduates of tekhnikums prefer night and correspondence courses.

Between 1970 and 1977, VUZ enrollment figures rose more rapidly than the number of applicants. This was reflected in the lowering of "pre-examination" requirements. The general competition figures for all types of courses decreased from 243 applicants for each 100 vacancies in 1970 to 225 in 1977. In day divisions, the corresponding decrease was from 269 to 245 applicants for each 100 vacancies.

The decline in "pre-examination" competition automatically raised the indicator of the realization of applicants' plans to enroll in VUZ's. This indicator rose from 41.2 percent in 1970 to 44.5 percent in 1977 for all types of courses, and from 37.2 percent to 41 percent for day courses.

The orientation of youth toward higher education is one of the elements of orientation toward various types of professional education, which include, in addition to VUZ's, secondary specialized training, vocational and technical education and other types of professional training (training in vocational programs, training courses at enterprises and establishments, etc.). The interrelated nature of young people's feelings about all of these types of professional education is particularly reflected in the fact that decreased orientation toward higher education is accompanied by increased enrollments in secondary specialized institutions and vocational and technical institutes. If 1 stands for the number of VUZ enrollments, enrollments

in secondary specialized institutions in 1965 amounted to 1.3 and enrollments in vocational and technical institutes were equivalent to 1.4. In 1976 the proportions changed--1:1.4:2.3.

Composition of VUZ Applicants in 1977 (Throughout
the USSR, %)

Breakdown of VUZ applicants	Day divisions	Night and correspondence divisions	Total
Graduates of secondary schools	72.6	27.4	100
Graduates of tekhnikums and other secondary specialized academic institutions	21.7	78.3	100

This is also attested to by the statistics cited in the monograph "Sotsial'noye razvitiye rabochego klassa SSSR." The relative percentage of young people who acquire their initial professional training in VUZ day divisions remained almost unchanged throughout the period beginning with the mid-1960's and ending with the early 1970's, while the percentage of young people who acquired their training in the day divisions of secondary specialized institutions and vocational and technical institutes increased 1.5-fold. The percentage of young people who acquire their training at enterprises and establishments also decreased, from 60 percent to 45 percent.³

If we compare, as is frequently done, VUZ enrollments only with secondary school graduation figures, we derive obviously lower indicators of the "accessibility" of higher education. It is more correct to calculate the actual "accessibility" of VUZ's for young people with consideration for their orientation toward higher education and the segment of the school graduating class which enrolls in VUZ's 1 or 2 years after receiving a diploma. If this method of computation is used, it turns out that although the increasing number of graduates from the tenth grade and from other forms of secondary education is slightly decreasing the "accessibility" of higher education, it is not to the extent indicated by a direct comparison of the growth rates of school graduation and VUZ enrollment figures. According to our calculations, the average annual rate of decrease was only 0.44 percent during the entire period in question. In the next few years, there will be a decrease in school graduation figures in connection with the end of the "demographic boom," and this, in combination with an increase in VUZ enrollments, will heighten VUZ "accessibility."

The diminished orientation of secondary day school graduates toward higher education and the simultaneous increase in their orientation toward secondary specialized education and vocational and technical training signifies the equalization of not only the views of youth in regard to various types of professional education, but also the prestige of professions involving mental and physical labor. The slight decline in the orientation of young people toward higher education indirectly reflects the further eradication of

social class differences in the developed socialist society. The combination of a rapid increase in the number of graduates from secondary academic institutions with the relatively stable level of the accessibility of higher education is establishing the prerequisites for further expansion of the social base of the Soviet intelligentsia.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Vysshaya shkola kak faktor izmeneniya sotsial'noy struktury razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva" [The Higher School as a Factor of Change in the Social Structure of the Developed Socialist Society], Moscow, 1978, ch III.
2. Titma, M. Kh., "Vybory professii kak sotsial'naya problema" [Career Choice as a Social Problem], Moscow, 1975, p 120.
3. "Sotsial'noye razvitiye rabochego klassa SSSR" [The Social Development of the Working Class in the USSR], Moscow, 1977, p 239.

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SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND PRACTICE

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 104-112

[Report by V. V. Kruglov and Yu. G. Te on a round table discussion held in Vladimir by the editors of the journal]

[Text] The attainment of the CPSU's announced objective of organically combining the achievements of the technological revolution with the advantages of socialist economic management will require the purposeful and comprehensive development of all subsystems in the society, including such social organizations as the city with its major subunits--enterprises and associations. In a large socialist city, broader and deeper technological progress leads to several complex problems requiring sociological investigation. These include the particular role played by individual labor collectives in the resolution of citywide problems and the study of experience in the field of social planning and social management on various levels. This was the topic of the round table discussion attended by party administrators and scientific personnel in Vladimir, one of the nation's large industrial and cultural centers. The meeting was attended by Yu. A. Dmitriyev, secretary of the Vladimir CPSU Gorkom; Professor A. G. Kharchev, editor-in-chief of the journal; Professor V. G. Podmarkov, member of the editorial board; and several scientists and teachers from Moscow and Vladimir.

In his report, CPSU gorkom Secretary Yu. A. Dmitriyev said that Vladimir is one of the most intensively developing cities in the RSFSR's Nonchernozem Zone: Over the last two decades its population has doubled, reaching 300,000, and its annual volume of industrial production has quadrupled. In the last 10-12 years, at least two-thirds of all capital investments in the city have been used to improve the technical and organizational structure of plants and factories. During the years of the Ninth Five-Year Plan alone, more than 6,000 pieces of new equipment and 17,000 meters of transport means were installed, and 240 flowlines outfitted with highly productive mechanized and automated equipment were started up. As a result, enterprise profits rose by 65-80 percent during these years, labor productivity rose by 46.3 percent, and all of this was primarily due to the incorporation of the achievements of technological progress.

Analyzing the connections between technological progress and social transformations in the city, Yu. A. Dmitriyev said that improvements in the technical and organizational structure of production were changing the nature and content of labor. Skilled workers now make up more than 70 percent of the total personnel staff at plants and factories in the city, while unskilled workers now represent no more than 7 percent.

Technological progress is giving rise to profound social changes in the structure of public employment. Whereas the number of city workers employed in the national economy has risen by 6.1 percent since 1959, the number in science and in scientific services is now 6.7 times as high. Today 44.2 percent of all production workers in Vladimir have a higher, partial higher or secondary education.

The public standard of living is constantly rising. During the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the population of Vladimir received more than 800,000 square meters of additional living space, as a result of which the convenience level of housing reached 83.5 percent. The average monthly wage rose from 127 rubles in 1970 to 150 in 1975. All of these changes, in turn, resulted in a rise in public demand, which called for the rapid development of the non-production sphere and a considerable increase in the number of workers employed in this sphere and the volume of municipal and consumer services offered.

In addition to this, technological progress faced city organizations with several fairly complex socioeconomic problems, the resolution of which required assistance from the sociological and economic sciences. Today Vladimir has one of the characteristics common to many large cities--a lack of proportion between the development of industry and the growth of the population on the one hand, and the construction of housing and improvement of the quality of municipal, consumer, transport, trade and cultural services on the other. In order to overcome this disparity, it will be necessary to balance the development of various urban zones with the aid of a comprehensive plan for the socioeconomic development of the city.

For the scientifically substantiated and effective management of the city and the prediction of its further development, it will be extremely important to create a special information system like the city-ASU [automated control system], which will process information received daily from local government agencies. The resulting acute need for extensive consideration of the experience and knowledge of direct participants in production will lead to the further expansion of the democratic bases of management. This, in turn, presupposes, as Professor V. S. Yevlikov (VGPI [Vladimir State Pedagogical Institute imeni P. I. Lebedev]) states, the augmentation of the role and significance of worker awareness of the nature, content and purpose of the work of public administrative agencies.

Sociological studies conducted at several enterprises in the city and oblast testify that many workers do not know enough about the work of their own enterprise or of public administrative agencies. This reduces their enthusiasm and desire to take part in administrative activity.

An analysis of sociological research findings shows that the work of involving the laboring public in administrative activity should be carried out on a differentiated basis, with consideration for the qualifications and educational level of the worker. Around 30 percent of the workers surveyed at the Avtopribor Chemical Plant and the Kovrov Mining Administration said that they could not take part in the work of, for instance, public agencies of economic analysis and public offices of technical standardization, because this requires special knowledge. This means that worker awareness can only be useful if his abilities and skills allow him to take an active part in public administrative work.

The purpose of the experiment conducted at the Kovrov Mining Administration was to arm the worker with knowledge and enhance his competence in specific areas of production management. A 2-year people's university was established here to teach "The Fundamentals of Scientific Production Control." The persons attending the class were brigade workers, foremen, shift and section supervisors and the party, trade-union and Komsomol aktiv. This was the first academic institution of this kind to be established at an industrial enterprise in the oblast.

In conclusion, Professor V. S. Yevlikov remarked that more effective participation by the masses in production management is an objective requiring a comprehensive approach. It will necessitate, firstly, the establishment of substantiated and standard criteria (qualitative as well as quantitative) for evaluating the work of public administrative agencies; secondly, the adoption of a unionwide statute "On Public Administrative Agencies in the USSR," which would reinforce the legal status of these agencies, precisely define their functional role, aid in the coordination of the activities of numerous bureaus and councils and put an end to duplicate projects, studies of little importance and the dissipation of resources; thirdly, the publication of a special journal entitled OBSHCHESTVENNYYE ORGANY UPRAVLENIYA SSSR (tentative title) to examine the theoretical and practical aspects of this important sociopolitical phenomenon in the developed socialist society.

In his speech, V. M. Igoshin, winner of the State Prize of the USSR and chief technologist at the Vladimir Tractor Plant, noted that the level of mechanization had reached 65 percent in basic production units and 43 percent in auxiliary units after the enterprise had been remodeled during the Ninth Five-Year Plan. The socioprofessional structure of the collective changed: The percentage of highly skilled (23.6 percent) and skilled (46.4 percent) workers rose considerably. The labor savings was equivalent to the jobs of more than 6,500 workers, mainly semiskilled; the sanitary and hygienic conditions of production were improved, workers became more active, both professionally and in the sociopolitical sphere, and the rate of personnel turnover dropped to 9.2 percent. In some shops, however, the rates of mechanization were obviously not quick enough: Only 2.3 percent of the machine tool inventory is replaced here each year. A large part of their staff is still engaged in manual labor--around 40 percent. Young people do not apply for jobs here and, for this reason, the collective is ageing

noticeably. For example, young people represent only 20 percent of all workers with more than 3 years of seniority in the forging shop, and the figure is even lower in the mechanized packaging shop--9.1 percent.

To achieve maximum effectiveness from the mechanization and automation of production, social planning is being introduced at the plant on the level of the primary labor collective, and shop councils for the planning of economic and social development have been created.

In his speech, Professor V. G. Podmarkov discussed some of the fundamental questions connected with the improvement of social planning practices. All of the measures specified in social plans have a dual purpose--the mobilization of social reserves for more efficient production and the utilization of production results to satisfy the material and spiritual needs of the workers. These goals are also interrelated: Diminished concern for one affects the attainment of the other. Analyzing the experience in social planning in the city, V. G. Podmarkov mentioned the inadequate quantitative substantiation of the results of plan fulfillment. Moreover, the economic impact must be measured wherever possible (for example, calculation of the impact of measures to reduce personnel turnover, reinforce labor discipline, improve working conditions, etc.). Naturally, not everything can be expressed in rubles, tons and so forth, and managers must not demand that the economic impact of all measures be estimated. It would probably be more correct to distinguish between two types of impact: production and non-production (this is sometimes incorrectly called the social impact). The calculation of the non-production impact must follow the line of the attainment of each social objective facing the collective.

One important indicator of the social impact of technological progress on production is the satisfaction of young workers with their jobs. This was discussed by Ya. L. Eydel'man, candidate of technical sciences and senior research associate at the All-Union Scientific Research, Design and Technological Institute of Electrical Machine Building of the USSR Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry. He said that young workers prefer jobs distinguished by a variety of functions and requiring higher qualifications. The least preferable jobs involve work with forging and pressing equipment and flowlines, as well as auxiliary jobs. The most significant factor contributing to job dissatisfaction is the tedium of the labor process. Nonetheless, conveyor lines which divide the labor process into single operations and flowlines with semiautomated equipment, which are distinguished by extreme uniformity and monotony, are now regarded as the main solution to the problem of increasing the output of mass-produced items. The cardinal solution to the problem is the automation of production processes. Wherever there is no indication that semiautomatic devices are to be replaced by fully automated production processes within the near future, measures should be taken to reduce the harmful effects of monotony (the combination of professions, the periodic shift of work positions, moral and material compensations for monotonous work and so forth).

A sociological study conducted at enterprises in the city indicated that the impact of identical material, technical, economic and social measures could vary under different conditions.¹ This must be taken into account in the practice of social planning when the results of technological progress are being estimated.

General Director A. A. Nemontov of the Tekhnika Production Engineering Association discussed problems in the management of social processes with the aid of a comprehensive plan for the scientific, technical, economic and social development of the enterprise collective. The exertion of purposeful influence on the material and technical base (in 8 years, more than 70,000 technological processes were planned, mastered and perfected, more than 1,000 organizational and technical measures were carried out, labor productivity was augmented by 83 percent and 570 individuals were made available for other jobs) led to considerable improvement in the general educational level and professional-skills structure of the enterprise collective and increased its stability. At present, 44.5 percent of all engineering and technical personnel have a higher education, and 49.9 percent have a secondary technical education. Around 80 percent of all the workers have a secondary, higher or secondary technical education. This has made it possible for the association to quickly organize the production of high-precision and ultra-precision machine tools and establish multipurpose processing centers with digital programmed control. During the 10th Five-Year Plan, almost 80 percent of the association's workers will undergo advanced training, and by 1980 the average skills category of workers in basic units will rise to 3.8 (a rise of 29 percent during the 5 years) and the average category of workers in auxiliary units will rise to 3.75 (a rise of 14 percent). The average monthly wage will rise 21.6 percent and will reach 186 rubles. As a result of measures to improve working conditions, the number of persons working under conditions which are not completely in line with medical and sanitary requirements will be reduced by 65 percent. Particular attention in the association is being devoted to the organization of outside activities for the workers.

The results of all this testify that comprehensive plans are playing an important organizational role in party and economic work and have become an effective means of solving urgent problems in the social development of the association collective.

Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Z. Dadashev, sector head at the Moscow Institute of Economic Problems in the Comprehensive Development of the National Economy, presented a report on the freeing and redistribution of personnel in connection with technical progress. Technological progress is expanding the sphere of the application and influence of the law of labor modification and is accelerating the process of intraplant and interplant

1. The study involved 1,003 young workers under the age of 25 (369 men and 634 women). It is interesting that the social composition of working youth in the city reflects the social structure of the Vladimir population quite precisely: 70 percent of the young workers came from worker families, 20 percent came from kolkhoz families and 10 percent were the children of employees.

(sectorial, intersectorial and territorial) regrouping of manpower, thereby making higher demands of the professional training of workers.

The elaboration of the fundamentals of scientific control over the process of the freeing and redistribution of personnel and the enhancement of its impact are connected with improvement of the statistical base. The enterprise reports used at present do not contain indicators of the social impact of the incorporation of new technology--the number of workers actually freed, the patterns of this process and the redistribution inside and outside the enterprise, including job transfers within the same profession and outside the profession.

The effective management of interplant personnel redistribution on the citywide level will necessitate augmentation of the role of city (or rayon) job placement and public information bureaus. Studies have shown that job placement services aid in preventing the change of professions: For workers who found their own new jobs, the coefficient of career change was 0.24 and was twice as high as the coefficient for workers who were aided by job placement organizations (0.11).

In some cities, information on personnel requirements is still being given out by each enterprise independently. This frequently gives rise to unhealthy competition in personnel hiring practices and stimulates the turnover rate. Information on job vacancies and working conditions should be totally concentrated in the municipal job placement bureaus that have been opened in 278 cities in the nation.

Under present conditions, the problem of using the achievements of technological progress in the public service sphere has been acquiring increasing importance, department store Director N. M. Kobets remarked in his speech. It has been calculated that the city's inhabitants and visitors spend more than 30 million hours a year on the purchase of goods. The methods of reducing these expenditures are not only connected with the improvement of the organizational structure of city trade enterprises, but also with the use of the achievements of technological progress in trade: the mechanization and automation of trade processes and the conversion of stores to sell goods in packaged form, through automats and on the sample-order basis. During the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the incorporation of progressive forms of trade increased commodity turnover per worker at the department store by 52.5 percent and increased profits 2.4-fold. But the main achievement was that the average amount of time spent serving each customer decreased from 12-15 minutes to 3-7.

The resolution of procedural and organizational problems in the coordination of sectorial and regional social planning will play an important role in the planning for the social development of labor collectives and the city as a whole. This was the subject of a report by V. V. Kruglov, head of the group studying the social problems of labor at the VNIPTIEM, who said that the following principles were taken into account when the comprehensive plan for the socioeconomic development of Vladimir during 1976-1980 was being drafted:

a) the city plan for economic and social development does not represent the simple sum of the comprehensive plans of enterprises, since these objects of planning have different characteristics and functions; b) the comprehensive plans of enterprises must occupy a position of secondary importance in relation to the city plan; c) in connection with the expansion of the enterprise's social functions, enterprise resources should be used to solve a variety of local problems, and enterprise plans should be supplemented with a section reflecting the regional aspect of the activities of labor collectives.

This approach and the application of the special-purpose programming principle made it possible to coordinate the development of the city's main subsystems--the urban-development and urban-maintenance spheres--and to determine capital investment guidelines with consideration for the rate of technological progress, its social results and its consequences on the one hand, and social requirements on the other.

Under the conditions of technological progress, the social planning of leisure time and everyday life is assigned an important place in the plans for the social development of enterprises and the city as a whole. This was the topic of the report by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A. G. Levitskaya, docent at the Vladimir Polytechnical Institute. According to an analysis of the findings of several concrete sociological studies, the actual structure of the leisure activities of workers in Vladimir is consistent with the objectives of communist indoctrination and the formation of high spiritual demands in the Soviet people. Today the city has more than 100 cultural establishments, including a legitimate theater, a symphony orchestra and 139 libraries with a total of around 3 million books. There is no question that they are playing their part in organizing the leisure time of city workers. But the material base of many cultural establishments still does not meet current requirements and needs further reinforcement.

The amount of free time and the efficient use of this time depend to a considerable extent on the housing conditions of workers and the availability of child-care establishments and socioconsumer and municipal services.

The more intensive development of all major branches of the municipal economy is envisaged for the 1976-1980 period, including the considerable augmentation of residential construction and the construction of municipal, consumer and sociocultural facilities. This will make it possible to take a comprehensive approach to the establishment of the necessary conditions for the use of leisure time by the working public, to augment the variety of services offered to the public and to expand the network of small cafes and restaurants.

When leisure activities and the developmental level of cultural and consumer services are being planned in the large socialist city, the specific features of each city must be taken into account. It is not enough to predict the future activity patterns of various groups of the urban population--they must

be mapped out precisely: Leisure time must be filled with activities which will provide greater opportunities for self-expression, personality development and the discovery of creative potential.

Broader and deeper scientific and technical progress, A. I. Vlasov, head of the industrial transport section of the Vladimir CPSU Gorkom, said, calls for the transfer of agriculture to an industrial basis and the reinforcement of urban-rural lines of communication. Industry in Vladimir is making a substantial contribution to the technical re-equipping of national agriculture. The city sponsors 58 kolkhozes and sovkhoses within the Vladimir greater metropolitan area (6 cities and 10 urban settlements). In recent years, this sponsorship has become more purposeful and effective: All measures are now carried out in accordance with the "Comprehensive Plan for the Sponsorship of Sovkhoses and Kolkhozes in Suzdal'skiy, Sobinskiy, Sudogodskiy, Kameshkovskiy and Yur'yev-Pol'skiy Rayons by Enterprises and Organizations in the City of Vladimir," drawn up in conjunction with the administrators of the sponsored rayons and ratified by the bureau of the Vladimir CPSU Gorkom. This plan concentrates on the reinforcement of the material and technical base of kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

The establishment of large specialized production units is being accompanied by the construction of well-planned rural settlements of the new type with a broad network of municipal and consumer service enterprises and trade, public catering and cultural establishments.

Student construction brigades are making a substantial contribution to the reinforcement of the material and technical base of kolkhozes and sovkhoses. It is important to note that half of the students of the construction school, as well as many students in other schools of the Vladimir Polytechnical Institute, plan to work in rural areas.

Rural workers are receiving a great deal of assistance from the personnel of the service sphere and the city's cultural enlightenment workers.

All of this has made considerable progress in the economic and social development of rural areas possible. Suffice it to say that the level of migration from rural areas to the city in our oblast is one of the lowest in the central region.

Carrying on the discussion of ways in which the city can help rural areas, V. I. Staroverov, assistant editor-in-chief of SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, pointed out the fact that the social impact of city sponsorship of rural areas under the conditions of the technological revolution is now provided for primarily in the city itself. He cited several examples of this.

Sociological surveys have indicated that some of the Niva, Kolos and Sibiryak combines delivered to farms at the beginning of the year cannot be used until the next season because they are not ready to operate when they arrive, as

they might require additional assembly, adjustment, pressure-sealing, finishing and so forth. The correction of production defects requires the labor of many machine operators, who are in short supply in rural areas. Here is another example. Due to poor quality, insufficient reliability and durability and the shortage of spare parts, the DT-75 tractor requires an average of six minor repairs and two major overhauls (not counting technical maintenance) during its period of operation on a farm, and the cost of these repairs is around 7,000-8,000 rubles--or 2.5 times the wholesale price of the tractor itself. Obviously, if city workers and engineers were to pay more attention to the quality of this equipment, kolkhozes and sovkhoses could conserve a tremendous amount of skilled labor and use it in other spheres of production.

It must be said that technological, ergonomic and, finally, aesthetic technical imperfections in agricultural machinery become an even greater problem as the technological revolution spreads more extensively and more deeply into rural areas. The quality of this machinery was pointedly questioned at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in October 1976. As speakers noted at the July (1978) Central Committee Plenum, however, the situation is being corrected too slowly.

Today's agricultural machines cannot be developed with the use of obsolete technology and primitive designs. As personnel with an increasingly excellent background enter agriculture and the mass communications and news media develop, people will see this fact more clearly and will understand it more thoroughly, and this will result in dissatisfaction with agricultural work and all of the related consequences--diminished interest in the work, lower labor productivity, a higher rate of personnel turnover and so forth.

Agriculture is so important to our nation and its management is such a complex process that its mechanization and automation must be based on the very latest technical discoveries. This work must begin in the cities. It might be expedient to "inject" new design and engineering forces, unfettered by tradition, into the sphere of agricultural project planning and machine building; the blueprints, designs, components and machines that are best from the technological, ergonomic and aesthetic standpoint should be brought to the attention of the masses, particularly youth.

In reference to sponsorship, L. I. Brezhnev remarked that "the practice of recent years has given us many valuable forms of this work."² These include assistance in the planning and construction of hothouse combines, animal husbandry farms, fodder shops, housing, and cultural and consumer facilities, help in the training of agricultural machine operators and the offer of cultural services to field and farm workers.

The initiative and experience of the party organizations of Moscow and Moscow Oblast, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk and other cities

2. Brezhnev, L. I., "O dal'neyshem razvitií sel'skogo khozyaystva SSSR" [On the Further Development of Agriculture in the USSR], Moscow, 1978, p 41.

In sponsorship work were highly commended at the plenum. The annual assistance rendered by Moscow Oblast enterprises to rural workers in the reinforcement of their material and technical base is valued at 25 million rubles. They have paid 6.5 million rubles for machines and equipment for the mechanization of animal husbandry and crop farming. It would be difficult to list all of the professions of urbanites who are now involved in accomplishing agricultural reforms and the socioeconomic elevation of rural zones: Even workers in the garment and footwear industry are involved--the quality of work clothing and, consequently, the productivity of the labor of agrarian workers depend on them. The quality of agricultural training, the effectiveness of technical designs and so forth depend on scientists and instructors, and the rural spiritual atmosphere depends on people working in radio, television and the press. The list of connecting links in this chain would be extremely long, since agriculture serves the entire population and, in turn, needs the assistance of the entire population. For this reason, the party declared the further development of agriculture to be a nationwide affair long ago. Urban sponsorship of rural areas is part of this work. Under the conditions of the current technological revolution, this assistance should be backed up by the entire complex of scientific and technical achievements.

In his report, O. V. Romashov (Scientific Research Institute of the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee) noted that technological progress in the city has a direct effect on the rural socioeconomic situation. In different parts of the nation, this effect varies. For example, in Moscow Oblast, the level of general job dissatisfaction is somewhat higher than in other parts of the nation. According to the results of a sociological study conducted in the spring of 1978 in Moscow Oblast, the urban way of life is playing an increasingly important role among the reasons for rural migration, particularly such elements of the urban environment as cultural and consumer services, the structure of leisure time and the educational system. Direct territorial ties with the city and extensive information about the conditions and nature of urban labor are placing higher demands on rural labor. This provides convincing proof of the tremendous significance of the decisions of the July (1978) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which outlined an entire group of measures for the gradual convergence of urban and rural cultural and consumer conditions and standards of living.

The results of the discussion were summarized by A. G. Kharchev, who stressed the contradictory nature of technological progress and its social consequences. The development of science and technology is creating greater opportunities for the enhancement of worker welfare, the elevation of cultural standards and labor productivity levels, the eradication of criminal and amoral behavior and the all-round development of the individual. These opportunities can only be fully realized under the conditions of socialist production relations and the socialist socioeconomic order. Nonetheless, the very process of realization and its results will depend largely on subjective factors: scientifically substantiated decision-making,

mass organization, awareness and activity, and the proper style of work. The 25th CPSU Congress defined the optimal style of work as the Leninist style, a "creative style, with no elements of subjectivism, permeated with a scientific approach to all social processes. It presupposes that the individual demand much from himself and from others, excludes the possibility of self-satisfaction and is directly opposed to any form of bureaucracy and formalism."³ The introduction of the Leninist style of work in all areas of administration and in each labor collective is one of the important objectives of the present time. Much will depend on the degree of success with which this is accomplished: the utilization of positive social and economic possibilities arising from technological progress, the moral and psychological atmosphere in the collective, the impact of indoctrination and, consequently, the effect of moral incentives for labor and the contribution of each individual to the common cause.

The tremendous importance of organizational and administrative activity and the particular style of work is also connected with the fact that the consequences of technological progress are not necessarily totally positive; these consequences could acquire a positive or negative nature, depending on the degree to which subjective factors in the developed socialist society are utilized correctly and effectively.

Much of this discussion has dealt with the fact that the economic and moral losses incurred by some collectives are often not in any sense unavoidable, but are the result of the untimely implementation of measures required by changing circumstances or of erroneous decisions, confusion and inefficiency. A great deal of subjective effort is required, in particular, in the regulation of the social consequences of urbanization and migration, which presuppose concerted organizational and cultural-indoctrinational activity on the part of labor collectives, the improvement of the entire system of indoctrination, the transfer of emphasis in this system to the development of convictions, responsibility and unity of thought and action--that is, the particular qualities which signify that the individual takes an active stand on public affairs. In addition, in reference to indoctrination, it should not be limited to mere propaganda, didactic statements and verbal persuasion. Indoctrination now calls for the use of the entire set of factors influencing human thinking and behavior for the attainment of a specific goal: from various components of the social environment and the personal example set by the indoctrinator to persuasion and, if necessary, even coercion. Under the conditions of urbanization, the organization of informal communication, social control and the establishment of irrevocable social and judicial penalties for any violation of moral or legal norms are acquiring particular significance.

Therefore, if technological progress is to be placed at the service of the cause of socialism, energetic and creative work will be required in all

3. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 68.

areas of social life. Naturally, the journal's round table could not discuss all of the social problems engendered by the development of science and technology. But there is no question that it was useful as an opportunity to unite practical experience and sociological knowledge in a search for solutions to at least some of these problems, and to coordinate the work of the journal with the requirements of practice.

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TO AID THE PLANT SOCIOLOGIST

COMPUTER-AIDED PROCESSING OF SOCIOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 113-126

[Article by Viktor Grigor'yevich Britvin, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior research associate at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Vladimir Fedorovich Sklyarov, graduate student at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

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CRITICISM OF BOURGEOIS SOCIOLOGY

SOCIOLOGY OF E. DURKHEIM AS A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION FOR BOURGEOIS
SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 127-141

[Article by Andrey Grigor'yevich Zdravomyslov, doctor of philosophical
sciences, professor and senior research associate at the Institute of
Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee]

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INITIAL ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM

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[Article by Viktor Vladimirovich Vityuk, candidate of philosophical sciences and junior research associate at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] There was already good reason a decade ago to foresee the possible appearance of the wave of "leftist" terror that is now sweeping through a number of capitalist countries. The leftist radical petty bourgeois youth movement of the late 1960's with its extremist tendencies, appeals for all-out destructive rebellion and attempts to make this rebellion a reality was distinguished, in particular, by the formation of several groups that were the embryos of today's terrorist organizations.

An understanding of the real danger of mounting terrorism was characteristic of some works published in our nation in the 1960's and 1970's.¹ Nonetheless, despite the unequivocal predictions and warnings they contained, the scope and forms taken on by "leftist" terror in recent years, the constant escalation of terrorist activity in the capitalist countries and the danger it represents for the cause of peace, democracy and socialism call for even deeper and more comprehensive analysis of this social phenomenon.

The definition of terror and its relationship to the liberation struggle of the working class, which was set forth by K. Marx and F. Engels and clarified in detail by revolutionary Marxists led by V. I. Lenin during the struggle against Social Revolutionary (SR) terrorism, is of great methodological value in the accomplishment of this kind of analysis. It should be noted that this experience has remained in the background for many years and has not been elucidated in our press (probably because terrorism has not represented any kind of significant threat for decades). It is particularly important to take a look at this theory at this time, however, since contemporary terrorists, engaging in social mimicry by ostentatiously voicing "leftist" phrases, are deliberately misinterpreting V. I. Lenin's views on the revolutionary process and saying nothing about his principled criticism of terror. The bourgeois press has also eagerly taken up this tactic in its anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda.

There is no question that historical conditions, the social structure of the contemporary capitalist society and the developmental level of the workers movement and its organizations call for strategies and tactics that differ considerably from those used by revolutionary forces in Russia. There is also no question that Russian terrorism was far from identical to contemporary "leftist" extremism, although they are related in some way. It is therefore quite obvious that some of the specific statements made in the past cannot be automatically applied to contemporary terrorism, just as the latter is not composed only of the features of its predecessors. The historical context must be considered.

The unique nature of various historical forms of terrorism, however, does not mean that the fundamental Marxist description of its essence is inaccurate. In this connection, it is extremely important that our party has consistently fought against terrorism, even when circumstances dictated the need for armed overthrow of the autocracy. The revolutionary Marxists took a concrete historical approach to terrorism, separating the People's Will movement from the SR and Nechayev currents. There is even more justification for using Marxist-Leninist criticism of past forms of political terrorism as a theoretical basis for the analysis of its contemporary variations.

1. The Romantic Aura and Political Reality

"...Illusions are just as harmful to our cause as indifference and, in fact, they are closely related to one another."

G. V. Plekhanov²

From its very beginnings, the Iskra movement waged a resolute and systematic struggle against the terror tactics proclaimed and implemented by the SR's.³ The serious attention given to the struggle against terrorism by the leaders of the working class' revolutionary party was not only dictated by a desire to prevent the acceptance of this tactic in the revolutionary ranks, but also by the need to shatter all of the illusions in regard to terror that had been widespread in social strata opposed to tsarism. It was also significant that when the SR's opposed the revolutionary Marxists, they said that they were carrying on the traditions of the People's Will movement, attempting to don the romantic aura surrounding the memory of these great fighters of the recent past. This memory, as well as the fact that the newest group of young people wishing to take vengeance on tsarism and its lackeys were fascinated with personal heroism and willing to sacrifice themselves, created, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, an atmosphere in which liberal circles sympathized with terror and encouraged its escalation.⁴ For this reason, the Iskra members believed that it was of paramount importance to dissipate this atmosphere and reveal the true sociopolitical significance of terror and the actual relationship between the two historical levels of Russian terrorism.

The accuracy and skill with which these tasks were carried out by the Iskra leaders were already evident in the first article published in ISKRA on the

subject of terror. For security reasons, the articles printed in this illegal publication were unsigned. There was only one exception to the rule of secrecy, when an article entitled "On Current Events," was printed with a signature. The author of this article, which was aimed against terrorism, was V. I. Zasulich, once a famous terrorist, friend of equally famous terrorist S. Stepnyak-Kravchinskiy, member of the first Nechayev group and colleague and comrade of the People's Will leaders--in short, the person who knew the most about terrorism (and through personal experience at that) in the Russian revolutionary movement.⁵

Zasulich noted that "in an atmosphere of pain and anger, excruciating inactivity and silence," at times "when there is no way of preventing evil from being committed openly," such actions as "the firing of a gun by the student Karpovich, who sacrificed his own life to avenge his comrades,"⁶ are psychologically sound. Realizing that this method of protest against brutality and repression could evoke widespread and passionate sympathies, Zasulich quite severely condemned terror precisely for its "psychic influence on the environment."⁷ She stressed that terror as a method of struggle sets up "psychological barriers" in the way of the free development of public activity, restricts the revolutionary process and leaves the masses and broad segments of the public in the position of passive observers. "The transfer of control over the struggle for liberation to a handful of heroes," she wrote, "...will not harm autocracy and is itself merely the result of concepts and feelings inherited from autocracy."⁸

The terrorist actions of the SR's are analyzed from the same standpoint by G. V. Plekhanov. In an article entitled "The Death of Sipyagin and Our Agitation Tasks," he remarks that many of these actions were directly provoked by the government's "repressive measures," which "enraged our free-thinking intelligentsia to the extreme."⁹ For Plekhanov, however, the socio-psychological justification for terrorist aims under the condition of an absolute police state is far from identical to the political justification.

The line of reasoning followed by V. I. Zasulich and G. V. Plekhanov is educative. They reveal the fundamental contradiction of terrorism and demonstrate that the failure to understand this contradiction is one of the main reasons for confusion about this issue on the part of politically immature and naive people--the contradiction between the subjective motives and aims of the terrorists and the objective social significance of their actions. Without casting any suspicions on the personal integrity of people like Karpovich, Balmashev and Kalyayev, but giving them credit for their heroism and their willingness to sacrifice themselves, Zasulich and Plekhanov take the issue beyond the narrow moral and psychological framework and evaluate terror from the historical and political standpoints.

The tactic of terror, as the Iskra group maintained, leads neither to the attainment of the final goals of the socialist struggle nor to the attainment of immediate political goals. The members of the People's Will movement regarded terror as only a temporary and emergency measure and expected the

death of Alexander II to compel his heir to take the tragic events of preceding years into account and grant the people a constitution; this, in turn, was to create favorable prerequisites for heightened political awareness on the part of the masses and the further spread of revolution.¹⁰ The SR's, on the other hand, believed that terrorist actions were necessary for the revolutionaries' self-defense, that they weakened the government and that they caused a "power shift" in favor of the people by instilling them with "courage and fighting spirit" and thereby revolutionizing them.

In his analysis of the pro-terrorist arguments of the SR party, V. I. Lenin stated that the idea of the "power shift" was "terrorism's most pronounced bias,"¹¹ since terror disorganizes "not the government, but the revolutionary forces."¹² It disorganizes them in two basic ways: firstly, because it singles out the most energetic revolutionaries and pushes them to their death and, secondly, because it severs the connection between revolutionary work and the majority of the working class. As for the arousal of "courage and fighting spirit" in the masses, V. I. Lenin remarked that terrorist actions by an individual "produce only a fleeting sensation," and indirectly promote anticipation of the next individual action.¹³

We must also remember (and this is particularly important in light of current events) that terror has always provoked stronger reactionary feeling. The shot fired by Karakozov was used by serfdom's advocates to make dramatic cuts in projected reforms and begin an offensive campaign against progressive strata in the society. The assassination of Alexander II was followed by the profoundly reactionary 1880's. Rightist monarchic groups used SR terror as an excuse to create the "Black Hundred" movement.

The principles worked out by the Iskra group in regard to the approach to terror are still significant today. Western observers have pointed out the fact that even though the broad working masses are firmly opposed to terrorism, there is still a certain segment of the population that sympathizes with this idea, and this segment is not only found in the lumpenized and marginal population strata. This sympathy is based on solidarity with the terrorists' hatred for existing society, and this hatred becomes, as it were, sufficient grounds for their actions. Even in the Western press, this approach to terrorism is not rare. An indicative article in this respect was "Freedom and Terrorism," published by LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, a weekly with known leftist radical tendencies.¹⁴ After declaring his dislike for the tactic of terrorism, the author of the article feels compelled to demonstrate that "terrorism is not engendered in a vacuum" but does have its social causes. His basic premise is correct, but then he goes on to clarify his thesis and reduces these causes merely to the "inadequacy" and "hypocrisy" of bourgeois democracy. The author sees this as sufficient grounds to divide society into those who are "satisfied" or "submissive" and those who are "rebellious" or, more precisely, extremists, and to then regard the actions of the latter as being completely justified.

On the other hand, another segment of the bourgeois press is distinguished by the opposite tendency: to depict "leftist" terrorists as mere criminals.

Naturally, the terrorist movement does attract overtly criminal elements, particularly since some extremist organizations--for example, the NAP--eagerly enlist their services. But when it comes to the so-called "ideological terrorists," in spite of all the reactionary nature of their actions and their unappealing moral and psychological image, it would be incorrect and even politically harmful to regard them as elementary bandits. It is precisely with the aid of this type of condemnation of terrorism that bourgeois ideologists are actually ignoring the issue of the social causes giving rise to it.

In a slightly different form, this problem also arose when SR practices were being assessed. When V. I. Lenin spoke of the SR's, he stressed that they were "not mere frauds," but "master con-men." "We must not confuse adventures of the revolutionary type that are internally contradictory, unprincipled and unreliable," he wrote, "with the adventures of rogues who are totally aware that they are committing criminal actions and could be accused of cheating."¹⁵ The members of the Red Brigades, RAF and NAP of today are not the SR's of yesterday, their adventurism is antirevolutionary and, in their unprincipled way, they combined political action with criminal acts long ago; moreover, they are also much more dangerous as "con-men." But they could not be described simply as "mere frauds" either. This would be too simple and too convenient for the capitalist order's apologists.

2. Single Combat or Mass Movement?

"...without the working people, all bombs are powerless, absolutely powerless."

V. I. Lenin¹⁶

The very process of initiating terror, this extreme means of political struggle, was distinguished, as the Iskra group pointed out, by a significant internal contradiction. This was the contradiction between the desire of a few revolutionary-minded intellectuals to engage in active struggle for political freedom and the absence of any hope of mass support.

This isolation from the masses and this feeling of desperation and impatience which suggested the need for extremist action were characteristic of the Russian People's Will movement and its imitators--the Social Revolutionaries. But even in this respect there was a fundamental difference between the two. The desperation of initiators and the impatience of individuals whose goals and ideals had no real basis for materialization as yet, individuals who wished to at least, as S. Stepnyak-Kravchinskiy put it, "bring a grimace of pain to the face of the boa constrictor coiled around the body of Russia,"¹⁷ represented one thing, but the desperation of hysterical individualists and adventurers who, because of their own political blindness, could see no other means of struggle than terror at a time when mass forms of revolutionary struggle had already become a reality, represented quite another matter. The external similarity of the methods of struggle employed by the People's

Will group and the SR's does not in any sense mean that they were identical. On the contrary, there was a fundamental watershed separating them: Whereas the former were situated on the very crest of the revolutionary wave of their era, the latter remained separate from the mainstream of the liberation movement of their time.

The People's Will terrorists, as V. I. Zasulich wrote, "lived in a non-revolutionary era when the student who acquired revolutionary feelings gradually became convinced of the impossibility of transcending the bounds of his student group and joining the people."¹⁸ This was the tragedy of the People's Will members, and it reflected, in K. Marx' words, worldwide historical confusion.

The SR's entered the historical arena at a completely different time, at the moment when a mass movement came into being and developed, when, in G. V. Plekhanov's words, "heroism appeared on the scene,"¹⁹ and when people who truly wished to join the people in their struggle had no reason to despair. Under these conditions, the spread of individual terror was not only politically and tactically unwise, but there was absolutely no historical justification either.

The SR's did not perceive the radical change in the social situation and the balance of class power that was taking place from the 1870's up to the beginning of the 20th century and they did not attach any significance to the fact that "the idea of political freedom, which once only interested the intelligentsia, has now penetrated some strata of the working class"²⁰ and is constantly spreading throughout this class. For this reason, while they verbally admitted the possibility of a revolutionary uprising in Russia, they actually, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, developed "the theory and practice of energetic action by an initiating minority," proceeding from the assumption that "a political coup could only be accomplished by a revolutionary minority."²¹ The intellectual terrorists believed that political changes would come about as a result of changes in ministers and their attitudes, and that these latter changes would be "accelerated by bombs."²²

The contradictory and unreliable nature of this position was apparent even to the SR leaders. This is why they made numerous attempts to eradicate or somehow conceal the contradiction between the abstract traditional vows of love for the people and faith in them and their actual practice of reducing political struggle to single combat between gangs of fighters and the regime's high-level dignitaries. This was the reason for, in particular, their ostentatious admiration for the People's Will group and their systematic attempts to describe the past and present conditions of struggle as similar to the maximum, if not identical.

This was also the reason for their loud declarations (which contradicted the position defined above) that the SR's were advocating terror not as an alternative to work with the masses, but as something that would promote this work and would be carried out at the same time as, and in combination

with, this work. Pointing out the absurdity of this attempt and commenting that the mere substitution of the word "combination" for the word "alternative" could not solve the real problem, V. I. Lenin wrote the following in an article entitled "Revolutionary Adventurism": "The Social Revolutionaries have naively failed to notice that their penchant for terror is connected, by the closest cause-and-effect relationship, with the fact that they...are still isolating themselves from the workers movement and are not even trying to become the party of the revolutionary class that is waging their class struggle."²³ The Social Revolutionaries' half-hearted acceptance of the mass workers movement, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, led to actual alienation from it.²⁴

When Lenin criticized SR terrorism, he did not condemn terror outright; he understood that it would have been naive for the revolutionaries to reject it a priori or "in principle."

Examining terror "from the tactical standpoint" at the beginning of the 20th century, Lenin believed that terror "is, at present, an inexpedient means of struggle."²⁵

Defining terror's place in the system of the proletariat's means of struggle, Lenin set forth the conditions on which it might seem expedient to resort to this tactic: "Terror can never become a commonplace military operation; at best, it is only useful as one of the elements of all-out assault."²⁶ The flaw in SR terrorism was precisely the fact that it did not serve "as one of the operations of a fighting army, closely related and adapted to the entire system of struggle, but as a separate means of individual attack, independent of any kind of army."²⁷ In this connection, V. I. Lenin stressed that "terror should be actually able to merge with the mass movement."²⁸

These are the two conditions set forth by V. I. Lenin, which must both be present and both be observed before terror can be historically and politically justified: firstly, the actual spread of a revolutionary uprising and, secondly, the initiation of terrorist actions when necessary during the course of the armed struggle by the rebelling masses and within the framework of this common struggle. In all other situations, terror should be categorically rejected as a tactic which is harmful to the liberation struggle of the working class, as "an extremely gross tactical error."²⁹

For this reason, for the Russian revolutionary Social Democrats, the tactic of struggle on two fronts--against opportunism and against terrorism--was also related to many years of "propaganda concerning armed uprising."³⁰ It is only under the conditions of popular revolt, V. I. Lenin stated, that armed actions are connected with the mood of the masses and, for this reason, do not constitute revenge against individuals or conspiracies entered into by intellectual groups. When V. I. Lenin assessed the activities of Latvian revolutionaries in 1905-1907, which included partisan and terrorist actions, he remarked that they could not be called "anarchism, Blanquism or terrorism... because here there is a clear connection between the new form of struggle and the popular uprising."³¹

Two basic conclusions can be drawn from these statements by V. I. Lenin. In the first place, for several of the developing countries the pathway to national liberation and progressive social reforms might be found today in an armed rebellion, exemplified by the events in Nicaragua. In these cases, the armed struggle of the population and the actions of its militant segments must not be equated with the terrorist tactics condemned by Marxism.

One of the bourgeois press' favorite ruses is to deliberately make use of the crimes of European extremists to heap condemnation on the armed actions of the national liberation movements of the African, Asian and Latin American people. In the second place, under the new historical conditions in the developed capitalist countries with their mass working class organizations, their experience in cooperation with broad-based democratic forces and the lately apparent possibility of peaceful advancement toward socialism, the practice of terror is unacceptable in principle to the Marxist-Leninist parties--neither as a tactic nor, especially, as a strategy.

Marxist-Leninists of the current era take the stand that there is a tremendous variety of forms and methods of revolutionary transformation of the world on the basis of socialist principles.

3. Revolutionary Violence and Terrorism

"...but we are against terror for the very reason that it is not revolutionary."

V. Zasulich³²

In one of his first Marxist works, "Socialism and the Political Struggle," and in another article written more than 15 years later, "More About Socialism and the Political Struggle," G. V. Plekhanov demonstrated that the People's Will and SR ideology characteristically separated economics from politics, isolated the political struggle from the economic struggle and ignored and denied the economic struggle in practice (and sometimes in theory as well). In addition, as Plekhanov pointed out, the People's Will and SR party had a one-sided and shallow understanding of the political struggle itself, reducing it to nothing more than underground activity by a small group of conspirators who concentrated on individual terrorist acts.

The absolutization of the political struggle by terrorism's ideologists and its injurious interpretation also had another, externally opposite effect. The terrorists who took an ultrarevolutionary stand and criticized the Russian Social Democrats for their "obsession with economics," were themselves, as V. I. Lenin astutely noted, "genuine upside-down 'economists.'"³³ This description, V. I. Lenin specifically stressed, was "not a paradox." "'Economists' and terrorists rely on different forms of spontaneity: The 'economists' believe in the spontaneity of the 'pure workers movement,' while the terrorists believe in the spontaneity of the intense anger of intellectuals who cannot or will not combine their revolutionary work into

a single entity with the workers movement. Those who have lost faith in this possibility or who have never had faith in it will naturally have difficulty in finding an outlet other than terror for their anger and their revolutionary zeal."³⁴

Ultra-leftist adventurism--which is engendered by petty bourgeois protest, desperation, impatience, hatred for reality and fear of it--typically gives priority to emotional reactions over theoretical thought, and to psychological motives over systematically substantiated calculation. In an article entitled "Some Features of the Current Collapse," V. I. Lenin commented that the SR ideology was distinguished by the exaggeration and absolutization of "the immediate feelings that seize the revolutionary and the ideals that inspire him."³⁵

For this reason, terrorism characteristically rejects theory, belittles its significance or advertises, as its own "theories," various social ideas that are excised from different sources and eclectically combined to serve as substantiation and justification for its practice. With his characteristic frankness, M. A. Bakunin once expressed the following attitude toward theory: "For us an idea is only valuable if it can serve the great cause of radical and total destruction."³⁶ Hostility toward theory was concealed by Bakunin and his SR followers with the aid of declarations of fidelity to active revolution. When V. I. Lenin wrote the SR leaders off as phrase-mongers, he said that "the absence of theory takes the right of existence away from the revolutionary current and inevitably condemns it, sooner or later, to political failure."³⁷

In spite of terrorism's characteristic lack of concern for ideology, however, its practice is based, by necessity, on a definite ideological foundation, since any kind of practice is only made possible by substantiation. It is quite a different matter that this substantiation is gained through the prism of a prevalently emotional and psychological feeling about social reality and takes shape under the influence of admiration for the terrorist tactic.

The theoretical constructions which terrorism's ideologists somehow manage to erect center around the concept of violence. The terrorists love to repeat Marx' words about violence as the midwife attending the birth of a new order. But their interpretation of the concept of violence is far from Marx' interpretation and is closer to the petty bourgeois idealistic "theory of violence" criticized by Marx and Engels.

In the first place, the terrorists' explanation of social reality and ongoing processes places primary emphasis on the role of superstructural phenomena (in particular, the repressive function of the state) and only touches upon socioeconomic subject matter quite superficially. Their infrequent references to this subject matter appear to be no more than a desire to reinforce the adventurist political tactic with pseudoeconomic, abstract and arbitrary statements. For example, some of the apologists of

Italian terrorism justify this tactic by saying that Italy, despite its external similarity to the developed capitalist powers, is allegedly much closer in essence to the Third World countries and, for this reason, the natural laws and principles of social struggle which apply to these nations also apply to Italy. These principles and laws themselves are then interpreted in a distorted manner, without any kind of serious scientific analysis, and appeals for spontaneous rebellion and terror are "substantiated" as a result.

In the second place, the terrorists (in this they do not differ from rightist opportunists) confuse the substance of this matter with its formal side, equating violence as the inevitable means of class domination and struggle by oppressed classes under certain conditions with overtly repressive activity on the part of the upper strata and armed struggle by the lower strata. This is used as the basis for the contemporary terrorists' thesis that class struggle is equivalent to armed struggle, from which they draw the conclusion that terror is a more "revolutionary" and effective means of struggle, since the confusion and chaos it engenders supposedly create the necessary conditions for mass indoctrination. More precisely, they force the "passive" masses to rebel.

If we disregard the concrete details of this logical construction, the theory of the contemporary "leftist" extremists is essentially not original. Each generation of terrorists has expressed this idea in different forms dictated by the conditions of their era and theoretical biases. In particular, even the SR's already believed, as V. I. Zasulich noted, that "only armed action is revolutionary, and only terrorist actions are revolutionary until the fighting reaches the streets."³⁸ Although the SR's themselves generally supplemented their recognition of the need for terror with various provisos, there were practical and theoretical grounds for V. I. Zasulich's conclusion.

According to G. V. Plekhanov's accurate observation, "terrorism, just as any other kind of struggle, has its own logic. Anyone who now 'recognizes' terror only as a means of self-defense or a method of 'revenge,' will begin tomorrow or the day after tomorrow...to regard it as the only possible form of revolutionary struggle for us."³⁹ The accuracy of this observation was soon corroborated by the terrorist Karpovich, who announced at his trial that he knew of no other form of struggle than terrorism.

The idea that terrorism was becoming the dominant means of struggle by the SR's, relegating all other means to a position of secondary importance, is also suggested by the theory of "triple" terror set forth by this party's ideologist V. Chernov. This theory, which was supposed to simultaneously establish the priority of terror in party activities and absolve the party of all blame for turning terror into a goal in itself, ascribed three basic functions to terrorism: disorganization, "excitation" (arousal), and agitation. The Iskra group criticized this vague and pretentious theory on several levels. First of all, it obscured the class meaning of terror.

Secondly, it ascribed certain functions to terror that were not inherently part of its character. The assignment of agitation and mobilization functions to terror virtually precluded the need for special work in these areas. Thirdly, it ignored certain important forms of class struggle, such as the economic form, and disregarded the need for organizational work with the masses. Chernov's clever and deliberately confusing formula actually did nothing more than establish the primacy of terror over all revolutionary party activities, which were essentially dissolved in this terror. Plekhanov ironically described it in the following way: "Kill, and all questions about who was killed and why will be decided in the next world: whether it was for the purpose of 'arousal,' for intimidation or any other reason."⁴⁰

The means chosen by the SR's to achieve a specific social end were actually inconsistent with this end. On the contrary, they gradually absorbed it and replaced it, virtually becoming an end in themselves. As K. Marx said, "an end calling for unjust means is an unjust end."⁴¹ This statement by Marx is extremely important because the terrorists' apologies for political assassinations are always combined with declarations that they were necessary in the name of human freedom and socialism.

No matter how vividly the word "socialism" may be embroidered on the banner of the terrorists, however, it does not have any real political significance because their political ideals are distinguished by class uncertainty and, in the final analysis, express the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. The SR's, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, were actually free of any kind of definite socialist theory, "of the inconvenience of firm socialist convictions."⁴² Regardless of whether advocates of terror talk about the society they anticipate in the future or prefer to simply avoid looking into the future, they are governed by Bakunin's statement about the spirit of destruction which is also the spirit of construction, which gives priority to negativist ambitions over a positive outlook.⁴³ This also applies to today's ultra-leftist fighters for "socialism": We can only guess at their desired social ideal. We can only say one thing with complete certainty: All of their views and actions testify that this ideal has nothing in common with scientific socialism. In this connection, we should add that "leftist" extremists do not recognize any of the achievements of real socialism.

4. The 'Ethics' of the Violent Good Deed

"...great historical reversals are not the result of outbursts of base passions."

A. I. Gertsen⁴⁴

The nature of terrorism as a movement which brings about (and, in certain stages, even absolutizes) political assassinations and uses "inhumane" methods to achieve "humanistic" goals, demands that it be examined from the ethical and psychological standpoint. The question of the morality (or immorality) of specific social actions and its correlation with the personal

moral standards of the individuals who commit these acts is, as we know, an extremely complex one and does not lend itself to abstract answers taken out of the historical context.

In the 17th century (the time of the English Revolution), the expression that "killing is not murder" entered the annals of social thought. This was supposed to give political assassinations a legal and moral basis which would distinguish them from common crimes. There is no question that there is a definite connection between the two. Therefore, although the Russian revolutionary Marxists rejected the tactic of terror, they firmly opposed any attempts to depict the revolutionary terrorists as common criminals or simply as immoral people.

Vera Zasulich's acquittal by a jury made up of representatives of far from revolutionary social strata demonstrated how close this connection could be under certain historical conditions. The delight with which the democratic public reacted to the verdict testifies that Zasulich was, in the eyes of society, legally and morally justified. Her assassination attempt was regarded as a humanistic act and as a heroic gesture in defense of human dignity under the conditions of an absolute police state.

The humanism of their democratic ideals, their genuine and passionate love for the people and their fervent desire to liberate the people, reinforced by their lack of greed, selflessness and spiritual nobility, provided a moral basis for the political actions of the legendary People's Will heroes under the specific conditions of Russia in the 1870's. The destructive antisocial and unethical potential of terrorism calls for the highest degree of social responsibility, adherence to ideals and purity from the people who resort to this type of action under the influence of the circumstances of the class struggle. The absence of these qualities, anachronistic or--what could be even more serious--reactionary goals (it is not important if they are conscious recognized or not), and the prevalence of feelings of hatred, not to mention such factors as authoritarianism, brutality and political opportunism, will unavoidably give terrorist actions and policies a harmful and immoral character. From the very beginning of the terror in late-19th century Russia, there were two opposing lines of action, which could be called the Zhelyabov and Nechayev lines.

The power-mad Nechayev, who used deceit as an aid in his attempt to form an underground organization and become the leader of the embryonic movement and who later savagely murdered one of his comrades who suspected Nechayev of deceiving him and did not wish to submit to Nechayev, maintained that everything he did was done for the good of the people. "I am the son of the people!" he proudly declared in a letter to Count Levashov from the Alekseyevskiy Dungeon. "My primary and major goal is the happiness and well-being of the masses."⁴⁵ But these proud declarations were the purest demagoguery. Nechayev's actual treatment of the masses and of individuals did not express love at all, but cynical adventurism, a morbid hatred for the working masses and the people and an arrogantly indifferent attitude toward them.

When V. I. Zasulich wrote about Nechayev, she said that "what lay behind his revolutionary zeal" were not views he had derived through close contact with the revolutionary milieu, but a "burning hatred, and not simply for the government alone..., but for all of society, for all of the educated strata, for all of these fops, rich and poor, conservative, liberal and radical. Even in his feelings for the youth he fascinated, there was either hatred or at least the absence of even the slightest bit of sympathy, the slightest trace of compassion, and a tremendous amount of contempt."⁴⁶

Nechayev hoped to build an underground revolutionary organization resembling a "real Jesuit order" with the use of "all Jesuit methods."⁴⁷ Nechayev divided society into six categories according to the treatment they could expect from the Nechayev order. Some people were supposed to be mercilessly murdered, others were to be forced to abandon their affairs by means of compromise and blackmail, a third group was to be deceived and a fourth was to be bribed and used. The Jesuit formula about the "end justifying the means" was made more specific by S. Nechayev and his cohort M. Bakunin as justification for the knife, poison and the noose.

Today's "leftist" terrorists are following directly in the footsteps of Nechayev (whether they realize it or not) and are objectively amplifying his tradition by giving it unprecedented scope. Personal disinterest cannot serve them as ethical justification either, since they have their own "interest": the desire to feel that they are "chosen individuals" who will "decide the fate of the people."

The belief in the unrestricted right to break the laws and the moral code has a fatal effect on those who possess this belief. The "superman" who is convinced that, for him, "everything is permissible" is internally prepared to commit homicide as well as political killings. Nechayev was one of the ones who satisfied his own lust for revenge by committing acts he called political. The so-called "proletarian courts" of today's terrorists, with their predetermined outcome--the death penalty--are of a cynical and sadistic nature.

When V. I. Lenin compared the actions of the People's Will movement to the pretensions of its SR imitators, he reminded the latter of the "famous proverb that if the original historical event represents a tragedy, then an imitation of it represents only a farce."⁴⁸ From the standpoint of the interests of social progress and the development of the revolutionary movement, there is no question that we are dealing today with a farce, and one that is even more senseless and absurd than the SR farce. Considering the means of mass destruction that now exist, the bloody farce being played out by the "leftist" terrorists represents a serious threat to the people of all the nations in which these terrorists are operating. Moreover, it is a serious threat to the security of all mankind, since the "revolutionary" course proclaimed by today's "leftist" terrorists presupposes the expansion of the armed struggle not only to the point of civil war, but even to the point of catastrophic world war.

The Marxist-Leninist parties resolutely oppose terrorism, condemn any form of it and are counterbalancing it with a struggle for the unification of all democratic and progressive forces.

In his speech at the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties in Berlin, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev of the CPSU Central Committee said that "the energetic activity of communists in the Western European countries and their persistence in the struggle for the masses and for the unification of the working class and all forces capable of fighting against monopoly domination, establishing democratic regimes and creating the necessary prerequisites for a transition to socialism, will bear fruit."⁴⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, Leybzon, B. M., "Melkoburzhuzaznyy revolyutsionarizm" [Petty Bourgeois Revolutionary Practices], Moscow, 1967; Leybzon, B. N., "Chto takoye revolyutsionnost' segodnya?" [What Does Revolutionary Spirit Mean Today?], Moscow, 1972; Batalov, E. Ya., "Filosofiya bunta" [The Philosophy of Revolt], Moscow, 1973; Myalo, K. G., "The Ideology of 'Total Freedom': Historical Tradition and Contemporary Variations," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1973, No 2; Davydov, Yu. N., "Estetika nigilizma" [The Aesthetics of Nihilism], Moscow, 1975; Denisov, V. V., "Sotsiologiya nasiliya" [The Sociology of Violence], Moscow, 1975; Volodin, A. I., Karyakin, Yu. F. and Plimak, Ye. G., "Chernyshevskiy ili Nechayev?" [Chernyshevskiy or Nechayev?], Moscow, 1975.
2. ISKRA, No III, Leningrad, 1925, p 81.
3. Issues No 3 and No 28 of ISKRA contained articles aimed against terrorism by V. I. Zasluch, and Nos 5, 20 and 26 contained similar articles by G. V. Plekhanov. Issue No 23 of ISKRA contained V. I. Lenin's article, "Revolutionary Adventurism," which was preceded by a collection of comprehensive theses entitled "Why Must the Social Democrats Declare Resolute and Merciless War Against the Social Revolutionaries?" Without listing an entire series of other works, we will simply note that terrorism is quite thoroughly criticized in V. I. Lenin's book "Chto delat'?" [What Is To Be Done?]. The objectives of the struggle against terrorism were set forth in a special resolution of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Revolutionary Party.
4. See V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 6, p 76.
5. In a letter to the Munich branch of the editorial board, dated 5 April 1901, P. B. Aksel'rod wrote: "Whoever decided to have V. Iv. sign the article deserves a medal" (LENINSKIY SBORNIK, III, Leningrad, 1925, p 169).
6. ISKRA, No I, p 64.

7. Ibid., p 65.
8. Ibid., p 66.
9. ISKRA, No III, p 79.
10. Although Lenin gave the People's Will members credit for the heroism and willingness for self-sacrifice they had displayed, he also stressed the following: "There is no doubt that these sacrifices were not made in vain, there is no doubt that they contributed--directly or indirectly--to the subsequent revolutionary indoctrination of the Russian people. But they did not and could not attain their immediate goal of starting a popular revolution" (V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 30, p 315).
11. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 6, p 382.
12. Ibid., vol 5, p 7.
13. Ibid., vol 6, p 384.
14. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, November 1977, No 284.
15. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 7, p 54.
16. Ibid., vol 6, p 382.
17. Ibid., p 66.
18. ISKRA, No IV, p 96.
19. Ibid., No VII, p 91.
20. Ibid., No III, pp 79-80.
21. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 17, p 141.
22. Ibid., vol 9, p 130.
23. Ibid., vol 6, p 380.
24. Ibid., p 373.
25. Ibid., vol 4, p 223.
26. Ibid., vol 5, p 8.
27. Ibid., p 7.
28. Ibid., vol 9, p 318.

29. Ibid., vol 7, p 389.
30. Ibid., vol 30, p 182.
31. Ibid., vol 14, p 5.
32. ISKRA, No IV, p 96.
33. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 6, p 383.
34. Ibid., p 75.
35. Ibid., vol 17, p 141.
36. Quoted in: K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 18, p 395.
37. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 6, p 379.
38. ISKRA, No IV, p 96.
39. Ibid., p 52.
40. Ibid., p 47.
41. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 1, p 65.
42. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 6, p 385.
43. Bakunin himself drew extremely radical conclusions from this thesis and wrote that any thoughts about the future were "criminal because they interfere with pure destruction and hold up the beginning of the revolution" (quoted in: K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 18, p 394).
44. Herzen, A. I., "Soch." [Works], vol XX, bk 2, p 589.
45. Quoted in: Shchegolev, P., "Alekseyevskiy ravelin" [The Alekseyevskiy Dungeon], 1929, p 200.
46. Zasulich, V. I., "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs], Moscow, 1931, p 57.
47. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 18, pp 329, 342.
48. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 6, p 173.
49. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom" [Following the Leninist Course], vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 62.

'LEFTIST' EXTREMISM: SOCIAL REALITY AND IDEOLOGY

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[Article by Professor Svetozar Aleksandrovich Yefirov, doctor of philosophical sciences and senior research associate at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The leftist radical movement in the developed capitalist countries has been fundamentally polarized in the last few years. A large segment of this movement has acquired a "respectable" nature, has indulged in "confession" and reflection and is concentrating on various specific issues. Another segment has heightened the extremist and fanatical tendencies of the movement to the maximum by embarking on the course of terrorism.

"Leftist" extremism¹ is a phenomenon which is certainly far from new, and it would be difficult to even say how far back in history its roots can be traced. In terms of the scales and forms it has taken in some parts of the capitalist world during the last decade, however, this is unquestionably an unprecedented phenomenon. Extremism, which once took the form of isolated attempts on the lives of high-placed dignitaries, has now become a dangerous social movement in some bourgeois countries. The "leftist" terrorism of recent years has consisted of a series of well-planned actions of fairly broad scope which have been more united than separate. In some places, murder, mutilation, kidnapping, theft, blackmail, airplane hijackings, political provocation and the bombing of institutions, barracks, police stations, party committees, editorial offices, enterprises, transport lines and so forth have become popular everyday means of attaining the most questionable goals. The rate of increase in terrorist activity has been impressive in recent years. For example, around 200 terrorist acts took place in Italy in 1968, 750 were committed in 1975, more than 1,000 in 1976, more than 2,000 in 1977 and over 3,000 in 1978.²

It is no coincidence that this unprecedented spread of leftist extremist activity has taken place in the last decade. In the first place, these years have witnessed the growing severity of a crisis which has considerably complicated the relative positions of the capitalist system and the

popular masses in the bourgeois countries, and the burial of many social myths and illusions. In the second place, the last decade has revealed the groundlessness of the leftist radical alternative to the communist movement, both in the form of the Gauchist movement of 1968-1969 and in the form of the ultra-leftist groups and "parties" of recent years. During these same years, several of the communist parties, "leftist" extremism's chief opponents, have gained a much stronger position. It is therefore not surprising that reactionary forces have begun to rely more and more on terrorism--"leftist" as well as rightist--and are constantly allying themselves with "leftist" extremists and are, perhaps, even guiding some of them.

It should also be noted that recent events have revealed other important facts: the inability of bourgeois government institutions and, in part, even leftist forces to deal with the present scales of terrorist activity;³ insufficient understanding of the essence of this phenomenon, particularly its social nature and program;⁴ the need for serious prognoses, since the prospects of leftist extremist activity are not clear and naturally arouse apprehension.

In the last two decades, the center of "leftist" extremism has shifted quite quickly and whimsically. In varying degrees, this movement has spread through France, the United States, Japan, the FRG, West Berlin, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey and several Latin American countries. During this time, it has become clear that the soil in some countries is particularly favorable for armed and other actions by "leftist" extremists. In this connection, it is useful to compare two locations where various forms of "urban guerrillas" (partisan fighters in cities) have gained particular influence: the FRG and Italy.

The "urban guerrilla" methods, organizational principles, techniques and ideology that took shape in the 1970's in the FRG are considered to be a sort of paradigm of "leftist" terrorism. On the other hand, however, despite some bold and daring assassinations and kidnappings in the FRG and West Berlin, we can quite definitely say at this time that the RAF (Red Army Faction) and other West German terrorist organizations are actually completely isolated, without even the hint of mass support. In Italy the social base of terrorism is much broader, which is due, in particular, to its more severe forms of crisis and its much lower level of industrialization and standard of living. It is not surprising that the victims of terrorist actions in the FRG numbered in the hundreds in the 1970's while in Italy there were many thousand. For these reasons and a few others, Italy can more properly be called the "model" of contemporary "leftist" terrorism.

The social base of terrorism in several countries--and in its most obvious form in Italy--consists of two basic components. The first is the lumpen-proletariat, the semiunemployed, day laborers, seasonal workers, craftsmen working in the home and all types of "outcasts." These individuals are particularly numerous in the Italian cities, which is largely connected with

the migration patterns of the brief Italian "Economic Miracle." The second component consists of some petty bourgeois strata and part of the intelligentsia, including administrators and student youth. A common feature of the two groups is their large number of "marginals"--unemployed and semi-unemployed individuals who have absolutely no prospects for the future. Italy has more than 1 million unemployed just in the younger age groups. Slightly more than half of the 700,000 youths who graduated from universities between 1972 and 1977 have been able to find jobs. In general, the youth problem in the nation is quite urgent, and this has the most direct relationship to the escalation of violence and terrorism (the terrorists--both "leftist" and rightist--are almost exclusively young people). Many unemployed young men and women feel cheated and totally alienated and, for this reason, they reach the point of paroxysms of rage, regarding violence as their only means of survival. "Anger, and even rage, is the prevalent emotion of young Italians," TIME magazine reported. "The most explosive youth problem in Europe," according to TIME, exists in Italy.⁵

Some extremely prosperous groups of the intelligentsia and student youth also represent a source of cadres for "leftist" terrorism. Youths from wealthy families frequently concur in their extremist and nihilistic views with declassé "marginals." This is particularly characteristic of the FRG and, to a lesser but still significant degree, of Italy. Some of the leaders of the Red Brigades come from wealthy Catholic families and attended the University of Trento at the end of the 1960's. It was in the bosom of this university's sociology department that this ill-famed organization came into being. Incidentally, liberal arts students represent a particularly high percentage of the students taking part in terrorist activity in other nations as well, especially the FRG.

In general, the developed and organized working class pointedly opposes "leftist" extremism, but it does have a small substratum of sympathizers and neutralists. The sociopolitical program of the "leftist" terrorists, according to one Italian labor leader and communist, B. Trentin, arouses a certain degree of sympathy, in particular, "in workers who are still relating to the old methods of revolutionary reasoning."⁶

In the FRG, the percentage of the proletariat taking part in terrorist activity or sympathizing is even smaller than in Italy. On the whole, there is no question that "leftist" extremism is not a proletarian phenomenon, but a petty bourgeois, marginal-intelligentsia movement. In this connection, it is indicative that Rome has become the "violence capital" of Europe, as it is a city with almost no working class but many bureaucrats and "marginals."

In a number of countries, the leftist extremist movement has a fairly intricate structure. The Italian variation of this structure consists of several concentric circles. The first--and the smallest--is the terrorist nucleus proper. It is backed up by another, much larger, circle of so-called "worker autonomy"--a semiunderground, semilegal movement of a spontaneous anarchistic type, which engages less in terrorist activity than in the provocation of

various types of disorder, arson, theft, acts of sabotage, the disruption of organized worker demonstrations and so forth. A third circle--the sympathizers--is quite large and diverse, consisting of representatives of various social groups: from a certain segment of the artistic intelligentsia to some proletarian groups. The structure of the leftist extremist movement in France, Spain and some other countries has features in common with the one described above.

The number of terrorist organizations in different countries, their character, their ideas and so forth are just as much of an unknown quantity as everything else connected with the world of terrorism, which is so inaccessible to the researcher. There are numerous hypotheses, which are extremely diverse and often contradictory, on this score. The most famous terrorist groups of "leftist" leanings are the Red Brigades, the NAP (Nuclei Armati Proletari) and the Front Line in Italy (it has been estimated that this country has close to 100 terrorist organizations, approximately three-quarters of them "leftist" and the rest of them rightist), the RAF in the FRG, Rengo Sekigun in Japan and others. Some countries (Spain, England and France) have terrorist organizations of a local separatist character. In this connection, it must be said that there are at least two varieties of "leftist" terrorism--antigovernment and nationalist. The second--which is not discussed in this article--is quite difficult to categorize because of its constant interconnection with the national liberation struggle (it is probably incorrect to even use the term "terrorism" in some of these cases). It must be distinguished from the terrorism of the first type, with its completely different, if not opposite, goals. Bourgeois researchers, however, generally do not make this kind of distinction, and equate, for instance, the terrorist activities of the RAF with the struggle of patriots in Zimbabwe, as well as the terrorism of separatist groups in Spain, France, England and so forth.⁷

Several terrorist groups have recently become much more "professional," organized and financially secure. Terrorists and the circles supporting them distribute their own literature, newspapers, journals and leaflets. In Italy they even have several radio stations. According to experts, a terrorist act on the scale of the kidnapping of A. Moro requires lengthy training and rehearsals, precise--"down to the second"--scheduling, hundreds of participants and hundreds of millions of lira. If we also consider the fact that each active member of the Red Brigades, according to some reports, was receiving 200,000 lira a month from the organization 3 years ago and is now receiving twice as much, we can assume that powerful and extremely suspicious sources of financing exist.

A number of terrorist organizations are distinguished by uncompromising discipline and the thorough regulation of their members' behavior in their daily life. The purpose of the latter is to avoid alienation from the social environment and to possess the reputation of "loyal citizens." This kind of "social mimicry" is extremely interesting. The special "rules of behavior," which each member of the Red Brigades must know by heart, contain

the most detailed instructions regarding the location and contents of lodgings, behavior on the street and in the home, interrelations with neighbors, the use of radios and tape recorders and so forth. The member of the organization is told that his "proletarian dwelling" must be modest but decent (curtains, a name plate, a doormat, etc.); his clothing and hairstyle are prescribed for him. He must always be calm, self-assured and polite, he must pay his rent and other bills on time, he must not stay out past midnight, he must not become involved in any kind of disputes and so forth--in short, he must scrupulously adhere to his chosen social role.

Apparently, we will not be able to definitely judge just how coordinated today's terrorist activities in various countries are until some time in the future. Many of them have so much in common that the objective basis for this kind of coordination is self-evident.⁸

In recent years, another, even more important question has constantly come up: Are the "leftist" terrorists being backed up by someone (and if so, then who?). The rightist and Maoist press have tried to spread slanderous lies about "secret agents of the socialist countries," who are supposedly trying to use this method to fight against projected "structural" reforms and the democratic path toward socialism and are striving to weaken some of the NATO countries. These are typical insinuations for our enemies, who ascribe all of their own methods to the socialist countries. Suffice it to say that there has recently been increasing evidence and increasing certainty that it is precisely the CIA that is not merely a disinterested observer, but is also directing many acts of the terrorist drama from behind the scenes.

The ideology of contemporary "leftist" extremism represents an exceedingly diverse picture, amazing in its eclecticism, fanatical dogmatism and cynical manipulation. The ideological roots of these fantastic constructions--which range from the extremely primitive (even semiliterate) to the totally "refined"--are quite obvious. These are the ideas of "classic" petty bourgeois anarchy and terrorism, Marxist ideas which have been vulgarized and dogmatized to the maximum, Trotskyist and Maoist theories, some extremist concepts of revolution and "urban guerrilla warfare" (F. Fanon, R. Debray, C. Marighela and others), the ideas of "leftist" Freudianism and the Frankfurt School, and so forth.

Two basic ideological lines can be conditionally singled out in the mosaic of the contradictory views of various leftist extremist groups: the "atheoretical" spontaneous line, characteristic of several anarchist groups, including the French and Italian "autonomists," who generally dissociate themselves from Marxism;⁹ and the ideologized line of the leftist extremist groups which make reference, in one form or another, to Marxist theory, stripping it of its true revolutionary meaning and turning it into a vulgar and dogmatic oversimplification.

The first of these lines is distinguished by the total rejection of existing reality. The very term "proletarian autonomy" signifies isolation from

everything that exists and its categorical nonacceptance. "Autonomy" signifies hostility toward everything, "alienation from everyone and everything."¹⁰ These extremists reject theory ("revolt must not be allowed to drown in theory,"¹¹ the French "autonomists" say), culture, politics, organization, authority, the party,¹² the government, labor, moral and social norms, etc. The "right to hate" is loudly proclaimed.

The "atheoreticism" of the "autonomists," as is often the case, has been sufficiently conceptualized by the theoreticians of "autonomism" (for example, A. Negri). This conceptualization is a mixture of extremely vulgarized motifs of existentialism, situationism and Marcuseanism. Moreover, it is interesting that the spontaneist, antiauthoritarian and antihierarchical ideas of the "autonomists" are quite unexpectedly and amazingly combined with the excellent behind-the-scenes organization of the movement, or at least some of its detachments.

The mentality of the declassé element, extreme lumpen individualism, is expressed most clearly in total "autonomist" nihilism. The "autonomist" hates everyone and everything: not only representatives of the ruling classes--for their power and wealth, but also intellectuals--for their culture and education, workers--for their jobs, party members--for their adherence to order and discipline, etc.

The "autonomists" have taken some of the keynotes of the 1968 movement and turned them upside-down. At that time the rejection of bourgeois society took a largely antimaterialistic form, but now this antimaterialism has become the most primitive materialistic dependence. Since the "autonomists" express the characteristic lumpen lack of inclination for work and reluctance and inability to work, they are not advocating the "freedom of labor" but, rather, "freedom from labor." This means that someone will have to work in their place. They are rebelling less against the "consumer society" than against its inability to quickly satisfy all of their needs and give them what it seems to promise. These cheated illusions, impatience, desperation and contempt for labor and organization give rise to a desire to "barbarize" the world and to "go out into the ghetto" only for the purpose of blowing up everything that is there. The struggle against reality turns into senseless destruction, terrorism becomes common crime and the only positive ideal is the immediate satisfaction of primitive needs. The combination of all this inevitably and inexorably leads to total devastation, and sometimes even to suicide, the rate of which is extremely high among the "autonomists."

The most paradoxical element of this nihilistic outlook is the fact that it always turns into acceptance of the basic tenets and "rules of the game" of the rejected society. Just as the "autonomist" concepts of "freedom from labor" and "the satisfaction of needs" are a grotesque modification of the narrow-minded ideals of the "consumer society," the cult of hatred and violence reproduces one of the deep-seated characteristics of bourgeois society in the era of its crisis.

The cult of universal violence demands substantiation and, despite their declared contempt for theory, the "autonomists" have been forced to provide it. The substantiation provided has been of two types. On the one hand, they say that violence and armed struggle are "proletarian violence" in response to bourgeois violence, to the violence of society, the government, the fascists, the police and the communist parties, which have allegedly become "part" of the bourgeois state and have "joined the masters." On the other hand, they imply that violence and terror do not exist, and that the only form that is evident derives from the repressive fascism-imposing state. "The only terrorism I know of," "autonomist" O. Strano said, "is the terrorism of the state."¹³

The idea that there is only one form of violence and terror--state terror--is one of the keynotes of the ideology of "leftist" terrorism. But the violence practiced by the terrorists is not only real, it takes the most barbarous forms and could have dangerous consequences. It is precisely this, the alpha and omega of all forms of terrorism, that unites its different branches, is becoming the reverse side or "alter-ego" of the contemporary capitalist system and is turning the terrorists into the accomplices of fascism-imposing reaction.

This is also how the violent actions of the terrorists are interpreted by the majority of Italian workers. A book entitled "Il terrorismo in fabbrica," which was recently published in Italy, cites a typical statement by a worker in one of the Fiat plants. "So-called 'red' terrorism," he said, "is nothing other than the latest variant of capitalist violence, made even more treacherous by its disguise and its novelty."¹⁴

The "autonomist" form of "leftist" terrorism is relatively massive in scale and this is its chief danger. It has a demoralizing effect on certain population groups, not only because of its provocations and assassination attempts, but also because of its preaching of blind hatred, irresponsibility and chaos, its rejection of all social and cultural values and its demagogic maximalist demands. The logical result of the social philosophy and socio-psychological premises of the "autonomists" is violence, since they reject all other forms of struggle and wish to eliminate those who do not share their views. Their anticommunism and anti-institutionalism and their struggle against organized forms of the workers movement are having a definite effect on the backward strata of the laboring masses. In addition, in contrast to other forms of "leftist" terrorism (for which "worker autonomy" serves as a kind of reserve and source of cadres), it has a fairly restricted, "localized" character, devoid of "scope" and purpose. B. Trentin says that it is still a "violent movement, connected with corporate commonplaces, without dimension and without perspective."¹⁵

The other branch of "leftist" terrorism, which is the opposite, in several respects, of the irrational spontaneous philosophy and mentality of "autonomism," has much more "dimension"--not in terms of the number of its adherents, but in terms of its goals and the precision and "rationality" of its ideas and organization. "We must," a Red Brigades document states, "discard the

idea, as quickly as possible and for all time, that the transformation of armed struggle into prolonged people's struggle can be a spontaneous process.... Creating the necessary conditions for alternative authority and organizing the revolutionary potential of the proletariat constitute a deliberate and violent process."¹⁶

In contrast to the "autonomists," whose program is largely limited to "existential" or corporate-materialistic demands, the Red Brigades, the First Line and other similar terrorist groups are striving for organization and a precise position and, in the future, the elaboration of a common political and ideological platform and the unification of terrorist groups into a single "militant party" on the basis of, and this is given special emphasis, "not a spontaneous process," but work "permeated with maximum political clarity."¹⁷

But the ideological (and practical) differences between the "autonomists" and the terrorist organizations of this type should not be exaggerated. They are mainly connected by secondary characteristics--tactical, psychological and organizational. We cannot give any fundamental weight to their constant use of Marxist phrases and terminology and constant references to such concepts as "communism," "revolution," "class struggle," "dictatorship of the proletariat" and so forth. None of this has anything in common with real Marxism, and it even serves purposes which impede the struggle for communism.

The basic methodological principle of the entire sociopolitical philosophy and propaganda of "leftist" extremism is the principle of social demagoguery, slander and exaggeration. This principle, which has essentially been taken from the Goebbels and Maoist arsenals, was given priority even in the initial, or Trento, stage of the activity of the Red Brigades leaders and ideologists. In combination with extreme oversimplification, it leads to a situation in which all sociophilosophical and political problems discussed by the theoreticians of "leftist" terrorism acquire monstrous forms, distorting sociopolitical reality and concealing this deformity with loud pseudorevolutionary phrases.

On the basis of this "methodology," the ideology of "leftist" terrorism engenders one extremely important common dominant--the extreme mythologization of today's social and political realities. With the aid of vulgarized Marxist phrases and some of the most general and true, but extremely exaggerated, premises (the crisis of the capitalist system, the repressive nature of the bourgeois state, etc.), the panorama of contemporary reality is amazingly distorted until it essentially has nothing in common with any real problems or contradictions. This terrifying, "infernal" picture, filled with incredible exaggerations and lies, serves as theoretical substantiation for terrorist practices.

The situation in today's world, according to the ideology of "leftist" extremism, is absolutely hopeless. This applies both to the capitalist

world, where all of the democratic gains of the workers movement (the working class, according to the extremists, has confirmist attitudes) are absolutely ignored (or called negative), and to the socialist community, which is called "social-imperialism" in the Maoist spirit. One of the basic elements of the terrorist ideology is the repetition of Maoist slander in regard to the communist parties in the capitalist countries, which are accused of "treason" for becoming a basis of support and a tool of imperialism and social-imperialism.

According to the terrorists, the situation in Italy is particularly gloomy: Here the dominant position of the "transnational monopolies" keeps the people in the clutches of a bloody repressive regime with the aid of surveillance, "mass murder," "political genocide," special tribunals, concentration camps throughout the nation and a huge gang of "government assassins" whose hands have been stained by a multitude of crimes against the proletariat.

This distorted and pessimistic view of today's world completely ignores the achievements of the contemporary workers movement, with which the majority of capitalist states have had to content. Naturally, these states are repressive by their nature, but the forms of their repression differ completely under fascist and bourgeois-democratic regimes. In the latter case, the ruling classes would probably be quite pleased to do everything they have been accused of doing by "leftist" extremists, but they are not capable of this. As for Italy, its specific conditions are totally ignored, particularly the existence of one of the more democratic bourgeois constitutions, which rose from the flames of the nationwide antifascist struggle. If we add the commonly known fact that leftist forces are constantly gaining a stronger position in national life, the absurdity of the "leftist" extremist theories becomes totally obvious.

What is the real purpose of these absurd ideas about the sociopolitical realities in today's world? In the first place, they divert people from the real problems and conflicts of the present day, thereby disorienting certain social strata and directing their energy into an extremely questionable and dangerous channel. In the second place, they have the purpose of forcing the working class to turn away from the communist parties. In the third place, they suggest that all peaceful forms of transition to socialism are hopeless. If the situation is actually as they describe it, then the only answer is armed struggle. And terror is the first stage of this struggle, after which it is supposed to evolve into civil war. The elimination of the "chief enemy," the dominant transnational monopolies, can only be achieved, according to the terrorists' beliefs, through a series of direct strikes at its very heart--at structures and individuals, at the bureaucratic machine and institutions, at the repressive and propagandistic systems, at the "opportunistic" policy of reform and so forth. And all of this is being said at a time when the balance of power in the world is making peaceful forms of transition to socialism possible for the first time and when any kind of irresponsible use of weapons is becoming particularly dangerous!

The absolutization of armed forms of struggle will deliver a strike not only at the bourgeois state, but also at participation by the masses in state and public life, by reinforcing the reactionary, repressive potential of the bourgeois state.

Therefore, this "infernalization" of the world situation has the purpose of justifying terrorist practices, which understandably need more justification than any other kind of action. Naturally, we cannot assume that this "infernalization" is the result of only conscious calculation. The illusory idea of a totally hostile world, where there is nothing but violence, repression and treachery, naturally stems from the damaged mentality of the social strata nurturing the terrorist movement. This mentality results in the general demoralization of this movement. Whereas the People's Will members, for instance, were individuals of rare nobility who felt that assassination was an extreme means, to be used only in exceptional cases, the contemporary terrorists regard assassination--or barbarous mutilation--if not as a goal in itself, then at least as a universal means, to be used daily and quite indiscriminately. Inspiration by high--although naive--ideals, which was characteristic of much of "classic" terrorism (but even then there was the Nechayev type!), is giving way to cynicism and callous calculation (even now, however, the possibility of subjective integrity and naive faith in the "cause" cannot be excluded). Humanism is giving way to hatred: hatred for everyone but the members of one's own clan, for everyone who does not support the practice of assassination and mutilation. This practice takes particularly grotesque forms when attempts are made to clothe it in pseudohumanistic and pseudo-orthodox attire. In reference to the assassination of A. Moro, R. Curcio said: "The act of revolutionary justice committed in the Moro affair is the highest act of humaneness that is possible in this society with its class divisions."¹⁸

The violence used daily by the terrorists, despite all of their declarations, has nothing in common with revolutionary violence. This is mainly because the latter does not take the form of terrorist actions, but the form of revolutionary struggle by the masses. Besides this, it is only justified in specific historical circumstances, particularly the existence of a revolutionary situation, which does not, whatever the terrorists may say, exist in the developed capitalist countries. Finally, revolutionary violence does not have the goal of establishing a repressive system, which is precisely the ambition of the terrorists, so that they can "awaken" the masses.

The ideology of assassination, as we have already pointed out, needs a substantial "moral alibi," if not for one's own conscience, then, in any case, for the rest of the world. This goal is served not only by the "infernalization" of reality, but also the obsession of the terrorist movement--the obsession with war. "We want war," say the terrorists.¹⁹ War is simultaneously the desired goal, the only possible means and the justification. After all, during a war the practice of mass murder ceases to be a crime. Therefore, the idea of war is used to advantage in every way possible, in what would seem to be the most incompatible variants. On the one hand, civil war

is discussed as an objective, as a qualitatively new stage of the struggle which must be reached. On the other, it is constantly maintained that civil war is already doing on and that, for this reason, the victims of terror are ordinary victims of war, and terrorists who are seized by the police are prisoners of war. The theoretical substantiation of armed struggle and partisan warfare in the cities is the focal point of all terrorist ideological constructions. "The tactic of popular partisan warfare and partisan actions," the supporters of the West German RAF state, "is the only way of undermining the power of capital and eventually defeating it."²⁰

The fanatical obsession with war, immediate and uncompromising, makes the ideology and practice of the terrorists particularly dangerous in view of the extremely risky nature of any kind of military plans in our era. Besides this, attempts to start a civil war in the developed capitalist countries can now only benefit antidemocratic forces and result in a more repressive regime or even an authoritarian coup d'etat. The practice of terrorism is aimed at the overthrow of the bourgeois democratic state, primarily emphasizing the destruction of its democratic elements, since after these have been demolished and discarded, according to the leftist extremist hypothesis, a people's revolution against the now overtly police imperialist state should begin.

The absurdity--or malicious intent--of this "logic" is constantly being proved both by the actual results of terrorist practices themselves and by researchers working on the subject of terrorism. For example, W. Laqueur, the author of "Terrorism," a book recently published in the United States, England and the FRG, says with good reason (and he is seconded by famous French researcher J. F. Revel)²¹ that even if the first part of this plan--that is, the stimulation of repressive regimes--is carried out successfully in general, the second can never come about (even if we can believe, we should add, that the terrorists are actually striving for this).

The futurological part of the terrorist ideology can only be judged from isolated fragments and remarks. Depending on the different general concepts, it is depicted either as the realization of certain anarchistic plans or as a harsh totalitarian regime like the one described by Orwell in his famous antiutopia. The masses will have no voice in this society and the regulation of human behavior and culture will reach unprecedented dimensions.

The clearest idea of the futurological program of "leftist" extremism can be gained from a few characteristic components of terrorist activity which suggest "how it will be." These include, above all, the so-called "people's prisons" and "people's courts" endured not only by A. Moro but also by several other individuals who were kidnapped by terrorists. The testimony of some of the "prisoners" who survived provides some idea of the horrifying and absurd proceedings of such "trials." The so-called "proletarian justice" of the terrorists not only presupposes the absolute presumption of guilt, but is, in general, a nightmarish farce with everything decided beforehand, although the exact charges against the "defendant" are never specified.

According to the description of one such "court," the "defendant" is constantly attended by two guards wearing black hoods. He is daily subjected to the propagandistic press, "brainwashing," "rapid-fire" questioning, drugs and tranquilizers, psychological isolation and so forth. The purpose of all this is to obtain a "confession" and self-criticism from the defendant. As we have already noted, however, he is never actually accused of any specific crimes, and reference is only made to criminal activity in general "against the proletariat." Even the admission of "guilt" and the acceptance of the extremist symbol of faith does not save the "defendant" from the only possible "verdict"--the death penalty. In these "trials," the "defendant" knows absolutely nothing about what is going on, there is no defense and only the demands of the prosecution are of significance. It is "courts" like this that the terrorists call truly humane "proletarian justice," in contrast to the bourgeois courts. All of this demonstrates the degree to which their practice and theory discredits not only the ideals of revolution and communism in general, but even socialist legality, and it is this "fragment of the future" that shows what would happen if these people should ever come to power. It is then that the charges they are leveling against today's world would come to pass--concentration camps would cover the map, and the standard means of control would be institutionalized terror, manufactured trials and mass genocide.

Therefore, there can be no doubt that the sociopolitical program of "leftist" terrorism, despite its constant references to the "proletariat," "revolution" and "communism," is hostile to the working class, to progressive forces and to the theory and practice of scientific communism. Leftist extremist terror has ceased to be the erroneous means of struggle for the democratic transformation of society, which it sometimes was in the past, and has become a means of struggle against democracy, against forces for progress and, above all, against the organized workers movement and its allies.

The terrorist "boom" of recent years has given birth to a flood of literature containing a huge quantity of contradictory opinions, hypotheses and predictions. In addition to individual studies and numerous newspaper and magazine articles, research into this phenomenon is also being conducted on the level of government and public organizations, secret services and so forth. There are two known large-scale studies on this topic by the American secret services and a voluminous NATO file. Political terrorism is being studied by a special group at the Hoover Institute, headed by S. Hook. The results of a 10-year analysis of terrorism, conducted by a special division of the Rand Corporation with the participation of specialists in various fields and with the aid of computers, are of interest. These researchers studied around 1,000 incidents of terrorist activity, which served as the basis for a fundamental work on the present nature and status of terrorism and its prospects for the 1980's.²²

The views on terrorism expressed in Western literature and the press are quite varied. The prevalent attitude is harsh condemnation for the most diverse reasons, but there is also no shortage of sympathetic views, voiced

by those who speak of the terrorists as "misled comrades" and allege that terror represents totally justified moral rebellion against the stifling effects of conservatism, opportunism and conformism. Some of contemporary terrorism's advocates like to discuss violence as the only means of solving existing problems, to even discuss the "creative" nature of subversive activity and so forth. These sympathizers include one of the prominent writers of our century, Alberto Moravia, who approaches the ethics and psychology of terrorism as an extra-historical religious phenomenon common to all ages. The social purpose of contemporary terrorism, in his view, consists in struggle for freedom from the corruption, alienation, hedonism and "materialism" in which contemporary society is mired. The intolerance of the terrorists is justified because tolerance signifies complicity in the corruptive tendencies of the existing system.

This is an extremely dangerous stand to take. Totally erroneous conclusions are drawn from a few correct postulates, testifying that the ultra-revolutionary phraseology of the terrorists is capable of misleading people. And this, strictly speaking, is what the terrorists are relying on. The extremists count on convincing some, beginning a "dialog" with others, gaining the sympathy of still others, and having some occupy a neutral position; as a result, the common front of social isolation is undermined. The communists' attitude toward this problem is uncompromising: Terrorists are not "misled comrades" and they are not even opponents with whom matters should be debated; they are the most dangerous of enemies, a tool of reaction, with whom there can be no contact, no compromises and no discussions. It is not only the direct support of this evil force that can considerably harm the democratic movement, but even any attempt to play up to it, to flirt with it, to "understand" it or to justify it. A firm stand against terrorism does not signify that we are giving in to ruling classes and authority, but that we are protecting the conditions in which the struggle against them and the fight for democratic reforms can be continued. The terrorists, on the other hand, are trying to block the way to reforms of this kind, to achieve a shift to the right and to establish an authoritarian regime. "Terrorism," Secretary General E. Berlinguer of the Italian Communist Party says, "is aiding the enemies of democracy. And since democracy in Italy is essentially a result of conquests and struggle by the working masses and of their unity, terrorism is primarily an enemy of the workers, communists, socialists and all those who are fighting for the progress of democracy in our nation."²³

It is indicative that even in some ultra-leftist circles, despite the prevalence of apologetic, sympathetic or at least ambiguous attitudes toward terrorist practices here, the most pointed criticism of terrorists can also be heard, which reveals the true purpose of their activity. For example, R. Rossand, leader of one of the ultra-leftist splinter groups of the Italian Communist Party, wrote the following in *IL MANIFESTO*: "If someone dares to say that terrorism is class struggle, we answer yes, naturally, but this is the struggle of the masters and those who are playing into their hands."²⁴

The communist parties in the developed capitalist countries have expressed the belief that political terrorism can be stifled by means of the broad

mobilization of the masses to struggle against it, the isolation of terrorist groups, the renovation of society, the improvement of public administration and the institution of a series of reforms which will make it possible to eliminate crises and eradicate the sociopsychological atmosphere in which terrorism comes into being and is constantly reproduced; it can also be achieved through firm and decisive measures on the part of the authorities.

The forecasting of terrorism is now of serious practical significance as well as theoretical value. After all, terrorism, both "leftist" and rightist, represents a significant threat in many respects. It threatens the future prospects of the democratic achievements of the workers, since it stimulates the activization of repressive and reactionary forces. It threatens the diversion of the efforts of certain socially active groups into futile and fatal--although externally quite radical--channels. It carries the threat of demoralization, chaos and fear, the consequences of which are difficult to predict. Finally, it threatens the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by cynical fanatics who will not stop at anything.

On the whole, the question of the future of terrorism can probably be regarded as a self-fulfilling prophecy. It will depend on the situation that takes shape in the capitalist world, on the development of the workers and democratic movement and on its further successes and conquests. The future of terrorism will be connected, to a considerable extent, with the fate of capitalism, since we can already say quite definitely that terrorism, both "leftist" and rightist, becomes a necessary attribute, result and symptom of the crisis in capitalist society at some particular stage of this crisis. It is a symptom of growing dissatisfaction with the social system, a channel for the desperation, disorientation and rage of some immature and marginal population strata seeing no other means of struggle against capitalism than overt violence, and simultaneously a horrifying weapon used by reaction to arouse social and political chaos and establish a regime of "strong authority." During the last stage of its development, capitalism will constantly actualize its own terrorist potential and its own immanent inclination toward social and political violence as its arsenal of other means continually shrinks. In view of the fact that the contemporary capitalist system is incapable of overcoming crisis phenomena, unemployment, "marginalization" and mounting feelings of alienation and hostility on the part of several social groups, it is extremely difficult to combat terrorism in the bourgeois world.

We must also bear in mind that terrorism is directly connected with crime. In order to attain their goals, the terrorists resort primarily to criminal means while theoretically "substantiating" this practice. Theft and kidnapping, they say, should become "fundamental aspects of the struggle to establish proletarian authority and one of the essential rites of passage for the revolutionary movement."²⁵ Some "leftist" terrorist groups implement Bakunin's idea of the bandit-revolutionary and even rely primarily on criminal elements and convicts (this applies, for example, to one of Italy's main "leftist" terrorist organizations--the NAP). In turn, criminals in

some Western countries now try to pass themselves off as terrorists, "proletarian partisans" and so forth when they are arrested. Therefore, in a certain sense, the struggle against terrorism is a struggle against crime, and this problem, as we know, cannot be completely solved under the conditions of the capitalist society.

The general conclusion to be drawn from all this is that terrorism--primarily "leftist" at the present time--is an extremely symptomatic phenomenon which could acquire dangerous proportions. The temporary ebb and flow of terrorist activity is possible, but it is highly improbable that its proportions will diminish in the near future if no cardinal changes are made in the general situation. Radical means of struggle should obviously be aimed less against terrorism itself than against its deep-seated causes. And they can only be eliminated as a result of a comprehensive set of socioeconomic and political transformations, or fundamental democratic and, in the future, socialist, reforms.

FOOTNOTES

1. The term "leftist" is used by the extremists for purely demagogical purposes, as the ideology and practice of extremism both serve the interests of imperialist circles on the extreme right. Moreover, the concept of "leftist" extremism is generally used in a much broader sense than the concept of "leftist" terrorism. Here, however, they are used as synonyms.
2. The increase in popular antiterrorist protests is also indicative. For example, demonstrations were held in many Spanish cities on 10 November 1978, under the slogan "Democracy--yes, terrorism--no!" More than half a million people took part in these demonstrations.
3. "Leftists have seriously underestimated the significance of terrorist practices" (PAESE SERA, 11 April 1978, p 1).
4. "We are faced with a phenomenon whose nature is probably still little understood in all of its ominous novelty" (L'UNITA, 19 April 1978, p 1).
5. TIME, N.Y., 14 November 1977, No 20, p 14.
6. PANORAMA, 28 February 1978, No 19, p 38.
7. The description of the last type of terrorism presents great difficulties. On the one hand, the aspirations of ethnic minorities which has suffered from discrimination are sometimes realized in these groups. On the other, the methods to which they resort are extremely dangerous. Aside from the issue of large numbers of innocent victims, their activities serve as an excuse for the passage of various types of excessive laws (from which democratic organizations suffer most).

8. R. Curcio, leader of the Red Brigades, announced the following not long ago: "In France, Germany, Spain and Portugal, there are military and political structures which operate on the basis of the same strategic hypotheses as we do" (see EPOCA, 22 May 1978, No 1433, p 24).
9. The book "The Right To Hate" (Verona, 1977) contains the following statement: "We are not Marxists.... Anything that is radical suits us. We are burying the corpses of old ideologies" (quoted in RINASCITA, 1978, No 3, p 23). See also, "Worker Autonomy," published by the autonomist committees of Rome (1976).
10. RINASCITA, 1978, No 3, p 23.
11. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 12-18 December 1977, No 683, p 59.
12. The "autonomists" have no uniting philosophy. Some of them preach these views in extreme forms, while others believe that all of this should not exclude the possibility of a search for some form of "proletarian counter-authority," organizations, parties and command structure.
13. PANORAMA, 18 April 1978, No 626, p 46.
14. "Il terrorismo in fabbrica," Rome, 1978, p 7.
15. PANORAMA, 28 February 1978, No 619, p 38.
16. L'ESPRESSO, 11 September 1977, No 36, pp 18, 19.
17. Ibid., p 18.
18. L'UNITA, 11 May 1978, p 1.
19. Ibid., 12 April 1978, p 13.
20. DER SPIEGEL, 17 October 1977, No 43, p 209.
21. L'EXPRESS, 30 January-5 February 1978, No 1386, p 30.
22. S. Jenkins, the head of this division, believes that terror will become the main factor in social life throughout the world in the 1980's. A similar viewpoint has been expressed by one of the leaders of the Italian ultra-leftists (non-terrorists), L. Magri, who feels that events in Italy would seem to presage phenomena which will become "the basic component of political life in the West in the next few years" (LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 23 April 1978, No 701, p 49). Naturally, far from ever agreeing with this extreme point of view, but even more "moderate" authors, such as the abovementioned W. Laqueur, believe that terrorism could become a serious threat in several countries in the next 10-15 years.

23. L'UNITA, 7 April 1978, p 1.
24. Quoted in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 26 December-1 January 1977, No 685, p 43.
25. PANORAMA, 11 April 1978, No 625, p 53.

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FROM THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT OF THE YUGOSLAVIAN PEOPLE (LATE 19th-
EARLY 20th CENTURIES)

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 167-174

[Article by Zinaida Tikhonovna Golenkova, candidate of philosophical sciences
and academic secretary of the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR
Academy of Sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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SCIENTIFIC LIFE

CURRENT PROBLEMS IN REGIONAL SOCIAL PLANNING

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 175-177

[Article by O. I. Obratsov]

[Text] The comprehensive, systemic approach to the management of economic, scientific, technical and social processes in a territorial community takes on concrete form in the comprehensive plans for the economic and social development of administrative regions, cities and oblasts.

In the Ukrainian SSR, plans of this kind were drawn up for the Tenth Five-Year Plan in all 477 administrative regions, 127 cities of oblast jurisdiction, 25 oblasts and the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol'. In addition to the traditional sections, these plans also contained a broad spectrum of social objectives set forth in CPSU policy-planning documents, particularly the objectives of communist indoctrination, increased social activity on the part of the workers, the improvement of ideological work and others. When the plans for socioeconomic development were being drafted, councils and commissions were formed in many republic oblasts to compile specific sections of the plan, the services of representatives of public organizations were enlisted, various procedural documents were utilized and special sociological studies were conducted. All of this considerably broadened the spectrum of social objectives set forth in the plans.

The summarization of results and the generalization of the experience of comprehensive planning for the economic and social development of territorial subdivisions were the purpose of an expanded session of the Scientific Methods Center of the Ukrainian SSR Gosplan and the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences on planning for the social development of collectives, rayons, cities and oblasts, held in Ternopol' in August 1978. It was attended by officials from the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, the USSR and Ukrainian SSR gosplans, chairmen of Ukrainian oblast planning commissions, republic scientists and specialists in sociology.

The session was called to order by the chairman of the center, M. M. Makhinya, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Gosplan. He mentioned the great significance of plans for the social development of collectives, associations,

rayons and cities for the purposeful management of social processes. Plans for the socioeconomic development of territorial communities provide for the most successful resolution of problems in the efficient utilization of material, labor and financial resources, environmental protection, the activities of education, public health and cultural agencies and such branches of the non-production sphere as trade, public catering and municipal services, and so forth. The considerable successes achieved by workers in the Soviet Ukraine during the first half of the Tenth Five-Year Plan were largely a result of the fulfillment of the comprehensive five-year plans drawn up in labor collectives, rayons, cities and oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR.

In addition, M. M. Makhinya stressed the need for further improvement in comprehensive planning and the augmentation of the impact of socioeconomic plans. This work is not being conducted on the necessary scientific level everywhere as yet. The system of control over the fulfillment of comprehensive plans has not been organized precisely enough. Measures are not always planned with the aid of in-depth studies of initial data or thorough consideration for the sociodemographic and professional-skills features of the local population. Plan indicators are sometimes poorly coordinated with actual economic possibilities. This gives rise to the need for an analysis of the key problems impeding the effectiveness of social planning, the role of scientific projects in the improvement of the procedural and organizational bases of comprehensive territorial five-year plans, and the methods of stimulating the work of public organizations in connection with plan fulfillment.

A report entitled "Planning for the Socioeconomic Development of Territorial Subdivisions: Some Results and the Main Objectives" was presented by N. N. Davgal', chief of the section for the territorial planning and distribution of productive forces of the Ukrainian SSR Gosplan. He stressed that the compilation of comprehensive plans in republic cities and rayons during the Ninth Five-Year Plan was accomplished at the initiative of local authorities without the necessary procedural and organizational unity. As a result, plan documents differed sharply in terms of structure, the system of plan indicators and the group of objectives included in the five-year plan, which made it difficult to assess their quality and compare the social developmental levels of administrative units.

The compilation of comprehensive plans for the socioeconomic development of territorial communities for 1976-1980 was accomplished on a qualitatively different level--according to a single set of methods worked out by republic scientific research organizations in 1974-1976, which aided in the preparation of plan documents which were consistent both in terms of structure and the volume of planning information and in terms of the system of indicators. As a result, Ukrainian planning agencies obtained ample information on the social development of each oblast in the republic.

Nonetheless, the planning documents of several oblasts still differ noticeably from one another. For example, some oblast comprehensive plans lack several important sections (on the communist indoctrination of workers and others).

Questions concerning the effectiveness of social planning are indissolubly connected with the creation of a strict system of accounting and control over plan fulfillment. In this connection, the experience of Nikolayevskaya, Khersonskaya and Zakarpatskaya oblasts is of interest. For example, in Nikolayevskaya Oblast, this control is the responsibility of standing commissions of the soviet of people's deputies, rayon and city executive committees, oblast departments (public health, public education, municipal services and others) and administrations (culture, consumer services, trade and others), which must submit information on the progress in plan fulfillment to the oblispolkom by 1 March of each year. The Zakarpatskaya Oblast ispolkom has assigned these functions to the oblast planning commission and the oblast statistical administration. More effective socioeconomic planning also calls for stronger propaganda and the study of public reactions to the basic premises of the plan.

Up to the present time, plans for the development of the local economy, plans for the comprehensive development of the territorial economy and, finally, comprehensive plans for socioeconomic development are drawn up in rayons, cities and oblasts, which considerably complicates the work of local planning agencies. The more precise coordination of these documents should be considered, as well as their close linkage as stages in the drafting of the comprehensive plan for the economic and social development of the territory.

Chairman V. P. Vykhreshch of the Ternopol'skaya Oblast Planning Commission presented a report entitled "The Experience of the Ternopol'skaya Oblast Planning Commission in the Compilation of Comprehensive Plans for Economic and Social Development." Plans of this kind were drawn up in each labor collective in the oblast for the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The oblast planning commission was responsible for all coordinating work and the procedural supervision of the compilation of the comprehensive plans of rayons, cities and oblasts. A comprehensive socioeconomic planning section was created as part of this commission to oversee the observance of the standard organizational and procedural bases of plan compilation. Procedural aids and standard planning forms were sent to each enterprise, organization, kolkhoz and sovkhoz, the deadlines for submitting materials were stipulated, executors were appointed and so forth. All of this established a good basis for the compilation of a scientifically substantiated comprehensive plan for the socioeconomic development of Ternopol'skaya Oblast during the 1976-1980 period.

The speaker expressed several ideas aimed at more effective social planning in regions:

The inclusion of sections on financial resources and improvement of the territorial administrative system as part of the socioeconomic plans of territories;

The development of a system of indicators to define the levels of economic and social development in regions, as well as a system of corresponding social normatives;

The inclusion of the basic indicators of plans for social development in the socialist commitments of rayons, cities and oblasts.

The head of the L'vov division of the Institute of Economics of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, M. I. Dolishniy, discussed ways of making plans for the socioeconomic development of rural regions more comprehensive. He focused his attention on the efficient use of labor resources and the effects of various socioeconomic factors on production efficiency, particularly the influence of the social infrastructure on rural migration patterns.

The heads of oblast and city planning commissions of the Ukrainian SSR-- R. N. Tsuperyak, B. P. Burchenko, M. P. Burenok, Ch. G. Kolesnik, E. M. Stepovoy, S. N. Obideyko, M. Ya. Alyakina and V. A. Geozanov--and head of the sociological research sector of the Cherkassy Division of the Scientific Research Institute of Technical and Economic Studies, K. Ye. Pozdnyakova, presented reports and speeches in which they pointed out difficulties in the fulfillment of comprehensive plans and made concrete suggestions in regard to the improvement of socioeconomic planning methods.

The resolution passed by the expanded session of the Scientific Methods Center of the Ukrainian SSR Gosplan and the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences and Social Planning recommended the following:

That the ispolkoms of oblast, city and rayon soviets of people's deputies focus their attention on the fulfillment of comprehensive five-year plans for economic and social development of territories by instituting stronger control over the attainment of the basic objectives of the comprehensive plan; that the comprehensive planning of economic and social development be propagandized more intensively in labor collectives, rayons, cities and the oblast as a whole; that applied science conferences be convened regularly for the discussion of experience in the fulfillment of comprehensive plans.

That republic research organizations (the Economics and Scientific Research Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Gosplan and the Institute of the Economics of Industry of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences) prepare standard procedural aids in 1979 for the comprehensive planning of the economic and social development of cities, rayons and oblasts in the republic.

To improve the informational basis of the compilation of social sections of the comprehensive plan of a territorial community, the Economics and Scientific Research Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Gosplan has been requested to draft a social description of the region. The proceedings of the session were distributed to all cities, rayons and oblasts in the Ukrainian SSR and all scientific research organizations and higher academic institutions engaged in the study of social planning issues.

SOVIET-FINNISH SEMINAR ON 'CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF THE MASS MEDIA'

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
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[Article by V. G. Karpov and M. G. Yelizarova]

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SOVIET SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION NEWS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 179-180

[Article by N. A. Kocherina]

[Text] In December 1968, at its latest meeting, the Presidium of the SSA [Soviet Sociological Association] Board discussed the work being performed by the Central Scientific Research Section of the SSA on the Sociological Problems of Physical Culture and Sports in conjunction with affiliated sections of SSA branches.

This section has focused its attention on research connected with the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. The section took part in preparing papers for the all-union symposium on "The Olympic Movement and the Development of Olympic Sports in Today's World." Preparations are now under way for another scientific congress at the time of the Olympic games (the sociological division of the congress).

The presidium passed a resolution to commend the activities of the Central Section of the SSA on the Sociological Problems of Physical Culture and Sports and to recommend that all SSA research sections study its operational experience and use it in their work. A decision was adopted to request the Sports Committee of the USSR to assist the SSA central section in the organization of sociological research and the preparations for an all-union applied science conference on the sociological problems of physical culture and sports immediately prior to the 1980 Olympics.

At this session of the presidium, a satirical article printed in PRAVDA on 21 November 1978 was also discussed. This was the article entitled "Newton versus Shakespeare," which dealt with the low procedural level of the studies conducted by some sociologists. E. A. Royz, who is discussed in the article, has set out on the path of forgery and fraud and has conducted unauthorized "research" that is distinguished by professional incompetence.

The board presidium resolved to admit the absolute accuracy of the conclusions drawn in "Newton versus Shakespeare" and approved the decision of the Moldavian Branch of the SSA to divest E. A. Royz of his SSA membership for violating the SSA Charter. The presidium outlined several measures which are expected to prevent the infiltration of the SSA by extraneous, unqualified and unscrupulous individuals.

LESSONS OF FOREMAN DAY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
p 180

[Letter to editors by S. M. Balanovskiy]

[Text] As reported in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (1978, No 4, p 208), in April 1978, the Omsk branch of the Siberian division of the SSA held a seminar to discuss "Improvement in the Management of Social Processes in the Labor Collective." During the course of this seminar, the participants were polled, and the results of this survey indicated the expediency of organizing a permanent club for professional contacts. Its first session--Foreman Day--was held on 11-12 October 1978. The topic of discussion was "The Foreman as the Educator of the Collective." The session was attended by individuals representing around 500 enterprises, and not only from Omsk, but also from Novosibirsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Magnitogorsk, Baraul, Irkutsk and other cities.

The proposals of participants in this meeting reaffirmed the opinion expressed by the bureau of the Omsk branch of the Siberian division of the SSA concerning the need to continue this work. A decision was made to hold a citywide Foreman Day at least once a year and, in addition to this, to organize meetings for the workers of personnel divisions, shop supervisors, the workers of quality control offices and other workers in 1979-1980.

It is important to point out the substantial public response to this citywide undertaking and, in connection with this, the increased prestige of "local" sociologists. Within a few months after the citywide "Foreman Day," several enterprises in Omsk requested the bureau of our branch of the Siberian division of the SSA to organize "small-scale" Foreman Days for them.

The next club session--Shop Supervisor Day--will have the theme of "Social and Economic Aspects of the Management of a Shop Collective." In preparation for this meeting, sociologists at Omsk enterprises polled the supervisors of shops and production units and the secretaries of plant party committees to determine the particular problems that are worrying shop supervisors the most. These problems were the following: the adaptation of new personnel and the

creation of the necessary conditions for the stabilization of the personnel staff; the development of conscious discipline; new forms of socialist competition; the socialist initiative and competence of supervisors of plant subdivisions, etc.

As we can see from this list, these are serious problems and some of them are issues which the Omsk specialists are not capable of "raising" on their own. Scientists from other scientific centers in the nation must be encouraged to come and speak at this meeting.

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RESULTS, PLANS, PROJECTS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 181-186

[Interviews with B. A. Chagin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Professor Kh. N. Momdzhyan, honored scientist of the RSFSR]

[Text] Recently in Leningrad, scientists and representatives of the public heartily congratulated B. A. Chagin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, on his 80th birthday and wished him good health and success in all new creative projects. Festivities were held in Moscow to congratulate Professor Kh. N. Momdzhyan, honored scientist of the RSFSR, on his 70th birthday and his 45 years of work in science, education and social activity. Representatives of the editorial board visited these prominent Soviet scientists and asked them to answer a number of questions about problems in the development of Soviet sociological science and their plans for future projects.

Transcripts of these conversations are published below.

Conversation with B. A. Chagin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences

Question: How do you assess the present and future of sociological science?

Answer: By virtue of its genesis and development, contemporary Marxist sociology, as a synthetic science, is concerned with practical problems of the present and the future. Its field of research takes in a broad spectrum of social relations and human communications. Its historical perspectives, both from the standpoint of foreseeing the future development of society and from the standpoint of actually improving social relations and human communications, are unlimited. The general theoretical and methodological basis of sociological knowledge is historical materialism, which is thereby playing an exceptional role in the investigation of sociological problems of the present day. It was precisely the general sociological theory of

Marxism--historical materialism--that gave rise to the need, it seems to me, for differentiation between several sociological doctrines, which have now acquired the status of relatively independent theories. These are now sometimes called "middle-level sociological theories." As yet, they have not been developed adequately or sufficiently, but they do have a future. We must dispense with the preconceived notion that concrete sociological research must justify the existence of certain sociological theories--for example, ideas about various social structures or such social phenomena as marriage and the family, labor, culture and so forth.

The general sociological theory of Marxism plays a definite role in all of these sociological fields of knowledge and concrete sociological investigations. I would like to point out the fact that the further elaboration of aspects of historical materialism has become extremely important in connection with the development of sociology as a whole, and it must keep up with the current interests of the social sciences. Above all, the further investigation of fundamental aspects of historical materialism is essential. Naturally, research has moved ahead somewhat in this direction in the last two decades. We still do not have any works, however, that are truly all-encompassing. I feel it is important to stress the fact that works on historical materialism should not be "purely methodological" works that are not backed up by theoretical and concrete materials, but works in which the latter represents a solid basis. As yet, concrete sociological research is not being used adequately in the theoretical conclusions of historical materialism.

The fundamental aspects of historical materialism which should be investigated first include, in my opinion, the problem of the socioeconomic structure and its phases (eras), the problem of objective and subjective factors, the problem of public awareness and the question of the forces motivating the historical process.

Question: What are you working on now?

Answer: I am now working on a book called "Struktura i zakonomernosti obshchestvennogo soznaniya" [The Structure and Natural Tendencies of Social Awareness]. This subject is an extremely complex one, requiring the simultaneous investigation of the methodological aspect of research and summarization of factual material from various fields of social knowledge, as well as the use of concrete sociological research.

This year I will take part in compiling a collective monograph entitled "Osnovnyye problemy obshchestvennogo soznaniya pri sotsializme" [Basic Problems in Social Awareness Under Socialism], in which aspects of social psychology, social ideology and spiritual social relations will be analyzed.

Question: Will any new materials from the archives of the G. V. Plekhanov House be published?

Answer: Absolutely. Far from all of the archival materials of the G. V. Plekhanov House have been published, and some of the unpublished papers pertain to aspects of the general sociological theory of Marxism. I would also like to suggest the publication of the interesting comments and notes G. V. Plekhanov made in the margins of books he read on sociology, history and literature. They include many comments on sociological matters.

At an anniversary meeting of the workers of the Public Library imeni Saltykov-Shchedrin and Leningrad VUZ instructors, held in 1978 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the G. V. Plekhanov House in accordance with V. I. Lenin's instructions, the publication of the literary and philosophical heritage of G. V. Plekhanov was proposed. New materials on the general sociological theory of Marxism will be included in these works.

Question: What are your suggestions for the SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA journal?

Answer: It seems to me that SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA has quite quickly become one of the most interesting journals in our nation, closely connected with the sociological community and responding quickly and well to current issues in our life. The section entitled "Thoughts About a New Book" is organized quite well. It seems to me that more attention should be given to the publication of articles on focal issues of historical materialism, as well as the most important results of investigations in connection with middle-level sociological theories. I believe that the editors of the journal should consider the publication of six issues a year.

Conversation with Professor Kh. N. Momdzhyan, honored scientist of the RSFSR

Question: What role does the Soviet Sociological Association (SSA) play in the organization and conduct of sociological research in the USSR and what contribution does it make to the resolution of urgent problems in communist construction?

Answer: First I would like to answer the second part of the question, since the association was founded in 1958, at the time when our nation entered the stage of developed socialism. This was no coincidence. The Marxist-Leninist science of society was always closely connected with the actual revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the actual construction of a socialist society in our nation. This indissoluble connection has always been the most important stimulus for the enrichment and development of the science itself and the augmentation of its role in the establishment of the communist structure.

The social processes connected with the new phase in the development of our nation required theoretical interpretation, and the management of these processes called for scientifically substantiated decisions and recommendations. Due to these circumstances, Soviet social scientists and philosophers began

to take an active interest in sociological research, particularly in connection with the most important and socially significant problems. The first large-scale sociological studies in our nation were conducted by Soviet scientists with the active support and participation of the Sverdlovskaya, Leningrad and Gor'kovskaya CPSU obkoms and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia.

This close cooperation was founded on the exceptionally valuable idea of using research findings directly in social practice and, consequently, of actively bringing this science closer to life and to its daily requirements and problems.

The first positive results stimulated considerable expansion of the geographical scope and organizational base of sociological research. And here we are approaching an answer to the first part of the question.

The Soviet Sociological Association, as a public scientific organization, was present when sociological research was revived in our nation and it became the organizational form for uniting and coordinating the efforts of Soviet sociologists working on projects assigned to science by our party and the Soviet State. This function of the association has become even more evident in our day, now that the dimensions of research projects conducted in the USSR have grown significantly. The association plays an equally important role in elevating the methodological and procedural standards of research, in promoting the exchange of scientific information, in organizing conferences on special topics and coordinating conventions, in popularizing sociological theories and in conducting ideological indoctrination work with the public.

Question: We know that the SSA is working with the Institute of Sociological Research (ISI) of the USSR Academy of Sciences on a proposal concerning the establishment of sociological services in the USSR. Can you tell us what led up to this proposal?

Answer: The time has come to establish a state sociological office in the nation. The basic goals and objectives of this office are essentially quite clear, and they are shared by the majority of Soviet sociologists: To elevate the standards and improve the quality of sociological research and to heighten their scientific effectiveness in accordance with the responsibilities assigned to sociological science by the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

The further successful development of social planning will be primarily connected with a great deal of research, conducted for the purpose of improving social statistics, expanding the sphere of statistics, determining major social normatives and overseeing their fulfillment in all areas of physical production and public life. This means that our science must be equipped with certified personnel--that is, this clearly indicates a need for sociological education in VUZ's. It is obvious that measures of this magnitude can only be carried out with the direct participation of party and

state organs and extensive public involvement. Experience has shown that the effectiveness of social planning depends on stronger and broader party supervision of sociological studies and on the transfer of this kind of research to the statewide level.

Our nation now has a fairly diversified system of research establishments specializing in sociological studies. The USSR Academy of Sciences alone has 40 specialized scientific subdivisions in addition to the head institute--the ISI; besides this, there are around 400 departmental sociological subdivisions and large sociological centers in several regions and republics. The SSA network unites more than 3,000 scientists engaged in empirical research. Institutes and laboratories of sociological research have been established by party organs and are actively functioning under public control. There are numerous associations of plant sociologists. In short, sociology has extremely strong scientific potential. On the other hand, the requirements of state and party organs for various types of sociological information are still not being fully satisfied. In other words, the scientific potential of sociology could be used more effectively. This inconsistency is largely due to purely organizational factors.

The present concerns of sociological science and their comprehensive nature are not always within the capabilities of even large sociological subdivisions. For this reason, scientists sometimes have to limit their studies to specific matters. There is no question that this diminishes their value, makes them less representative and restricts the possibilities for the practical use of research findings.

Besides this, there is unnecessary duplication of research projects in different parts of the nation, with no consideration for their social features. As a result, research papers are often of a trivial nature, and it is only with the aid of mathematical formulas and special terminology that they acquire a scientific appearance. All of this tends to undermine the public's faith in science, it leads to unnecessary expenditures of efforts and means and it diminishes the quality of work.

Another negative feature is that the data of many studies conducted in our nation do not lend themselves to comparison, even when the subject matter of these studies is the same, due to the different procedures employed in conducting research projects.

The methodological and technical tools of sociological research constitute an equally important problem. Here it is important to ensure that everything of value or deserving of consideration becomes accessible to the entire sociological community and that the transmission of information be centralized.

The experience of communist construction and our party are demanding that Soviet scientists increase the effectiveness of sociological research and study problems of vital importance to the developed socialist society in greater depth. During his recent tour of Siberia and the Far East, L. I. Brezhnev "pointed out the need for the close coordination of...decisions on production and social matters."¹

These objectives can only be attained if scientists concentrate on major areas of research and topics. The attempts that were made to solve this problem with the aid of coordinating conventions and several other measures were not effective enough. This is why we feel that there is now an urgent need for a state sociological office.

Question: How does the future look for a sociological service in our nation?

Answer: At present, it is probably too early to speak of any particular forms and features of the sociological service, since all proposals are still at the stage of calculations and estimates. First we must consider at least simple cooperation by Soviet sociologists, the quantitative unification of efforts, which will make it possible to address some of the currently unsolved problems of statewide importance and conduct unionwide representative studies based on a single program.

From the organizational standpoint, the service is seen as a system consisting of a scientific center and several subordinate regional branches which will be responsible for all day-to-day research coordinating and administrative work, as well as a periodically convened coordinating council, made up of representatives of the central division and its regional branches, who will make decisions on research projects, ratify plans, approve research methods and procedures, solve problems in organization and financing, etc.

There are differences of opinion in regard to the organizational forms of sociological service. Obviously, the activities of the future service agency should be carried out by the USSR Academy of Sciences in close cooperation with Gosplan, the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, the USSR Central Statistical Administration, the AUCCTU and the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. The forms and methods of this cooperation still require clarification.

Naturally, we have only touched upon the most general ideas about the sociological service; the structure of the organization and the principles governing its activity will be defined more concretely later, after all comments and recommendations have been considered. It should be stressed, however, that the establishment of a sociological service will aid in considerably heightening the effectiveness of sociological science and increasing its contribution to the construction of a communist society in our nation.

Question: You were an active participant in the work of the Ninth World Sociological Congress in Sweden and you were elected to the Executive Committee of the International Sociological Association. What can you say about the present and future of the SSA's international cooperation? What were your impressions of the congress?

Answer: The international ties of the SSA and its activities in ISA agencies constitute an important area of our work. Priority is now being given to the coordination of scientific research with the socialist countries within

the framework of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Working with their Polish colleagues, Soviet scientists have already compiled and published such fundamental works as "Problems in the Development of the Social Structure of Society in the Soviet Union and Poland" and "Individual Activity in the Socialist Society." Productive scientific contacts are constantly maintained with sociologists in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR and the CSSR, and effective cooperation is being established with representatives of the developing scientific community of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In recent years, the task force created to study "The Evolution of the Social Structure of Socialist Society" has been working more intensively; one of its objectives is to compile a collective work entitled "The History of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in the Socialist Countries of Europe After World War II."

Priority is also being given to the objectives of ideological struggle against various bourgeois sociological theories and propaganda of the achievements of the Marxist-Leninist social sciences in general and sociology in particular. Ideological confrontation with our ideological opponents does not exclude the possibility of participation by Soviet scientists in several international comparison studies. This cooperation is one of the factors contributing to peaceful coexistence and pursues the same noble goals as the joint projects being conducted by our scientists and foreign researchers in the natural sciences. The resolution of several scientific problems and practical issues, however, does not in any sense diminish the strength of our vigorously offensive position in the ideological struggle and in the exposure of bourgeois and revisionist theories.

This was reflected in the debates that took place at the Ninth World Sociological Congress. Through the energetic efforts of more than 300 representatives of Marxist sociology, several theories set forth by bourgeois researchers were cogently refuted. This applied to the criticism of the pluralistic interpretation of Marxist theory, attempts to cast doubts on the historical achievements of real socialism, the false idea of social development by means of some kind of "third" (neither socialist nor capitalist) course, etc.

Fierce ideological struggle and the confrontation of opposing views, it seems to me, do not exclude the possibility of collective discussion. Moreover, the Marxists feel that debates of this kind are necessary and useful, since they provide an opportunity to publicly prove the futility of bourgeois social concepts.

Question: What do you plan to work on next?

Answer: I think I have good reason to be satisfied with the results of my work in 1977 and 1978. During that time, I edited and wrote parts of such works as "Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskaya formatsiya--problemy teorii" [The Socioeconomic Structure--Problems in Theory] and "Dialektika obshchego i osobennogo v istoricheskom protsesse" [The Dialectics of the General and Particular in the Historical Process]. During this same period, my monograph "Pol' Lafarg i filosofiya marksizma" [Paul Lafargue and the Philosophy of Marxism] was published, and my book "Fazy istorii" [Historical Phases],

written at the request of the Progress Publishing House, is now being readied for publication.

For many years I studied the history of French materialism and atheism of the 18th century. Soon the "Selected Works of Fontenelle" which I edited and prefaced, will be published.

I am still collaborating with Politizdat. I am now working on a book entitled "Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya i zakonomernyy khod istorii" [The October Revolution and the Natural Course of History], in which I plan to analyze the main works of bourgeois literature pertaining to the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In these publications, our ideological opponents set forth their theories about the "accidental" or the "uniquely Russian" nature of the revolution, they try to depict the Great October Revolution as a "peasant uprising" and so forth. It is my responsibility to prove that these attempts to cast doubts on the worldwide significance of the socialist revolution in our country are absurd and unscientific.

I am also quite intrigued with the idea of writing a little book for secondary school upperclassmen to answer the question "What Is Philosophy?" I feel obliged to do this for the younger generation.

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THOUGHTS ABOUT NEW BOOKS

STUDY OF THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 187-194

[Article by Fridrikh Rafailovich Filippov, doctor of philosophical sciences,
professor and head of the department for the study of the social structure
of Soviet society]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

JOURNAL OF HUNGARIAN SOCIOLOGISTS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 195-201

[Article by F. E. Sheregi]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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HIGHER EDUCATION AS A FACTOR OF CHANGE IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE DEVELOPED SOCIALIST SOCIETY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 201-203

[Review by V. T. Lisovskiy of the book "Vysshaya shkola kak faktor izmeneniya sotsial'noy struktury razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva," edited by M. N. Rutkevich and F. R. Filippov, Moscow, Nauka, 1978, 270 pages]

[Text] The processes involved in the evolution of the social structure of the developed socialist society are complex and diverse. In addition to the decisive influence of socioeconomic factors, they have also been increasingly affected by factors of another nature, among which the educational system plays an important role. The truly socialist democracy of this system, its broad accessibility to youth of all classes and social groups in the Soviet society, and the compulsory nature of universal secondary education, as stipulated in the new Constitution of the USSR, are all considerably augmenting the possibilities for planned and scientifically substantiated management of the development of the social structure with the aid of the public education and vocational training system.

Sociological research into problems in education, including higher education, has been going on in our nation for a long time and has acquired broad scope. Scientific groups and large scientific schools have been formed to systematically conduct this kind of research and summarize its results. In particular, we could mention the research that has been conducted in the cities of Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk, in the Bashkir ASSR, the Ukraine and Estonia and in Leningrad and Moscow.

Until the publication of the collective monograph that is the subject of this review, however, our sociological literature and sociological research had never produced a work of such tremendous scope. The authors of this work and the participants in the studies it summarizes, who include not only specialists in sociology, but also hundreds of teachers, VUZ instructors, Komsomol workers and other volunteers assisting in this work, managed to successfully conduct an extensive interregional study, which could, with some justification, be called unionwide. It encompassed six large and

fairly typical regions in the nation: Moscow and Moscow Oblast, Novosibirskaya and Sverdlovskaya oblasts, Krasnodarskiy Kray, Odesskaya Oblast in the Ukraine, the Estonian SSR and (in accordance with a limited program) Voronezhskaya Oblast. A tremendous amount of statistical information was analyzed and around 47,000 persons were surveyed--first- eighth- and tenth-grade students and VUZ freshmen and seniors.

The result was a detailed picture of the interaction of the social structure of the Soviet society and the changes taking place in this structure, on one side, with the system of education (mainly the higher school), on the other. The general tendencies of this interaction were also investigated. In this connection, the first and second chapters of the book are of particular interest. They examine tendencies in the development of the social structure of the Soviet society and related changes in the intelligentsia and the role of the educational system in overcoming social differences in our nation. The authors study the social composition of pupils on various levels of education and analyze the concrete quantitative indicators of the increasing convergence of classes and social groups in the Soviet society and the progression of this society in the direction of total social homogeneity. All of this indicates that the social composition in the sphere of general education (in grammar and secondary schools) is essentially the same as the social composition of the population, and there are almost no substantial differences in the orientation and ambitions of students belonging to different social groups. In connection with this, the question of the correlation of social and professional ambitions and values is of great theoretical and practical significance, and there is an interesting discussion of this in the introduction to the book.

The research findings concerning the changes that have taken place in young people's higher education ambitions in the last decade are also extremely important. The reduced competition for student slots in the higher school, which has been noticeable throughout the nation, is explained in detail in the book, providing an understanding of this tendency in connection with changes in the nature and content of the labor of workers and kolkhoz members, the improvement of their working conditions, the rise in their wages and the development of the system of vocational and technical education, particularly the secondary vocational and technical institutes. The authors skillfully compare the results of their research with the results of several student polls conducted in the same region (particularly in Sverdlovskaya Oblast) in previous years. This allows them to derive a picture of the changes in the ambitions of youth in the last 10 years.

Most of the book is taken up by an analysis of changes in the social composition of student youth and in their socioprofessional plans and values. Graphically demonstrating a tendency toward constant convergence between the social composition of the students of VUZ day divisions and the social composition of the population, the authors also reveal the internal dialectical contradiction in this tendency, engendered by the more general contradiction between the eradication of social differences in the developed socialist society and their relative reproduction. In the sphere of higher education this contradiction is apparent, on the one hand, in the rising

percentage of persons from the working class and kolkhoz peasantry in the student body and, on the other, in the preservation of significant differences between urban and rural youths and between the children of workers engaged in mental and physical labor, including differences in their actual level of knowledge and preparedness for the VUZ, as well as differences in the social composition of these students and their subjective characteristics between VUZ's specializing in various fields.

The authors of the book thoroughly examine many of the characteristic features of the Soviet student's way of life, including his housing conditions, source of income and so forth, although the student way of life is not immediately related to the topic of this research. It is also extremely significant, in our opinion, that this study indicated the considerable degree to which the student body is affected by differences between various segments of the intelligentsia. Naturally, these differences do not negate the internal unity of the Soviet people's intelligentsia: "All of its numerous segments, which are so diverse in terms of professional interests and so united in service to the people, are donating their energy and knowledge to the cause of the construction of a new society."¹ Nonetheless, these differences must be taken into account, not only in any investigation of the intelligentsia, but also, as the materials of this study indicate, in an investigation of the student body--its young future members.

The authors' analysis of the ambitions and values of students is profound and thorough. It should be noted that the methods of factor analysis are used quite skillfully in this part of the book, correlation graphs are constructed to demonstrate the interaction of different value indicators, detailed diagrams are presented and so forth. This attests to the high professional level of the researchers.

The "supplementary materials," with which the section describing the methods of this research begins, are also of great interest. Unfortunately, the research tools used by the authors are not described here.

Two other sections of this appendix also deserve special mention: "The Placement and Advancement of Young Specialists" and "The Social Sources Supplementing the Intelligentsia in the Socialist Countries of Europe." At first glance, neither would seem to be connected with the research project in question: The first of these is based on the results of a survey of young specialists in several scientific research institutes in Moscow and Voronezh, and the second is based on an analysis of statistics from the countries of the socialist community (Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia). A closer look at these materials, however, conclusively demonstrates that they give the book the nature of an integral and complete work, and that they are organically related to the main research project by the common theoretical positions of the authors. The first of these sections amplifies, as it were, an idea expressed in the main part of the book--that

1. Kosygin, A. N. "Tvorcheskaya sila velikikh velikikh idey Oktyabrya" [The Creative Strength of the Great Ideals of October], Moscow, 1978, p 9.

the differences between segments of the intelligentsia are "perpetuated" in the system of higher education. The authors demonstrate the degree to which the type of higher education acquired influences not only the initial placement of specialists in various spheres of mental labor, but also their subsequent advancement. The second section provides a clear picture of the general tendencies in the development of new groups to supplement the intelligentsia in the socialist countries and some of the peculiarities of this process in each of these nations. These materials attest to the development of integration processes not only in the economy, but also in the social structure of the fraternal countries and in the social functions of their educational system.

Despite all of the merits listed above, the book being reviewed also has several shortcomings, many of which are due to the fact that, as we have already pointed out, this is the first time a research project of this scope has been attempted in our nation. First of all, a few words should be said about the sample group. Naturally, it was not and, in this case, could not have been a unionwide, representative group. We feel, however, that it should have been representative in some respects. There was no basis for comparing the data of some tables, even when these pertain to regions included in the sample group. For example, the career plans of eighth-graders (Table 27) were examined without the use of data on Estonia and Novosibirsk, the plans of tenth-graders (Table 28) did not include data for Novosibirsk, and the plans of VUZ freshmen were considered without any statistics for Krasnodar (Table 49 and others). These are obvious defects in the organization of the research.

Another shortcoming is repeatedly pointed out by the authors themselves. The study did not follow the same group through different stages of general and specialized education, but was conducted all at once with a "cross-section," which naturally did not provide for the precise determination of the dynamics of these processes. The authors are fully aware of this and, for this reason, they are fairly cautious in drawing some of their conclusions.

It should also be mentioned that there was a fairly long interval between the time when the study was conducted in 1973-1974 and the time when the book was published. Even if we consider the fact that it took a certain amount of time to process the initial information obtained and to write the book (including the editing of the manuscript), it still seems that the publication was delayed considerably. This is hardly something we can blame the authors for, but it must be mentioned in view of the length of time required to compile and publish the results of sociological studies.

We could also make several specific comments about this book: In some parts the language is too complex, and there are repetitions, excessively long explanations, stylistic errors, typographical errors in the tables, etc.

These isolated comments, however, should not cause us to lose sight of the main thing--the substantial contribution made by this book to Marxist-Leninist sociology. The organic combination of theoretical analysis with the analysis of empirical research findings in the book can be regarded as a model. The book demonstrates the great potential of Marxist-Leninist sociology for the study of complex and multifaceted social processes.

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SOCIOLOGY IN THE USSR, 1965-1975

**Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 204-205**

**[Review by V. S. Kruzhkov and Ye. B. Stolbun of the book "Sotsiologiya v
SSSR. 1965-1975" by G. V. Osipov and M. N. Rutkevich]**

[Not translated by JPRS]

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CATEGORIZATION, CORRELATION, PATTERN RECOGNITION. STATISTICAL METHODS FOR
CLASSIFICATION AND MODIFICATION OF RELATIONSHIPS

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 206-207

[Review by V. G. Andreyenkov of the book "Gruppirovka, korrelyatsiya,
raspoznavaniye obrazov. Statisticheskiye metody klassifikatsii i izmeneniya
svyazey" by I. I. Yeliseyeva and V. O. Rukavishnikov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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LAW AND BEHAVIOR

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 207-210

[Review by A. I. Dolgova and M. M. Babayev of the book "Pravo i povedeniye" by V. N. Kudryavtsev, Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1978, 190 pages]

[Text] Each new work by corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences V. N. Kudryavtsev attracts the attention of a broad spectrum of readers: legal experts, philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and other social scientists. One of the author's indisputable merits is his considerable contribution to the "sociologization" of the juridical science and his study of widespread social phenomena and processes from a legal standpoint. The book being reviewed is the latest in a series of works about the regulating role of the law and the interaction of law with human behavior and social relations. It distinguishes between three theoretically and practically significant groups of problems: the ways and means by which the legal superstructure influences human behavior; the actual possibility of influencing human actions with the aid of the law; predictions and tendencies in connection with the legal regulation of the behavior of citizens. These problems acquire particular significance when the legal bases of state and public life are reinforced and the sphere of legal regulation is expanded.

The theoretical suppositions with which the author begins his study are of methodological importance: The subject of legal theory and the practice of legal regulation is not just any type of human activity, but only activity that is, in the first place, socially significant and, in the second place, expressed in the form of concrete actions (physical or verbal). The inevitable logical result of any other approach is "mind control," legal recognition of the "danger" of certain thoughts and the use of governmental coercion. This has been demonstrated by all of the practices of antihumanitarian, reactionary regimes.

Kudryavtsev points out the complexity of the principles governing the influence of law and the need to guarantee the effective functioning of all elements of the legal superstructure: legal norms, a sense of justice, legal relations and legal institutions. The legal superstructure--and it is important to take this into account in social practice--influences the

thoughts and behavior of individuals and groups both directly (affecting their interests and goals, behavioral stereotypes, etc.) and indirectly, through the legal organization of social life as a whole, including influence "through the actions of other individuals and institutions, thereby establishing the necessary conditions and prerequisites for correct behavior" (p 71). The author neither absolutizes nor exaggerates the role of the law--it is examined in the context of all social relations. Difficulties arise, however, from the lack of correspondence between the legal system and the system of social relations. V. N. Kudryavtsev believes that there are many reasons for this. First of all, he says that "not all social relations require legal regulation to the same extent and some do not require it at all" (p 62). We should add that not all social relations lend themselves to effective legal control. The author sees a second reason in the lack of correspondence between the specific content of human activity and the sphere of social relations in which it takes place, and a third in the fact that the differentiation between various branches of the law is based on the subject as well as the method of legal regulation.

An examination of the genesis of human behavior through the prism of the law demonstrates the complexity of the process by which human behavior is socially regulated, particularly from the judicial standpoint.

A large portion of the book is devoted to an analysis of the axiological and informational aspects of the law. "The informational aspect of the legal regulation of behavior...is connected primarily with the cognitive side of human activity, with the acquisition of new knowledge and with the intellectual processes of the mind. The axiological (evaluating) aspect presupposes the focusing of influence on the individual's convictions, his philosophical views and attitudes, his feelings and emotions" (p 97). Unfortunately, the interaction of these two aspects is not always taken fully into consideration in the work, and this causes the author to make some inconsistent statements about the role played by the legal awareness of citizens in the genesis of criminal behavior. After citing the data of studies indicating that legal offenders are more aware of criminal law, the author draws the following conclusion: "Criminal and other offenders are aware of some legal requirements not because they have a better knowledge of legislation in general, but simply because these requirements coincide with general moral principles" (p 76). It is certainly true that many articles of criminal law reflect the "elementary" moral standards of behavior which are learned in early childhood. But the law does not simply stipulate standards of behavior, but also the rules of their application in specific situations. Legal awareness is therefore not only the knowledge of individual prohibitions, but also an understanding of the values and interests placed above all others by the state. Even when the axiological features of the law are not internally assimilated by an individual, a clear understanding of them, as well as of the consequences of legal offenses, can keep the individual from committing a crime.

The "self-evident" nature of the majority of prohibitions in criminal law, which is quite correctly pointed out by the author, unfortunately does not always exempt individuals from the complexities which arise in real life.

In this connection, it would seem more productive to examine criminal behavior not from the standpoint of individual elements of the sense of justice and legal standards, but from the standpoint of the comprehensive interaction, interconnection and interdependence of various elements--knowledge, attitudes, requirements and so forth. This does not mean that we cannot recognize the accuracy of the author's general assessment of the informational and axiological aspects of the law and, in particular, his belief that the second of these aspects could be regarded as a higher form of social control than the first.

The social values reflected and reinforced in the law, V. N. Kudryavtsev justifiably feels, exert considerable indoctrinating influence by developing the proper demands, values and legal attitudes in the individual and cause him to choose the most socially acceptable variant of behavior. Above all, this applies to such social values as socialist democracy, equality, justice, freedom and responsibility. The author presents a detailed description of the way in which these ideas and principles, reinforced in legal norms, influence the behavior of citizens and groups. The means of this influence differ depending on which particular elements of the legal superstructure are used to implement these principles--legislative norms determining the legal status of the individual, legal relations or the activities of law enforcement agencies. In view of the fact that "most of the motives for human action are independent of the effects of the law" (p 33), the author concludes that legal norms influence the choice of behavioral alternatives more than motivation. This points up the importance, in particular, of finding a better comprehensive approach to personality development and guaranteeing the optimal impact of various social regulators, as well as various means of legal regulation.

The question of restricting forms of individual and group behavior with the aid of (or by means of) legal norms is of fundamental importance from the sociological standpoint and in the practical sense. Kudryavtsev presents concrete examples to cogently demonstrate the essential incompatibility of socialist democracy with the slogan of "unrestricted freedom" and proves the scientific groundlessness and social falsity of this anarchic slogan which is contrary to the very idea of the normal organization of life in any civilized society.

By its very nature, the law is expected to establish the necessary limits without which democracy would be unthinkable, particularly the highest form of democracy--socialist democracy. Naturally, the role of the law is not in any sense restricted to the mere prohibition of socially dangerous and criminal behavior. Article 39 of the Constitution of the USSR states: "The exercise of rights and freedoms by citizens must not harm the interests of society and the state or infringe upon the rights of other citizens." Kudryavtsev cites convincing examples of the way in which this statute is consistently implemented in various branches of our legislation and how reliably it serves to stimulate such forms of behavior that work toward the good of society and of each specific individual. He stresses that any legal norm offers a choice of alternative types of behavior, limiting this choice to socially useful types.

The essence and nature of the law would be distorted if its organizational role were reduced to nothing more than "enlightenment." By confirming and implementing the values of the socialist way of life, the law not only calls for a certain type of behavior, but even requires it.

The author's views appear to be well-grounded in his discussion of the major social and legal category--responsibility--primarily as the social, moral and legal duty of the citizen. In declaring the principle of responsibility, the law essentially stipulates the need (duty) to make behavioral decisions which will take not only the interests of the particular individual into account, but also the interests of other individuals, groups, classes and society as a whole. Here the idea of responsibility is organically interconnected with the ideas of justice, humanism and truth, as they are reflected in the law, and thereby becomes a more comprehensive principle governing the motivating significance of the law.

The reader of this monograph will find profound statements concerning the essence and content of legal standards as an element of the socialist culture as a whole.

A separate chapter deals with a specific feature of the law--its compulsory nature. Supplementing the informational and value aspects of the law, its compulsory nature influences not only the intellect and the emotions, but also the will of the individual. This chapter justifiably points out the causes of defects in the influence of legal norms on behavior, when one of these three components "does not work" due to the effects of certain circumstances of a subjective nature. The author reveals the internal processes which lead to unlawful and socially harmful actions in certain situations.

In his discussion of the prospects and tendencies of legal development, the author remarks that the consistent advancement of socialist society is resulting in the continuous improvement of methods and means of state-legal influence on the behavior of citizens and groups. But this is not the result of expansion of the sphere of governmental coercion. One of the main tendencies in this field is related to the accelerated development of norms which permit, authorize and obligate rather than norms which prohibit and, consequently, to the expansion of the positive judicial consequences of behavior at the expense of negative consequences.

All of this allows Kudryavtsev to approach an understanding of the judicial policy of the socialist democratic state, examine its structure and content and describe the strategic means and practical ways of implementing the concepts of judicial policy.

Kudryavtsev's book will be of great significance in the further development of theory in the most diverse branches of the law. In addition, many of the statements the author makes could serve as an excellent theoretical basis for the development of more profound practical ideas concerning the causes and mechanisms of positive and unlawful behavior, and for the study and further, more effective use of legal regulators of human behavior in the interests of society and the individual.

EVERYDAY CONSUMER NEEDS IN THE SOCIALIST SOCIETY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 210-211

[Review by I. V. Fedorov of the book "Byt pri sotsializme" by Ye. M. Zuykova, Moscow, MGU, 1977, 240 pages]

[Text] We will not be so bold as to try to evaluate Ye. M. Zuykova's book as a whole, since much of the work pertains to the area of expertise of specialists in scientific communism. It seems to us, however, that the opinions of a sociologist, even if they are set forth in the form of isolated comments and explanations, will be useful to the author and her readers.

First of all, it should be noted that Ye. M. Zuykova limits her examination to only the material side of everyday life, defining it as the "area of social relations in which the organization of food production, personal hygiene, consumption and services take place" (p 3), and sees the basis of its content in the methods and forms of consumption and services and the organization of the production of consumer goods themselves (pp 17-18). But in this event, due to the broad interpretation of the term "organization of food production" and "organization of the production of consumer goods themselves," the sphere for satisfying personal demands would include not only public consumer services and trade, but also light industries, the food industry and some branches of agriculture. It should also be pointed out that the term "consumption" is not used specifically enough.

The author's criticism of some of the working definitions of everyday life used by other authors is not adequately substantiated in the work. Moreover, Ye. M. Zuykova distorts the statement made by L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov about the "coordination" of consumer needs with leisure time; they were referring to a gradual change in the structure of time schedules and the reorganization of these schedules, and not in any sense to the equation, not to mention the complete replacement, of time expenditures on consumer needs with leisure time.

The work also contains internal contradictions. Zuykova's supposition that the economic function of the family is no longer an objective necessity and has only continued to exist due to the poor organization of public consumer services, the inefficient distribution of resources and shortcomings in the operations of service establishments, does not agree with her other statement that the widespread introduction of socialist forms of consumer services and the development of consumer goods production for the purpose of simplifying housework, set forth as an objective at the 25th CPSU Congress, are only temporary measures which will not solve the problem of collectivizing everyday life (p 87).

There is oversimplification in the discussion of the need to establish the necessary conditions for the more total involvement of the individual (particularly women) in national production and for the spiritual development of the individual. For example, the author implies that if society's expenditures on the education of boys and girls are the same, then society can expect an equivalent return from both (p 136). But when V. I. Lenin spoke of the equality of men and women, he said that this did not mean that the woman should be expected to be equally productive, perform the same amount of labor, put in a working day of the same length, have equal working conditions and so forth, but that the woman should not be oppressed by a status inferior to that of men.¹

In her examination of rural households, Ye. M. Zuykova discusses only the kolhoz peasantry and does not even mention sovkhos workers. The criterion chosen for the classification of households--according to the possibility for transferring to collective forms of public consumption--is inconclusive. The author's own categorization of households will not stand up to any kind of criticism: households with subsidiary plots, livestock and poultry, those which procure agricultural products; those with a special worker for the performance of domestic services; and, finally, households in which these domestic tasks are performed to varying degrees by all members of the family (pp 119-120). The author's conclusion as to the need to transfer "to the collective organization of domestic services for the urban household, particularly the three latter categories," is far from indisputable (p 120).

The procedural level of the sociological research tools mentioned in the appendix is quite low (pp 228-239). This was apparently the main reason for the negligible amount of purely empirical material in the book. The questionnaire used in the study consisted mainly of open questions of a general type; the list of family members includes father, mother, brothers and sisters, but no wives and husbands (unless we count the category of "other family members"). The age groups used by the author are quite arbitrary: from 1 to 3 years, from 3 to 7, from 7 to 14, from 14 to 18, from 18 to 27, from 27 to 35, from 35 to 60, and over 60. The question about the monthly family budget is improperly stated, as it does not specify the particular month for which wages should be calculated (besides this, wages do not constitute total family income). The question about monthly family

1. See V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 201.

expenditures is difficult to answer (the month during which purchases are made is not specified, and furniture purchases should be calculated as part of the annual, and not the monthly, budget). It is doubtful that any kind of single survey could produce valid information (for example, in regard to "how much free time does each family member have each day?").

The diary and personal description also deserve some criticism. The author asks the same things 7 times for each day of the week, mainly in the form of open questions like "What is each member of the family doing?"

The author does not even consider such important issues as the convenience of modern housing for a family (she is only interested in designs for the future), the effects of work schedules on family life, the offer of part-time jobs to working mothers and many problems connected with the raising of children (the author favors upbringing that is totally controlled by the state), even though the current importance of these problems is directly connected with the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress.

The reader will also find a number of methodological and logical errors in the work, places where the author contradicts herself and frequent occasions on which she draws incorrect conclusions or makes unrealistic suggestions. We have only mentioned a few of them in this review.

In our opinion, Ye. M. Zuykova became too absorbed in an analysis of existing shortcomings in everyday life in the socialist society and in a search for qualitatively new forms of consumer service organization, frequently in isolation from the objective realities of the present day. This has made it difficult for the author, despite the great amount of work it has taken to collect and analyze the scientific material, to take a comprehensive approach to the subject, which considerably lowers the scientific level of the work. This book, at least from the sociological standpoint, could have been written much better.

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DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIALIST SOCIETY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79, pp 211-213

[Review by I. A. Blokhin of the book "Demograficheskiye protsessy i sotsial'naya struktura sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva" by G. A. Slesarev, Moscow, Nauka, 1978, 222 pages]

[Text] This work contains a comprehensive analysis of demographic processes in their indissoluble connection with changes in the social structure of the socialist society, and a description of the factors contributing to the process of social reproduction. In doing this, the author contributes to the further amplification of the Marxist-Leninist theory of population distribution and the theory of the social structure. From the practical standpoint, this approach is a productive one in improving the forecasting, planning and control of these processes and in elaborating social indicators.

The book contains convincing proof of the need to elaborate a sociological theory of population--a new field in the group sciences studying human population distribution, which indicates the specific tendencies in population patterns within the framework of a concrete historical structure and the various relationships and connections between social (in the broad sense) and sociodemographic structures. Proceeding from the belief that sociodemographic processes can neither be explained nor revealed unless they are viewed in the intricate context of social processes and relations, the author defines the position occupied by the sociology of human population in the total system of demographic knowledge and reveals the general and particular aspects of the approach of demography and sociology to the study of population distribution.

As G. A. Slesarev correctly points out, "in scientific practice, sociodemographic and social class processes are frequently examined separately, independent of one another" (p 5). The work being reviewed fills this gap to a considerable extent: The author makes an attempt to examine demographic processes from the standpoint of the way in which they are decisively influenced by the division of society into classes, social groups and strata. It is precisely from the standpoint of a class approach to the analysis of sociodemographic phenomena that the author thoroughly criticizes bourgeois sociological theories of population patterns.

Analyzing the interrelationship between sociodemographic and social class processes, the author demonstrates that population reproduction and the reproduction of the class structure represent a single and integral process by which social life and social relations are reproduced. In the system of social relations, population reproduction guarantees the continuous existence of society and the reproduction of its social structure. "The reproduction of the social structure of the socialist society," the monograph states, "cannot be reduced only to the reproduction of the population and its distribution among social classes.... This is also a process by which people enter an independent life as citizens and become members of the developed socialist society.... The objective side of this process consists in the development of the productive forces of society and socialist production relations, changes in the social structure of society, and the convergence of classes, social groups and strata in the direction of total social homogeneity" (p 11). This broad definition of the topic has made it possible for the author to consistently examine problems in the quantitative and qualitative growth of human population under the influence of socioeconomic factors, the social causes and means of the augmentation of classes and social groups and problems in the management of demographic processes and the definition of social indicators, to determine the characteristics of classes and sociodemographic groups (youth, women, pensioners) and to study the role of the family in the reproduction of the population and the social structure of the socialist society.

There is no question that the reader's attention will be attracted by the author's system of classifying social factors affecting demographic processes. Along with more general categories, he distinguishes between two large groups of objective factors with considerable influence on the development of population patterns: 1) factors connected with the demographic structure of the population and sociohygienic conditions; 2) factors connected with the social structure of the population in the broad sense. In combination with objective factors, factors of a subjective nature are also set forth in the book (the sociopsychological aims of the demographic behavior of various social groups; the influence of public opinion, the mass media and special demographic propaganda on the modification of demographic behavioral models; state demographic policy, which is aimed at the optimization of population reproduction processes in the interests of socialist society and each of its members). The subjective factors play an equally important role in the regulation of demographic processes.

In our opinion, the system proposed by G. A. Slesarev for the regulation of demographic processes in the Soviet socialist society appears quite promising.

A large part of the work is taken up by an examination of the demographic aspects of the reproduction and improvement of the social structure of Soviet society, including problems in the reproduction and development of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, the intelligentsia and the employee category. The author's arguments provide us with new evidence of the accuracy of ideas substantiated earlier by M. T. Iovchuk, M. N. Rutkevich, L. N. Kogan, V. I. Staroverov and other sociologists in regard to the existence of a worker intelligentsia and a peasant intelligentsia.

The author does not limit himself to an examination of the processes by which classes and social groups converge in the production sphere. He also demonstrates how these processes affect the modification of family and marital relations and the social class composition of the family. He uses sociological research data as a basis for the important conclusion that "the processes by which social classes and ethnic groups converge in the sphere of family and home life are a reflection of the more general processes by which socialist society is moving in the direction of social homogeneity and the Soviet population is evolving as a new historical human community" (p 189).

In reference to the shortcomings of the monograph, it should be noted that the author, unfortunately, limits himself in the first (methodological) chapter only to an analysis of some of the basic theoretical premises of K. Marx and F. Engels and does not provide the reader with even a brief survey of sociological literature and party congress documents pertaining to the issues he is considering in this book. It is true that the names of several demographers who have played an important part in the establishment and development of Soviet demography are mentioned in the introduction. But this is not enough.

It would have been better to substantiate the sociological aspect of demographic problems in the methodological section rather than the introduction to the work. In our opinion, the author should have analyzed not only the theoretical views of certain scientists in the USSR and the other socialist countries in regard to the optimization of demographic policy, but also the practical steps taken in this direction in several of these countries.

On the whole, however, there is no question that G. A. Slesarev's monograph will make a definite contribution--and, in several respects, an extremely significant one--to the study of the interconnection between demographic processes and the social structure of society under socialism.

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BRIEF COMMENTS ON BOOKS

LIVING CONDITIONS AND THE AGED

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
p 214

[Review by A. V. Dmitriyev of the book "Usloviya zhizni i pozhiloy chelovek"]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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SECONDARY SCHOOL GRADUATE (EXPERIMENT IN COMPARATIVE SOCIOPEDAGOGICAL RESEARCH)

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 214-215

[Review by Ye. Ye. Levanov of the book "Vypusknik sredney shkoly (opyt sravnitel'nykh sotsial'no-pedagogicheskikh issledovaniy)" by L. G. Gurova]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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SOCIAL PLANNING (SOME METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS)

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 215-216

[Review by G. N. Sokolova of the book "Sotsial'noye planirovaniye
(nekotoryye metodologicheskiye aspekty)" by G. A. Antonyuk]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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PROCEEDINGS OF SIXTH ALL-UNION COMPETITION OF YOUNG SCIENTISTS AND
SPECIALISTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
pp 216-217

[Not translated by JPRS]

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VALENTIN GEORGIYEVICH PODMARKOV

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 2, Apr-May-Jun 79
p 218

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